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INTRODUCTION
HEIDEGGER’S “ENORMITY” AND THE QUESTION OF BEING
§ 1. The sense o f the relation between philosophy and science
a) The Greek beginning of thought
In a brief text written in 1974 entitled L ’«énormité» de Heidegger 
[Heidegger’s «enormity»], Jean Beaufret, a disciple and a friend of his for thirty years 
and the addressee of the renowned Humanismusbrief [Letter on Humanism] (1946), 
writes: “We can say that the difference between Heidegger and any other philosopher is 
that philosophy for him is neither a universal problem nor the result of a disposition 
which would make part of man’s nature in general, but merely a Greek peculiarity. To 
be a philosopher means in some way to become Greek again. The whole history of 
philosophy is just an endless variation on the Greeks’ theme, which is the theme o f  
Being itself” .1
To highlight right from the start the dimension from which Heidegger’s 
meditation takes place -  the Greek beginning of philosophy - , has the object to single 
out the theme on which the analyses carried out during our research are based: the 
question of Being, as the question from which philosophy originates and which is the 
foundation of its whole history. Under this perspective, the originality Beaufret refers 
to, makes the incipit of Heidegger’s first decisive work Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] 
(1927) with a quotation from Plato’s Sophist (244 a) more comprehensible and 
significant: “...For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you 
use the expression «being». We, however, who used to think we understood it, have 
become perplexed [have fallen into aporia]” (BT 19). As reminded by Gino Zaccaria, 
the editor of the Italian edition of Heidegger’s Politische Schriften [Political writings], 
Plato’s quotation starts, in fact, “with three dots, almost as to point out the fact that we
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are going to face a question [...] which has been kept pending for a long time, namely a 
debate which, in a hidden way, is still going on and which brings us straight back to the 
Greek beginning of thought”.2
But: from what humanity’s spiritual condition can we start perceiving the 
possibility of discovering the background theme of the Greek beginning of thought? 
Better: how about today -  namely, the Modern Times, also called “the age of science 
and technology” -  the aporetic state Plato himself refers to? Only a careful analysis of 
the decision that the modern world has assumed with regard to the sense of Being will 
be able to highlight the nature and the extent of that historical phenomenon the Greek 
world has been for European-Western thought, as the dimension in which Being itself, 
according to Beaufret, “starts to talk” (p. 162) to man -  in particular, to thinkers and, in 
a different way, to poets -  in its initial language: Greek.
b) The main consequence of the “return to the Greeks”: 
putting into question the positivistic interpretation of the world
Let us refer, once more, to Beaufret’s text with which we started our 
introduction, and remember that it originates from a conversation with Roger-Pol Droit, 
which appeared on Le Monde on 27 September 1974. To the question asking what the 
main consequence of the “return to the Greeks” is -  question which follows in a few 
lines our quotation -  Beaufret answers: “To get straight to the core, I think that 
Heidegger’s «enormity» in our epoch consists in the fact that he has been the first after 
a long time who did not have any more illusions that the path leading to philosophy 
passes through science. According to him, what is important is, in the course of history, 
the counterblow that philosophy has on science more than the alleged influence of 
science on philosophy” (p. 163, our italics).
1 J. Beaufret, De l ’existentialisme à Heidegger. Introduction aux philosophies de 
l ’existence, Vrin, Paris 2000, pp. 162-163 (our italics).
2 G. Zaccaria, «Essere»?... e «tempo»? Note su Sein und Zeit, in La filosofia del 
Novecento in sei libri, Ibis, Pavia 1999, p. 150 (our italics). Let us bear in mind that the 
revolution of thought, on which Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933 as rector of the 
University of Freiburg is founded, could be interpreted in its turn on the basis of the necessity of 
re-establishing a relation to the element from which the Greek beginning originated (see infra, §
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The return to the Greeks, as the return to the background theme of the 
beginning of thought, casts a decisive light on the meaning assumed nowadays by the 
pre-eminence of techno-scientific knowledge compared with the philosophical one, and 
the consequent claim by science to influence philosophy, to such an extent as to reduce 
the latter to mere “philosophy of science”. The inversion of sense, as proposed by 
Heidegger, can, thus, be understood only in case science is in its turn driven 
(“counterblow”) inside the dimension -  Being -  from which it may have its orientation. 
In other words: what determinate interpretation o f  Being must necessarily be at the 
base o f such illusory claim from science?
According to an indication supplied by Heidegger himself -  mentioned by 
Beaufret as a comment to his answer (p. 163) -  the problem lies in a word which 
indicates the constituent trait of the current interpretation of Being and, as a 
consequence, of the relation between philosophy and science in our time: “positivism”. 
The non-problematic nature with which positivism, “in which, says Heidegger, we have 
found ourselves for some decades”, determines truth-reality in terms of mere facts -  
thus reducing the background concepts (namely, the interpretation of Being thereto 
assumed) to “mere expedients of which we need on occasion, but with which we should 
not bind too long” -  allows to realise the nature of Heidegger’s revolution of thought. 
Only thanks to the perception of a different interpretation of Being can “the comical 
trait, or more precisely, the tragic trait, of the current situation of science” emerge, 
insofar as, says Heidegger, “one believes that positivism can be beaten by 
positivism”(!).
c) The difference between Being and being: world and language
Thus, in the light of “a prodigious rediscovery of the Greek world” 
(Beaufret)3, the need of awaking the sense of the question of Being to thought, and thus 
the need of its explicit restatement (BT § 1), emerges. The positivistic interpretation of
2 and chap. 3) and on which man’s “Being in the world” as Dasein  is grounded (see infra, chap.
1 and 2).
3 M. Heidegger, A ufenthalte, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1989 (Fr. Trans. 
Séjours/Aufenthalte, Éditions du Rocher, 1992, p. 91).
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Being reveals, in fact, its own limits, once the expression “being”, which appeared in 
the quotation from Plato’s Sophist, has been acknowledged as the one pointing out the 
impossibility of reducing reality to mere facts: as reminded by Beaufret in the passage 
we cited, Plato himself differentiates in his Hyppias major a beautiful thing (“what is 
beautiful?”) from its being-beautiful (“what is beauty?”). In this sense, the guiding- 
question of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy which asks “what is a being?”, far from 
confining itself to gather any possible information on the beings which are encountered 
in the world -  beings that would thus be assumed at once as facts - , brings to light the 
phenomenon o f  the difference and the participation o f Being and being. And just this 
difference will constitute the background theme of Heidegger’s reflection starting from 
Sein und Zeit, although the expression “ontological difference”, by which Heidegger 
indicates this phenomenon, explicitly appears in his work only after 1927. The 
difference (and the participation) of Being and being so transfigures the essence of 
knowledge and truth: in fact, the world, by means of the Greek guiding-word Kosmos 
(Heraclitus, fragment 30), does not indicate the Universe to which the Earth would 
belong, but, rather, “the disposition by virtue of which things appear” in their Being, or 
“at the climax of their light” (DH 1 25): a jewel!4
In the same way, language cannot be reduced to a form of expression of 
thoughts and of communication among men; on the contrary, it would reveal the caring 
reception, in the word, of that difference between Being and being which, alone, lets the 
being show in its Being: it is in the light o f  Being that the being, the world, shows itself 
in its splendour. That this hypothesis is particularly in line with the Greek nature, finds 
a confirmation in the analyses by Walter Friedrich Otto, one of the most outstanding 
contemporary interpreters of Greek classical religion; in a short essay of his entitled Die 
Sprache als Mythos [Language as myth] -  a sort of “spiritual will” he wrote a short time 
before dying (1958) -  Otto writes: “Language, thus [...] is not an imitation of existing 
things at all, and not even a human answer to things in their Being, but that very Being,
4 See also M. Heidegger, Séjours/Aufenthalte, op. cit., p. 45.
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the very essential dimension of the world in its taking place. It is knowledge, but in the 
sense of being itself what it knows...”.5
Here lies the possibility that Heidegger’s rediscovery of the Greek world 
may reveal a new determination of the world and, with it, of man’s essence in his 
“Being in the world”, as the one who listens to and talks the language of Being: the 
modern metaphysical interpretation of the relationship between man and world in terms 
of “subject” and “object” -  interpretation which takes man as measure of the Being of 
being, to such a degree that language is only “a product of subjectivity” (Otto) - , thus 
constitutes a real reversal of sense in comparison with the essence of knowledge of the 
Greek world.
d) The new determination of man’s essence: alèthéia, Dasein, stay
Now, let us supply a first elucidation in the determination of man’s essence, 
as emerges from both the renewed care towards the question of Being and the 
suspension of the positivistic view of truth-reality. As a starting point, let us take some 
reflections made by François Vezin, the French translator of Sein und Zeit, inside a brief 
essay entitled Alèthéia, Dasein, Séjour, as appears in the appendix to the translation of a 
text Heidegger wrote in 1962 after a trip to Greece.6
Right from the beginning, the title of Heidegger’s book -  Aufenthalte/Séjour
-  gives an indication of the nature of such a “trip”, in agreement with the dialogue with 
Greek Being to which his thought “goes back”. The matter is, to enter that dimension 
inside which the Greek thought had its inception and thanks to which “that great 
people” could “find” itself inside its own world (séjour). This is the dimension which 
makes a place on the earth the homeland (Heimat) of a people and of every human 
being who dwells on it: here lies the possibility which allows man to find his own place 
in the world. Now, i f  alèthéia is the Greek name o f  that dimension, Dasein is the 
German word fo r  such a possibility o f  existence (Being in the world) fo r  man. As 
reported by Vezin, it is Heidegger himself who clarifies the nature of the reference
5 W.F. Otto, Mythos und Welt, Klett, Stuttgart 1962, pp. 283-284.
6 M. Heidegger, Séjours/Aufenthalte, op. cit., pp. 89-99.
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between alèthéia and Dasein in a letter he addressed to Beaufret (23 November 1945): 
“Dasein is the key word of my thought... It means for me, if I am allowed to say it in a 
perhaps impossible French: être le-là. And le-là is exactly alèthéia: [Being as] Open 
without holding-back (ouvert sans retrait) -  to be overt (être-ouvert)” (p. 93).
At this moment, to start meditating upon the word which, according to 
Heidegger, names the constituent trait of early Greek Being (Heraclitus and 
Parmenides), would be premature, insofar as our embarrassment and perplexity are deep 
when we try to say what “Being” means. Thus, let us limit ourselves to highlight that 
the word alèthéia discloses the reference to the opening of Being itself to man, opening 
that the latter has to be as his own configuring trait. In this sense, man’s determination 
as Dasein, as highlighted by Vezin, “designates man’s Being in an even more radical, 
more original way than the word reason, in which classical philosophy has long seen 
the distinctive trait and the very definition of the human being. [...]. According to 
Heidegger, thus, it is not reason «which makes us men and distinguishes us from 
animals», but the attitude (which is almost innate to reason) to say «there (it) is» (il y  a), 
attitude we own for the mere fact that the word falls to our lot” (p. 94).
Thus, language can be interpreted as the way in which man -  and man only
-  receives and preserves in words the opening of Being: Dasein, namely Being in the 
world, means to have to be, through language and thanks to it, the very dimension o f  
that opening which is the difference between Being and being. The possibility of man’s 
stay on the Earth has its own ground in listening to Being, as the element which 
anticipates the knowledge of this or that being we might encounter in the world. In this 
perspective, the return to the Greeks -  that is to say, to the dimension of (Greek) Being
-  constitutes the conversion of thought which lets man find his place in the world: the 
positivistic view of truth represents a reduction of the world to a mere sum of facts, as 
well as the determination of man as mere reason forgets the authentic dimension in 
which he, unlike animals, exists.7 In the light o f the rediscovery o f the Greek beginning 
o f thought, man and world reach the climax o f their possibilities, o f their intimate truth.
7 Let us bear in mind that the expressions “authentic”, “genuine”, “real” and “true” 
we refer to throughout our writing when dealing with man’s existence, do not stem from a new 
establishment of values by Heidegger, as they rather point out that only an explicit relation to
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§ 2. Plan o f the dissertation
a) Overall outlook
Right from the start, let us premise this dissertation with the methodological 
presuppositions that lead the comprehension of our writing, by dwelling upon its title 
and subtitle. In the first place, it should be kept in mind that our main goal is, first of all, 
to prepare  the field for an understanding of the theoretical core of Heidegger’s 
meditation from Sein und Zeit: the question of Being. Once we welcome the hypothesis 
that “Being and time” is not only the title of a book, but rather the name of a question 
that is worthy of continuous attention by philosophical knowledge and that has marked 
the horizon inside which Heidegger’s entire phenomenological research took place, it 
proves decisive to elucidate the reference Heidegger perceives between Being and time 
on the basis o f a clarification o f the key word that names the most intimate essence o f  
the human being. This word sounds in German: Dasein. In particular, we will focus our 
attention only on the very first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit, where the 
approach to the problem is given on the basis of a preliminary elucidation of the sense 
and necessity of interpreting man as Dasein (rather than as “subject”). Let us bear in 
mind, in fact, that the analytic of Dasein can be caught in all its significance, only in the 
case one is willing to welcome the hypothesis that Being (which Heidegger, at least in 
Sein und Zeit, perceives under the perspective of time) constitutes that dimension which 
grounds any possible knowledge as such and which, therefore, preserves and allows 
any possible truth o f the human existence in the world.
It is not by chance, then, that the first paragraphs in Sein und Zeit are 
expressly dedicated to an elucidation of the priority itself of the question of Being 
inside human knowledge and, in particular, inside the philosophical one. That 
philosophical knowledge has “fallen” in our epoch into an absolute oblivion of such a 
priority (forgetfulness of Being), becomes therefore the occasion for a radical rethinking 
of the entire Western philosophical-metaphysical tradition (especially, to our purposes, 
of the Cartesian and post-Cartesian one), in order to win once again the one and only
the dimension of Being may square man with reference to the constitutive possibilities of his
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ground on which the possibility itself of man’s existence on the Earth can be founded in 
a radically genuine way. In this sense, Heidegger’s work should be able to show, among 
other things, the limits of that knowledge, which, by grounding itself on the definitive 
abandonment of any “sensitivity” with regard to the question of Being, has come to the 
point of gaining the role of unquestioned and incontrovertible guide in the essential 
decisions on the present and future of Western and, maybe, World humanity: the 
modern science, or rather, the scientific method. Once we bring the absolutistic claim by 
the scientific method to take decisions on questions like truth, liberty, existence, 
divinity, history, destiny, world, time e t c .  back to that oblivion of the dimension of 
Being (from which only things can originate), we will be ready to welcome the breaking 
impact of that real spiritual revolution arising from Heidegger’s approach itself to the 
problem, which would contribute to show the absolute groundlessness and insufficiency 
(namely, inadequacy with regard to the most genuinely human nature) of the knowledge 
that guides today our way of seeing, perceiving, th ink ing .
Here we have then come to the subtitle of our dissertation: philosophy, 
science and politics. Leaving aside for the time being any reference to the facts 
concerning Heidegger’s biography (on which we will concentrate further on, especially 
in the third chapter), let us try to listen to the following hypothesis: all the difficulty of 
seizing the relation we perceive among philosophy, science and politics lies in freeing 
oneself definitely from the way one is accustomed to understanding the expression 
“politics”, which is nowadays caught first of all in terms of a more or less efficient 
bureaucratic organization of the State-system in view of the welfare of a nation and of 
its citizens. In case one put in parenthesis the modern interpretation of State as “State of 
right”, and meant with “politics” the dimension that gathers a possible community o f  
human beings (where man is interpreted in terms o f Dasein, and not as “subject ” -  
here lies the constitutive difference between Heidegger’s determination o f  m an’s 
political dimension and any modern political theory)*, the putting into question of the
own existence (see infra, chap. 1, § 3.c & chap. 2, § 2.d).
8 See H. Crétella, Politique et pensée, in Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin 2002, p. 89. We dare point out that our writing could be interpreted as a preparation for 
an accurate reading of Crétella’s essay, whose aim is to elucidate the nature of the connection 
between politics and thought in Heidegger’s entire pathway of thinking, particularly on the basis
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primacy of the scientific method (and of its resulting interpretation of truth) could lead 
us to perceive a new “horizon”, on the basis of which men could decide to build 
themselves up as a finally free people. Which other way o f  escape could arise with 
respect to the deep spiritual devastation in which the European-Western humanity finds 
itself (may it rely on liberal, communist, fa sc is t .  ideologies), if  not a profound 
rethinking of what words like liberty, truth, people mean? The history of the XX 
century has taught, in fact, how putting an ideology in the place of another (be it the 
liberal-democratic, in comparison with the Nazi or communist ones) is not sufficient. 
Where, then, should we take a measure for a decorous existence of the peoples on the 
Earth, if not from a thought that is able to make itself responsible for that ineluctable 
task which concerns everybody in the first person, that of being a man? But what does 
“being” mean in this case?
*
Here we are once again back to the point from which Sein und Zeit and, in a 
way, our dissertation originate. How could we approach a question -  that of Being qua 
Being -  no one (not even the Greek early philosophers, who left the determination of 
alèthéia un-investigated), according to Heidegger, had even felt the urgency and 
necessity of? Just this urgency will make us take a problematic detour with regard to our 
analysis of the first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit, in order to gain and have at 
our disposal, in an extremely concrete and immediate way, a first indication of what is 
hidden (and preserved) inside that expression -  Being - , which is as misunderstood as 
shunned. We are here making reference to the equally well-known expression 
“ontological difference” or “difference between Being and being”, which constitutes an 
elaboration after Sein und Zeit of the same question of Being and time (let us bear in 
mind that Sein und Zeit breaks off all of a sudden, namely before the explicit 
elaboration of an interpretation of Being with regard to time), and nonetheless has the 
advantage -  once perceived in its meaning -  of nominating in an even simpler and
of the failure of Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933 and of the responsive turning his 
thought had to face thereafter in terms of man’s poetic  dwelling on the Earth (see L ’explication
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clearer way the intimate nature of that phenomenon that plays a major role in the 
determination of the ground from which the noble figure of man originates.9
At first, we may get bewildered by the fact that the question of Being just 
shows the dimension without which, according to Heidegger, there could be no man as 
such, especially as Being -  if compared with the beings we deal with daily - , seems to 
be nothing. But are we sure that this recognition hits the mark? Would thought urge us 
to give a look at such a meaningless and empty question then? Are we here confronted, 
perhaps, with a perverse vicious circle? Does not Heidegger himself remind us that the 
depth of a philosophical position can be “measured” right on the ground of the attention 
given to the question of the Nothing?
Now, if we just hush up our own ambition, which results offended with 
regard to a problem one would wish to see settled in an instant, we could try to fit 
ourselves with less impatience to listen to the words Heidegger addresses our hearing, 
as he lets us perceive those phenomena concerning our common existence in which the 
Nothing plays such a decisive role that it shakes our own Being to its foundations: we 
are here referring to the phenomena of anxiety and death. Supposed we do not confuse 
anxiety with mere fear (see BT § 30) and death with annihilation, we could start 
perceiving that they both -  if seen under the perspective of the question of Being - , just 
as they lay ourselves open to our own deep finitude and let us hang on an abyss we 
cannot master, free us right in the middle o f our destiny, and let us ponder, though in its 
harshness, the pure joy o f our Being. Contrary to those who see in this bringing to light 
the ineluctable reference between man and angst/death the manifestation of a desperate 
and nihilist spirit, we are of the opinion that only a wide perception of man’s depths 
could lead each of us to an appropriation o f  one’s own authentic Self. If we now made 
the hypothesis that a whole people -  namely, each of us in the first person -  would take
poétique, pp. 97-104) and of a new determination of history as Ereignis (see La question 
historique, pp. 104-114).
9 For the elucidation o f the detour we are referring to -  which leads from the 
question of Being to the ontological difference through the clarification of the sense o f the 
expression “forgetfulness of Being” - , see our paragraph entitled Note on time (see infra, chap. 
1, § 3). Let us remember that this detour is based, in its turn, on the turning (Kehre) Heidegger 
made just after Sein und Zeit, in particular thanks to a more radical interpretation of the question 
of the sense (truth) of Being in terms of Verborgenheit and Unverborgenheit, always with the 
Greek interpretation of “truth” as alèthéia in the background.
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the measure of its existence from this perception, could we not hope that, in doing so, a 
people would be tempered in its constitutive forces and introduced into the world with a 
much more lively sense of being rooted?
*
In order to clarify the nature of the ground on which man’s existence is 
rooted, we will extend our analysis concerning Sein und Zeit -  as proof of the fact that 
the question of Being constitutes the key theme of the Heideggerian thought -  by 
presenting two other essays Heidegger wrote soon after his first masterpiece, namely 
Vom Wesen des Grundes and Was ist Metaphysik?, whose theme just centres on the 
difference between Being (as nothing) and being. In particular, a major role with regard 
to our dissertation is played by the fundamental 1929 writing entitled Was ist 
Metaphysik?, which, insofar as it sets out right from an interpretation that has already 
been able to perceive the limits of the leading knowledge inside Western humanity 
(namely Metaphysics, of which science and technology represent the definitive 
accomplishment), contributes to the elucidation of the sense of the difference between 
Being and being through a further elaboration of the existential phenomenon of anxiety 
as man’s privileged disclosedness to the Nothing, i.e. to Being.
But the most surprising aspect is that Heidegger’s writing originates from a 
radical putting into question the primacy of the scientific method, which would 
(necessarily) have come to exclude a priori any possible meditation on the question of 
Being: Being is definitely considered in fact as an empty nothingness. Even more 
enigmatic is also the fact that this putting into question the primacy of scientific 
knowledge -  and, consequently, of the essence, structure and teaching of the University 
related to it -  would be the ground of the deeply-felt risk Heidegger bore when he 
undertook the appointment of rector at the University of Freiburg at the time of Hitler’s 
rise to power. Far from minimizing Heidegger’s responsibility and mistake, our aim is 
to show how his intentions during his (though short) political involvement were not, in 
any case, to contribute to an ultra-strengthening of the German people in terms of racial 
(and, consequently, spiritual) superiority. In other words: any reference Heidegger made
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to his people, to the German University and to his mother tongue would not originate 
from a delirious feeling of omnipotence, but rather from a genuine care o f what is 
proper to a people, in the hope that a similar awareness could be perceived by all the 
other peoples with whom the Germans could collaborate, in order to achieve a common 
being up to the task that concerns those Western powers willing to build up a European 
history and destiny. For what is here at stake is not the predominance of a people, but 
the possibility itself of a dialogue!
It is not by chance that Heidegger, just as a result of the failure of his 
“political project”, gave rise to a meditation on the possible dialogue between thought 
and poetry starting from Hölderlin’s work, which would constitute for the Germans a 
destiny (Schicksal), i.e. capable of building up an authentic future: far from fleeing the 
harsh reality of his own time by seeking consolation in that mere fabulous world poetry 
would be, Heidegger’s attempt is driven by the need of finding the true ground on 
which the possibility of a genuinely human existence is rooted, right in an epoch when 
the devastation of truth threatens to unhinge once and for all that mild relationship 
between man and his own world, of which poetry would be the noblest manifestation.10 
In case we were capable of listening to this very precious indication Heidegger is 
suggesting, the possibility may rise that a meditation on the relation between thought 
and poetry could also make other European peoples build up a decisive way of escape 
from the totalitarian vice-like grip, which still today lays siege to the Western spirit: 
concerning this, let us remind ourselves of the Spanish poet Antonio Machado, who 
“found the time to foretell in 1936 that poets in the future «will be led to Heidegger’s 
philosophy as butterflies to light» and, soon before the fall of Barcelona, to reiterate his 
welcome by writing on Vanguardia on 27 March 1938 that Heidegger’s interpretation 
of man «es al antípodo del germano de Hitler»”.n It is in this perspective that we may
10 For an analysis of the relationship between thought and poetry on the basis of 
Heidegger’s confrontation with Hölderlin, please refer to B. Allemann, H ölderlin und 
Heidegger, Atlantis Verlag, Zürich/Freiburg i. Br. 1954 (Fr. Trans. H ölderlin et H eidegger, 
traduit de l ’allemand par François Fédier, PUF, Paris 1959 (1987); in particular, with regard to 
the turning and its relationship to the question of time/history -  see infra, chap. 1, § 3 - ,  please 
refer to Part Two and Four).
11 J. Beaufret, En Chemin avec Heidegger, in Dialogue avec Heidegger, t. 4,
Minuit, Paris 1985, p. 108.
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start interpreting both the continuous references Jean Beaufret makes to the tradition of 
French poetry (Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Mallarmé above all) and the wonderful 
dialogue that rose from Heidegger’s encounter with the French poet René Char: the 
claim of judging Heidegger’s care towards what is properly German (das Deutsche) in 
terms of a manifestation of nationalistic spirit starts proving extremely limited, doesn’t 
it? Is it still permissible to refuse the German people (even after the Nazi atrocities) the 
possibility to think of a homeland? Should we not start understanding that nationalism 
represents a radical perversion (which may always occur, in any people and in any 
epoch) of that inner necessity of being rooted, from which only a historical community 
of truly human beings -  be they Germans, French, Italians e t c .  - , may blossom? 
Where else could we draw the measure of what makes a man a human being, if not from 
the coming to light of the dimension -  Being -  that grants every man and every people’s 
Dasein, thus rooting them in what is genuinely proper, that disclosedness inside which 
they may soar, like butterflies towards the light of truth?
b) The circular structure of the thesis
Following the lines of our comments, as expressed in the first paragraph and 
in the overall outlook, let us present the path our dissertation will take by enunciating 
the titles of the three chapters it is composed of, namely:
Chapter One: Reflections on the difference between philosophy and science 
based on the phenomenon of the forgetfulness of Being: the ontological difference;
Chapter Two: The question of the sense for Being in Sein und Zeit, §§ 1-44: 
Dasein, disclosedness, and truth (existence -  Being in the world -  disposition);
Chapter Three: The Rektoratsrede: exposition of the essence of knowledge 
and science on which the University has to be founded.
Chapter One. Taking into due account the main consequences of the “return 
to the Greeks”, the task of the first chapter will be to define the nature of the 
relationship -  and thus of the difference -  between philosophy and science: in this 
sense, it will be decisive to clarify their specific theme of analysis. On the basis of the
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constituent question of the Greek beginning of thought -  the question of Being - , our 
aim is to show what the positivistic reduction of truth-reality consists of: thanks to 
Beaufret’s reflections in a text (which will prove more and more essential to our 
purposes) entitled Entretiens avec Frédéric de Towarnicki [Conversations with Frédéric 
de Towarnicki], we will come to comprehend in what sense Heidegger identifies the 
phenomenon of the forgetfulness of Being (i.e. of the difference between Being and 
being) as the foundation of the leadership science has assumed today towards 
philosophy, insofar as the former, defined by Heidegger as “science of beings” (positive 
science) -  against philosophy as “science of Being” (critical science) - ,  refuses Being: 
“What should be examined are beings only, and besides that -  nothing; beings alone, 
and further -  nothing; solely beings, and beyond that -  nothing” (PM 84).
Thus, assuming that science cannot take its eyes off beings -  namely, facts! 
- , Heidegger’s assumption is that, just at the moment when science determines its own 
theme, it cannot but mention the dimension thanks to which facts themselves have 
appeared for the first time as perceptible and thus liable to be inquired. In this sense, 
the rediscovery of the Greek world constitutes the event which enables the 
determination of the intrinsic limits of any scientific explanation, since the latter 
appears to be necessarily founded just on the element it persists in refusing as 
something “unreal” . Under this perspective, the sense of Heidegger’s locution 
“ontological difference” begins to take shape, and Being, by then fallen into 
forgetfulness, becomes -  though invisible to the eyes of science -  the background theme 
of philosophy. The comprehension o f the relationship between philosophy and science, 
based on the difference between Being and being, becomes the first access way to 
elucidate the question o f Being and, with it, the new determination o f man’s essence as 
Dasein, thus keeping its modern definition as reason within its limits.
The concern about the positivistic interpretation of reality in terms of facts 
(a mere “establishing what the world [...] is in fact”) does not involve Heidegger only, 
as it finds its confirmation in Edmund Husserl’s celebrated 1934 Prague conference: 
“The exclusiveness with which the total world-view of modern man, in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive sciences [...] meant an
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indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity. 
Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people [our italics]” (CES 5-6). 
Under this prospect, our analyses on Husserl’s late thought -  which, on its turn, stems 
from the “unavoidable necessity of a transcendental-phenomenological reorientation of 
philosophy” (CES 3) -  should, thus, prepare us to comprehend the menace which, 
according to Heidegger, is impending on scientific knowledge insofar as the latter, 
because of its non-acknowledgement of its reference to the question of Being, appears 
to be unfounded and, as such, unable to represent any constituent knowledge fo r  man 
and, more extensively, fo r  the destiny o f  European humanity -  that is to say, any 
knowledge able to shape the future, to give a direction. In other words, the hypothesis is 
that scientific knowledge, as it has evolved from the exclusiveness of the positivistic 
interpretation, despite the continuous successes assured by it, represents just an illusion 
of knowledge. To the illusory nature of the decision around the truth of Being 
corresponds the illusory nature of the sense of human existence: hence that “radical life- 
crisis” Husserl talks about, and of which we ourselves are witnesses nowadays.
*
To this purpose, the comments contained in a Heideggerian text written in 
1937 entitled Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft (La menace qui pèse sur la science, EP 
165-192) [The menace impending on science] appear to be decisive. Moreover, it 
should be kept in mind that this writing makes part of the Politische Schriften and could 
help clarify the sense of Heidegger’s political involvement in favour of National 
Socialism (1933-1934) in terms of the will to revolutionise the essence o f knowing and 
science. In this sense, the sub-title of the whole dissertation, “Philosophy, science and 
politics”, should sound more comprehensible now: in fact, by “politics” we refer to the 
dimension inside which, thanks to the new relationship between philosophy and 
science, we may perceive a horizon of sense for the existence of every man as an 
individual and of a people -  be it German, Italian, French... It is knowledge, in its most 
genuine meaning, that determines the trait which binds both a community o f human 
beings and o f  peoples: Europe, far from constituting first of all a mere geographical or
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economic-financial configuration, appears to be founded on philosophy as a specifically 
Western form of knowledge which, starting from its Greek beginning, gives shape to its 
historical-spiritual destiny. Thus, before becoming the object of analysis of political 
science (as the study of the phenomena concerning the State, the power, and the 
Government), “politics” means “stay”, that is to say, Being in the world.
*
From all that, the “circular” nature o f  the whole dissertation should 
emerge in a clearer way, insofar as the analyses made in the third and last chapter in 
connection with Heidegger’s “political” involvement aims at re-launching the sense o f  
the problematic relationship between philosophy and science, on the basis o f  the 
rediscovery o f the question o f Being as the ground for the possibility itself o f  thinking 
and knowing, and, in a broader sense, o f existing authentically. To this end, our writing 
will centre, in particular, on three works Heidegger carried out in a rather limited period 
of time: Sein und Zeit (1927) -  Was ist Metaphysik? [What is Metaphysics?] (1929) -  
Rektoratsrede [Rectoral address] (1933), taking the second one as the bridge between 
the other two, insofar as it singles out, as its own fundamental core, the scientific 
interpretation of the difference between Being and being, in the light of the 
phenomenon of the “forgetfulness of Being” which is fully operating in it.
Moreover, as to make the nature of Heidegger’s thought even more evident 
with regard to the relationship between philosophy and science, we have decided to 
analyse some passages from a work of a clear neo-positivistic sort as Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung [The scientific conception of the world] (1929) by Hahn, Neurath and 
Carnap: man, definitively meant as “measure of everything”, who does not know 
deadlocks, refuses any question which is not retraceable to statements on empirically 
attemptable things; “metaphysical” questions should be but pseudo-problems.
Chapter Two. After having been reminded that our analyses refer to the first 
forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit only, we do point out that the first part of the title 
of this chapter corresponds to the title of paragraph 44: Dasein, disclosedness and truth.
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And more precisely, “truth” (Wahrheit), as interpretative translation of the Greek 
expression alèthéia, is related to man’s disclosedness to Being: it is thanks to the 
opening of man to Being and of Being to man that the latter, as Dasein, relates to the 
possibility of truth. In this perspective, truth is not firstly a feature o f human knowledge 
but, rather, a trait o f  Being itself in its giving to man, thus granting him a place -  the 
clearing o f a world -  where he can truly be himself: here lies the essence of the already 
cited (originally Greek) reference between alèthéia and Dasein in language-word.
To comprehend the nature of the “movement” with which Being gives itself 
to man, goes beyond the preparatory aim of this writing; rather, our task is to 
comprehend the way man is constituted so as to keep relationship with Being. To this 
end, we will limit ourselves to analyse three basic determinations of Dasein, thanks to 
which there will emerge the relation of Being to man as the trait which gives shape to 
the sense of his very Being: in fact, all determinations have their foundation in the 
phenomenon Heidegger names “understanding of Being”. Only thanks to the re­
discovery o f  the Greek world, can this last phenomenon emerge as decisive in view o f  
the interpretation o f the essence o f that being that each o f us is. In the light of what has 
been said above, the expressions “existence”, “Being in the world” and “disposition” 
will be properly understood, once the trait proper to the human being -  which lies 
hidden and even misunderstood when man is interpreted as “reason” and “subject” -  
comes out: assuming that, in spite of what stated by modern philosophical tradition, 
only man exists in the true sense of the word -  as his Being differs from the “existence” 
of any other being “outside” the human subject12 - , the same determination of the 
essential structure of Dasein as “Being in the world” assumes that its “Being in” the 
world cannot be meant as merely being contained inside that big “box” the world is -  
the latter meant as the sum of beings (objects) simply present-at-hand.
In the light of a new sense of existence, thus, also the essence of the world 
(worldhood) will have to be re-interpreted: hence, the need to re-think the nature of 
what we are accustomed to calling “feelings”, assuming that, by this expression, we
12 As reported by Heidegger himself, it has to be remembered that the expression 
D asein  appears, for instance in Kant, to designate the existence of God himself: let us think
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mean man’s way of Being, from time to time, in his own world. In other words, feelings 
themselves shall be re-interpreted in the light of the phenomenon of the understanding 
of Being, insofar as it is Being itself which attunes Dasein's existence. Proof of this is 
the fundamental disposition of angst, in which, just insofar as beings as a whole vanish, 
the Nothing comes to light -  that same Nothing of which science does not know what to 
do. In fact, if such a nothing were Being itself (Being as no-thing, non-being), angst 
would show itself as Dasein's privileged disclosure to the difference between Being and 
being. Thus, angst, far from annulling man and any project of his -  just when going 
away, beings in their Being would enigmatically address to man - , exposes the latter to 
his enigmatical destiny, that is to say, to the possibility itself of Being in the world: 
stay!
Chapter Three. The direction and the sense of the analyses we have devoted 
to Heidegger’s well known political involvement in favour of Hitler’s National 
Socialism between 1933 and 1934 -  for the overall duration of only 10 months -  clearly 
appear from the title of our third chapter: on the basis o f the re-formulation o f  the 
question o f Being and, thanks to it, o f  the preparation o f an authentic possibility fo r  
man to stay in his own world, the need o f a new relationship between philosophy and 
science highlights Heidegger’s role as rector at the University o f Freiburg. In fact, 
assuming that, after resigning his post as rector, Heidegger acknowledged his mistake, 
our aim is to clarify the problematic concept of the controversial Rektoratsrede, the sub­
title of which -  Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität -  usually meant as a 
clue of Germans’ will to dominate the rest of the world (“The self-assertion of the 
German University”), highlights the need for the University -  as the seat o f  knowledge
-  to help face everything can damage or reduce, or even destroy the spiritual future of a 
people, in the light of the crisis which upset the whole Europe, in particular during the 
so-called “age of totalitarianisms”.
To this end, we want to stress that the translation we will refer to -  thanks to 
a different interpretation of the decisive expression Selbstbehauptung -  sounds as
about his 1763 writing entitled D er einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstartion des
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follows: “The German University/firm in itself/towards and notwithstanding 
everything” (L ’université allemande/envers et contre tout/elle-même, EP 42). The 
firmness to which we refer here has its own foundation in the decision in favour o f a 
revolution o f the essence o f  knowing and science, just when the direction assumed by 
scientific research, in the light o f the positivistic conception, was making the University 
become more and more an apparatus able to supply useful results to the (National 
Socialist) dominant world view. Rather, this decision, far from constituting a form of 
fixity which sets once and for all the sense of knowledge (“self-assertion”), arises from 
the ever keen need to give shape, from time to time, to knowledge, which allows a 
people to find its own place in the world history. Dialogue, as philosophical exercise o f  
questioning between teachers and students, thus constitutes the brightest example of that 
strife fo r  the essential -  the truth (of Being) -  on which the authentic possibility of 
Being in the world is founded: this last phenomenon, thus, is not reduced to a mere 
remark, but becomes a task to which each of us and all together are called.
To this purpose, to face this very delicate question we will refer to the 
analyses formulated by François Fédier, a disciple of Beaufret’s and editor of the 
French edition of Heidegger’s Politische Schriften, whose valuable contribution helped 
unmask the false accusations against Heidegger (in particular from Victor Farias in his 
Heidegger et le nazisme) and clarify his real intentions during his “ill-famed” rectorate. 
It is worth remembering, in fact, Heidegger’s will to contribute to the revolution of the 
essence of knowing -  and, thus, of the University -  which may already be found in his 
writings well before Hitler’s ascent: so, claiming to demonstrate that Heidegger’s 
philosophy was aiming at theoretically justifying Hitler’s world view, means to 
misunderstand the origin itself of his thought. In fact, his assent to National Socialism 
was not limited to a “passive” acceptance of Führer’s politics but, according to a letter 
Heidegger wrote to his brother Fritz on 4 May 1933 (the day following his assent), it 
was determined by his will to act directly on the course of events, “in the conviction 
that it is a necessary transition to restore to health and clarify the movement as a whole” 
(EP 79). It is emblematic in this sense that Heidegger did not play any institutional role
Daseins G ottes.
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inside Hitler’s hierarchy: on the contrary, the Party’s will to subjugate also the 
University world to its doctrine made Heidegger convinced that his assent was a 
mistake. With a view to freeing the field from any suspicion on Heidegger’s figure as a 
thinker and a man, we deem it opportune to suspend any accusing judgment against 
him. Indeed, very few realised from the beginning the real menace Hitler was 
representing: as reported by Fédier on the basis of the witnesses borne by Earl Harry 
Kessler and Winston Churchill, the Führer, in the months following his ascent to power 
“managed so as to appear very different from the madman who champions the criminal 
program to establish a worldwide control by a «superior race»” (EP 59-60).
*
To clarify what is exposed above, let us analyse another case of 
Totalitarianism in Europe, Mussolini’s Fascism, by dwelling upon the figure of one of 
the most renowned twentieth-century Italian writers, Elio Vittorini, who joined Fascism 
at its beginning, to realise later on -  when the Spanish Civil War broke out (1936) -  the 
illusion on which it was based. However, it is worth remembering that his joining 
Fascism had never been a fanatical one: had it not been the case, how could we 
comprehend the invitation he addressed to Italian Fascists to fight against Francoists in 
favour of freedom! -  which caused his definitive expulsion from PNF? And even more 
peculiar is his involvement inside the Resistance (1942) and his enrolment to the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) as a “non Marxist Communist” (1945), which was followed by 
his desertion of PCI itself in 1951. Our hypothesis is that the role assumed by Vittorini 
inside Fascism and Communism can be compared to Heidegger’s intentions to 
contribute to the reformation and clarification of the very essence of National 
Socialism: really, Heidegger’s resignation and Vittorini’s abandonment of both 
ideologized Fascism and Party-Communism, are they not the sign, according to the 
words contained in the letter Vittorini addressed to PCI Secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, in 
1947, of that “feeling of perplexity so many intellectuals are having [...] with regard to 
something that today is withering and hampering the relationship between politics and
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culture inside and around our Party to be more alive”13? Wanting to act inside culture, 
and not on it “staying outside its problems”, is it not suitable for a cultural (or 
philosophical) battle -  the opposite of any obscurantism? Only in case politics renounce 
any intervention on culture “through political subjects and means, and political 
pressure, and political intimidation”, thinkers and poets will be able to “put culture 
forward” and, thanks to that, to “put themselves forward into culture: to transform and 
to be transformed”!
In this sense, the analyses that come out of the study of Heidegger’s 
political writings about the question o f labour, be it manual or intellectual, will aim at 
highlighting that dimension which, apart from any social class, allows each man the 
chance to contribute to the transformation -  or the building up -  of the world in which 
he lives: once again the existence reveals as man’s stay in his own world, and labour, 
far from being a mere occupation in view of a salary, becomes the opportunity to put 
oneself forward into culture -  namely, to transform oneself according to the saying that 
recites: “become what you are”. In fact, according to Heidegger’s words, not by chance 
said inside a Speech to Workers in January 1934, “to know means: to recognize 
ourselves and find ourselves in the world in which we are placed, both all together and 
each of us individually” (EP 139).
*
Now, let us think of the revolution of the capitalist production system in 
1913 further to the introduction of the conveyer belt into the assembly chain: it is 
outstanding to remember that all industrialized Western nations, starting from the 
United States (Henry Ford), have adopted this new production technique which may be 
defined, thanks to the theory formulated by F.W. Taylor, as “scientific organization o f  
labour” or “rationalization”. The scientific or rational trait of this labour planning has 
its explanation in the need to optimize the yield through a more and more efficient 
production system. Thus, it was necessary, once workers were concentrated at the 
factory, to oversee them so as to get their steady diligence, to set rules to prevent any
13 E. Vittorini, Il Politecnico, n. 35 (January-March 1947).
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carelessness and to fix the minimum daily production (optimization of time and space). 
The workers, who were no longer required to have any skill in carrying out their job -  
which was, in fact, just a mechanical repetition of very simple operations that could be 
accomplished by anyone, with no need o f  thinking - ,  were scattered inside the factory 
departments depending on the degree of efficiency they were able to reach in this or that 
production field. Now, the reduction of man to human material (“human resources”), 
out of which to take the maximum yield, makes the possibility for labour, as creative 
and free  moment, to ennoble man pointless: the brutalizing repetitiveness and the speed 
of its execution hamper, a priori, the opportunity for “every man to see his own job as 
an object o f contemplation” (CO 45).
Thus, the well-known alienating trait of the assembly chain would not have 
its only origin in the capitalist logic of profit -  both Mussolini’s and Hitler’s regimes 
followed this production method, as well as Stalin himself addressed to Ford’s 
engineers so as to make the Soviet production more efficient and competitive. Apart 
from the political world view at stake, be it Democratic-capitalist, Communist or 
Fascist, the rational utilization of human resources becomes one of the most striking 
examples in which the danger represented by science as the exclusive method of 
interpretation of truth and of man’s destiny, by this time reduced to a mass, appears in 
all its violence. Every existence and world dimension is, in fact, characterized by what 
Paul Valéry identifies as the will or need fo r  definition, whose aim is to enumerate, 
compare, level, organize and order everything inside the model which is, from time to 
time, considered as undoubtedly valid. The intellectual labour itself could reduce to an 
endless reproduction of standardized cultural “objects”: art itself, whose foundation, 
according to Vittorini, lies in the necessity to repeatedly reshape truth, could be 
formatted to a truth which is always the same because deemed as the only useful one. 
The scientific conception of the world would be the ideal form (because more efficient) 
of that need to balance all accounts, the only one which makes the supremacy assumed 
by man towards the Being of the being as measure for everything possible -  supremacy, 
the extreme expression of which is Hitler’s claimed superiority of the Aryan race. To 
clarify the point Valéry, making reference, in particular, to the treatment reserved to
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intellectuals and artists in our epoch, writes: “Our civilisation acquires, or tends to 
acquire, the structure and the qualities of a machine [...]. The machine is bound to have 
a universal power and cannot stand that (human and non-human) beings remain outside 
its mechanism, outside its functioning. On the other hand, it cannot adjust itself to 
indefinite lives in its field of action. Its exactness, which is essential to it, cannot admit 
neither vagueness nor social quirks; its good functioning is incompatible with irregular 
situations. It cannot accept that someone’s role and life conditions are not exactly 
defined. It tends to eliminate individuals with vague ideas according to its point of view 
[ideology], and to classify the others again, with no consideration for the past and also 
the future of the species”.14
As an example of the mechanical logic of our time, it is worth citing the 
emblematic case of Heidegger himself, whose “action” was opposed during and after 
his rectorate by the National Socialist Party; who was, later on, removed from his office 
as University professor until 1952 by the Occupation Army command; and on whom a 
suspect is still impending of such significance, as to risk to compromise the (possibility 
of) listening to the question which gives birth to his thought and which revolutionises 
the still dominating essence of knowledge from top to bottom. Heidegger writes: “As 
far as I can see, the most characteristic feature for the forgetfulness of Being [...], the 
characteristic feature of our destiny is the fact that the question o f Being, which I pose, 
has not been understood yet” (QA 83).
c) Methodological note on the circular structure of the thesis: 
the relation between philosophy and politics
Let us try to clarify the “circular” nature of our dissertation by means of a 
bibliographical remark, thanks to which the reason of following Jean Beaufret’s and 
François Fédier’s interpretations -  with regard to Heidegger’s pathway of thinking and 
his problematic political involvement in favour of Hitler between 1933 and 1934 -  will 
be brought to light.
14 P. Valéry, Propos sur ¡’Intelligence, in Essais quasi politiques (Variété), Œuvres 
I, Gallimard, «Bibliothèque de la Pléiade», Paris 1957, p. 1051.
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Assuming that this involvement can be perceived not as an adhesion to the 
anti-Semite and racial-positivistic (biological) ideology fostered by the National 
Socialist Party, our interpretation will have to face a very intricate cultural and 
historiographical debate on the “Heidegger affaire”.
As far as this debate is concerned, our main goal will be to show the 
philosophical presuppositions which found some of the most decisive critical 
interpretations on the political -  i.e. existentially  constitutive -  sense of that 
involvement. Yet, if one may easily find preconceived attitudes in the accusations made 
against Heidegger by intellectuals such as Farias, Ott, Ettinger, Adorno and Grass (see 
infra, chap. 2 & 3), the work of analysing those philosophers who constituted a step 
forward on the path of this or that “current of thought” -  be it existentialistic (Sartre), 
anthropological (Löwith), Marxist (Lukács), phenomenological (Husserl) and neo- 
positivistic (Vienna Circle) - , proves to be much harder and subtler.
Briefly: in order to be able to understand the mistake Heidegger made in 
1933 and the setback he suffered both as a man and as a thinker, we do have to put 
ourselves on an ontological level. To this purpose, to study, in particular, Sartre and, 
though in a different way, Lukács and the Vienna Circle’s positions, will help us see 
how extraneous to Heidegger’s thought these interpretations are. However, as these 
interpreters still keep themselves inside a metaphysical (in particular, modern) 
perspective, they will contribute to elucidate the revolutionary (de-obstructing) 
importance of Heidegger’s thought and its meaning for the future of philosophy.15
15 Our analyses will therefore leave out four enigmatic thinkers, whose works have 
been wrongly considered by some scholars within the sphere of existential, anthropological, 
phenomenological and neo-positivistic interpretations in the strict sense of the words: Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Harendt, Emmanuel Lévinas and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Let us bear in 
mind, with regard to the first of them only, what Heidegger wrote to Jean Beaufret on the 
occasion of his premature death in 1961: “Although I have not known Merleau-Ponty 
personally, I perceived in him, from what he said and from what he set himself, a free and franc 
spirit that knew what thinking is about and what all this re q u ire s . Let us be cheered by saying 
to one another that the friend, who has just died, has traced an authentic path of true thought up 
to the dimension which has never been reached by business uproar and agitation” (F. de 
Towarnicki, Martin Heidegger. Souvenirs et chroniques, Payot & Rivages, Paris 2002, p. 96). 
With regard to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on the work of Heidegger, please refer to his Notes 
des cours au Collège de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961 (Gallimard, Paris 1996). Also the 
work of H.G. Gadamer and the hermeneutical “current” have not been taken into consideration, 
as we deem it prominent to, first o f all, p r e p a r e  the field for an eventual debate on 
hermeneutics, which would presuppose an understanding o f the phenomenon of language -
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Moreover, we will also make reference (see infra, chap. 3, § 2) to the 
criticisms made by those scholars who have followed these interpretative lines later on 
in the course of the history of the existentialistic, anthropological, Marxist, 
phenomenological and neo-positivistic reception of Heidegger’s thought and, more in 
general, of the whole history of philosophy. That is why a confrontation with authors 
(such as Jürgen Habermas, Otto Pöggeler and Tom Rockmore) with more faded 
metaphysical positions -  which originated from an articulate combination of references 
to many (if not all) of the currents quoted above - , proves instructive, insofar as the 
acknowledgement of Heidegger’s philosophical importance goes together with 
criticisms on specific aspects of his thought, thus coming to the point of 
“deconstructing” it and, in so doing, of undermining its foundations, without perceiving 
in our opinion the core of the Heideggerian meditation (the relation of Being to the 
human being, as it shows from Sein und Zeit on) in its entirety. Let us just think about 
the cases of Jacques Derrida in France and Carlo Sini in Italy, according to whom 
Heidegger would have neglected, in accordance with his view of the primacy of the 
word-logos, the question of writing!
At this point -  just in order to be able to give an opinion, for instance, on 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s judgement, according to which, on the basis of the interpretation of 
National Socialism in terms of “National-aestheticism”, Heidegger’s ontology is 
defined as “archifascist”16 -  it becomes necessary to understand what “ontology”, i.e. 
“Being”, and “art” mean. Hence the need to refer ourselves to Sein und Zeit and to the 
sense of the guiding-word Dasein, through which we may gain that dimension inside 
which thought and art, starting from the phenomenon of Being, can no longer be 
reduced to merely subjective cultural and aesthetic manifestations.
which, in its turn, needs a clarification of the question of the sense of Being, from which Sein 
und Zeit starts. As to the Husserl-Heidegger debate, an analysis of which would require a study 
on its own, let us limit ourselves for the moment being (see infra, chap. 1) to remember that 
Sein und Zeit was dedicated to Husserl as a sign of gratefulness and friendship: may the 
examplary dialogue between Plato and Aristotle help us understand the nature of their becoming 
estranged.
16 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Lo spirito del nazionalsocialismo e il suo destino, in F. 
Fistetti (ed.), La Germania segreta di Heidegger, Dedalo, Bari 2001, pp. 12-14.
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CHAPTER ONE
REFLECTIONS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 
BASED ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE FORGETFULNESS OF BEING: THE
ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
“By the little which now satisfies Spirit, we 
can measure the extent of its loss.”
(Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes)
§ 1. Preliminary interpretation o f man’s essence: 
the “existential analytic” o f  Dasein and the forgetfulness o f Being
a) Remarks on the preparatory character of the research
The aim of this dissertation is to lead to an initial comprehension of the 
“existential analytic” of Dasein, which constitutes Part One (§§ 9-83) of Heidegger’s 
Sein und Zeit, and to help clarify its sense in view of the problematic core from which 
the project as a whole stands: the question of Being. In more detail: Division One of 
Part One (§§ 9-44) is named: “Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein”. It is our 
task, therefore, to understand the “preparatory” character -  and we limit our task to that
-  Heidegger gives this Division One, insofar as the analytic of Dasein should be 
perceived as “laying bare the horizon for the interpretation of the sense of Being in 
general” (BT § 5).17
17 It is essential right from the start to premise this dissertation with a fundamental 
observation: all along the whole writing the guiding-word, thanks to which Heidegger 
determines the very “essence” of man -  D asein  - ,  will remain untranslated. To translate this 
word in a phenomenologically adequate way needs, in fact, a profound comprehension of the 
intimate urgency of the question that constitutes the sense of Sein und Zeit and the horizon of 
Heidegger’s entire Denkweg: what is Being? This comprehension invites those who follow his 
Denkweg to a translation of Dasein, which would be capable of saying the authentic sense of his 
thought, thus showing, as it happens with the English translation of Dasein  with “Being-there”, 
the limit inherent in its translation in terms of spatial collocation. During a seminar held with 
Eugen Fink on Heraclitus in 1966-1967, Heidegger says: “In French «D a se in » is being 
translated with «être-là», for instance in Sartre. But, all of a sudden, what has been reached as a 
new position in Sein und Zeit is completely lost. Is man here («là») as a chair [is]?” (Seminare 
[1951-1973], HGA 15, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1986, p. 204). On this topic, see: François 
Vezin, Au sujet de la traduction and Le mot Dasein, which appear in the Appendix of his
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“To prepare” means to put things in order, so that they may be used for the 
best; to see that something is ready for use; to put someone in a position to stand a test. 
In all these accepted meanings of the word, the trait of the “in-view-of” something is 
outstanding. Let us now consider the expression: “we do not know what the future 
prepares [holds for] us”. Here lies an additional trait of the word “to prepare”, which 
constitutes, though in a less remarkable way, its essence: the aspect of providing, 
reserving, meant as putting aside, keeping and guarding (for example a destiny full of 
promises). In the tonal technique of composition, for example, “to prepare a 
dissonance” means to stress the note that will determine the dissonance before it takes 
place. Inside the word “to prepare” there is a play of cross-references, as though the two 
aspects identified echo each other. It is, therefore, necessary to think about what joins 
them. Every single preparation, as such, must have already envisaged its own “in-view- 
of” (its own horizon of sense), must have taken care of it before this happens. In other 
words, every beginning must have its goal within sight and only from this does it derive 
its main sense: the end, however, though not yet attained, must somehow be “present”, 
as it becomes the source of every preliminary moment. As far as our analyses are 
concerned, this means that Division One of Part One, though preliminary, constitutes 
the start of the research and contributes in a decisive way to the outlining of the 
question which names the work itself, insofar as the sense of the analytic of Dasein can 
be seen only in the light of the question itself of Being and time.
*
French translation of Être et Temps (Gallimard, Paris 1986, pp. 515-527). Let us remind 
ourselves what Vezin writes: “Such translation of Being and Time has been undertaken in the 
conviction that it is possible to translate Heidegger into French and that the French version of 
this book should also integrate in French the German word D asein . We thought that this was a 
word -  like logos or spleen [...], not to be translated. [...]. Everybody knows that [the word] 
Dasein  has much gone around in discussions over the last sixty years on Heidegger’s first book, 
but it is not our intention to consecrate a state of fact or to take refuge in a habit. Dasein  is 
different from any other imported word -  like ersatz, week-end or samovar. Not to translate it is 
an option” (p. 519). O f a completely different opinion seem to be the two English translators of 
Sein und Zeit -  John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson - ,  according to whom “The word 
«D a se in » [...] is already so fam iliar to the English-speaking reader who has read about 
Heidegger, that it seems simpler to leave it untranslated [ ...]” (BT 27). With regard to a 
renewed attention to the English translation of Heidegger’s works, see K. Maly, Translating  
H eidegger’s works into English: the history and the possibility  (in H eidegger Studies, Duncker
& Humblot, Berlin 2000).
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Let us start by exposing a remark with regard to the structure of Sein und 
Zeit, which originally consisted of two parts: Part One (BT §§ 9-83): “The interpretation 
of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental 
horizon for the question of Being”; Part Two: “Basic features of a phenomenological 
de-obstruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of temporality as our 
clue”.
Now, after noticing that the work is incomplete -  the entire Part Two 
(dedicated to the phenomenological analysis of Descartes’, Kant’s and Aristotle’s 
ontology) and Division Three of Part One (“Time and Being”) have never been 
published in Sein und Zeit18 - , let us concentrate on the title of Part One, which may be 
subdivided into two sentences linked by the conjunction “and”: “The interpretation of 
Dasein in terms of temporality” and “The explication of time as the transcendental 
horizon for the question of Being”. What is the meaning of this “and”? The two 
sentences highlight the phenomenon of time: the former identifies the sphere inside 
which Dasein is interpreted in terms of time (Division One and Two); the latter, instead, 
directly puts the phenomenon of time in relation to the question of Being (Division 
Three). The conjunction “and”, therefore, identifies the unitary phenomenon thanks to 
which both the interpretation of Dasein and the question of Being are highlighted. Then, 
the first two Divisions of Part One have to be understood starting from the question of 
time as “possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (BT 19): in fact, 
Division One (BT §§ 9-44) introduces Division Two (BT §§ 45-83), where the results 
reached in the former -  which determine Dasein in a provisional way -  will be 
elaborated again in the light of temporality, in view of a truly existential interpretation 
of Dasein (see infra, §§ 1.d & 3).
18 They are to be found, instead, in some later works: with regard to Division 
Three, see Heidegger’s Zur Sache des Denkens (Niemeyer, Tübingen 1969) and D ie  
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (SS 1927, HGA 24, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1975; 
see also W. F. von Hermann, Heideggers “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie”. Zur zweiten 
Hälfte von “Sein und Z e it”, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1991). As regards Part Two, see 
Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der M etaphysik (HGA 3, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 
1973) and all the works that rose thanks to Heidegger’s activity of teaching at the University of 
Freiburg between 1928 and 1944 (HGA 27-55).
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But, let us proceed more slowly and think about these preliminary 
considerations. There are three key words mentioned in these pages: Dasein -  time -  
Being. Now, we have to start considering the origin of Sein und Zeit: what does it mean 
that Dasein is interpreted in the light of time? And that time constitutes the 
transcendental horizon for the question of Being? And again: what do “Being” and 
“time” mean? So how can the research be started?
b) The ground of Sein und Zeit: 
the need of reawakening an understanding for the sense of Being
Now, let us listen to Heidegger’s words, who, on the first page of Sein und 
Zeit, so determines -  in his dialogue with Plato (Sophist 244a) -  the thematic ambit of 
his researches: “Do we in our time have an answer to the question on what we really 
mean by the word «being»? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the 
question of the sense of Being. But are we nowadays even embarrassed at our inability 
to understand the expression «Being»? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an 
understanding for the sense of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work 
out the question of the sense of «Being» and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is 
the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of 
Being” (BT 19, translation slightly modified).
Thanks to this passage we can take note, first of all, of the “starting point” 
of Sein und Zeit, which consists of showing the spiritual disposition of our historical 
humanity: this is an age in which the question of the sense of Being is no longer 
perceived in its inexhaustible vastness, such is to be assumed as something obvious -  to 
say it with Heidegger’s own words: a dogma.
Then, to be well pondered and understood, the question of Being requires a 
guideline for the research towards the fundamental concept of “Being”. Now, as Being, 
according to Heidegger, is always the Being of a being, the being “man” will assume an 
essential role and priority, insofar as man is interpreted as that being whose “essence” is 
constituted by the contract (Bezug) with Being -  contract which manifests itself in that 
understanding o f Being that, alone, discloses and outlines the world in which we live. In
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the guiding-word Dasein we must perceive that trait which names the constituent 
relation of Being to man, as the foundation of the sense (truth) of his existence. In Sein 
und Zeit, specifically in the Randbemerkungen aus dem Handexemplar des Autors, 
Heidegger recites: “Dasein is not the case of a being which represents Being by 
abstraction, but rather the site (Stätte) for an understanding of Being” (p. 8). In other 
words: “If we are to arrive at the basic concept of Being and to outline the ontological 
conceptions which it requires [...], we need a clue which is concrete. We shall proceed 
towards the concept of Being by way of an interpretation of a certain special being, 
Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for 
the possibility of interpreting it; the universality of the concept of Being is not belied by 
the relatively special character of our investigation” (BT 63, translation slightly 
modified).
Man, then, is not caught according to a psychological or anthropological 
perspective, but in the light of an ontological research. Only on the basis of this new 
formulation of the question of Being -  question which constituted a real gigantomachia 
for the Greeks -  it becomes necessary, and therefore comprehensible, the “existential 
analytic” of Dasein, whose sole objective is to explain the fundamental constitution of 
Dasein itself, just insofar as man, in his Being that being he is, is mainly looked after by 
Being and cares for it.19
19 Writes Heidegger: “When, moreover, we use the term «ontology», we are not 
talking about some definite philosophical discipline standing in interconnection with the others. 
Here one does not have to measure up to the tasks of some discipline that has been presented 
beforehand; on the contrary, only in terms of the objective necessities of definite questions and 
the kind of treatment which the «things themselves» [i.e. the phenomenon of Being] require, 
can one develop such a discipline” (BT 49). In this sense -  in view of the determination of the 
phenomenon Heidegger refers to with the expression “things themselves” - , please refer to Sein 
und Zeit, §§ 9 (The theme o f  the analytic o f  Dasein) and 10 (How the analytic o f  Dasein is to be 
distinguished from  anthropology, psychology, and biology). Writes Heidegger: “In suggesting 
that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to give an unequivocal and ontologically 
adequate answer to the question about the kind o f  Being which belongs to those beings which 
we ourselves are, we are not passing judgement on the positive work of these disciplines. We 
must always bear in mind, however, that these ontological foundations can never be disclosed 
by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material, but that they are always «there» 
already, even when that empirical material simply gets collected. If  positive research fails to see 
these foundations and holds them to be self-evident, this by no means proves that they are not 
basic or that they are not problematic in a more radical sense than any thesis of positive science 
can ever be” (BT 75).
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*Once again, we take a slower pace, in fear of supplying a seemingly too 
clear interpretation. Indeed, in these first pages, we have easily talked about “Being” 
and “understanding of Being”. When listening to Heidegger’s words on the 
embarrassment and perplexity we feel -  assuming that we “recognize” them -  when 
thinking about what “Being” means, we must admit that we have supplied, at most, a 
conceptual interpretation of a question that, nowadays, “nobody” even feels the need to 
question. In fact, Heidegger’s words, as quoted above, recite: “Do we in our time have 
an answer to the question on what we really mean by the word «being»? Not at all. So it 
is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the sense of being. But are we 
nowadays even embarrassed at our inability to understand the expression «Being»? Not 
at all”.
We do have to admit that our understanding of what “Being” means is really 
wrapped up in a worrying darkness. Indeed, it is deemed to be the “most general” of all 
concepts, or impossible to define, or, even, an obvious one. However, the question of 
Being does not seem to need any additional reflection. But: what does it mean that 
Being appears as something stranger to us and something we do not need at all, to such 
an extent that “if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method 
[!]” (BT 21)?
Indeed, the “concept” of Being is clear in its obviousness. Then, what 
problematic is hidden inside this question? How to turn again our eyes towards what, 
according to Heidegger, has shaped the spiritual history of the West, from the Greeks up 
to us, and now appears to be something unnecessary and, being it very general -  and, as 
such, indefinable -  not to be defined? Can we still feel the need and urgency for the 
question around Being? Can we hear the appeal addressed to us by Being itself, 
notwithstanding the hubbub of the active and busy historical epoch we live in? 
Heidegger recites: “The man of this age finds himself in a fundamentally new relation 
to Being -  the problem is that HE KNOWS NOTHING OF IT!”.20
20 M. Heidegger, Seminare (1951-1973), op. cit., p. 369.
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This is the age that has exhausted the question of Being, that has dried out 
that endless source which, according to Heidegger, has given birth to any real human 
community and has been able to give it a shape, time after time, in its unceasing 
research for a new interpretation of it. Let us listen to the words of a poet with respect to 
a period of time -  for us, Western men of the twenty-first century -  chronologically 
“passed”, yet enigmatically present from a spiritual point of view. Boris Pasternak 
(1890-1960), in his 1914 essay entitled Wassermann’s reaction, making reflections on 
the condition of art (or, better, of artistic production) “in our century ...of democratism 
and technology”, recites: “The doubts about the possibility of a personal election, 
which, up to now, had given every history of talent the aura of martyrdom, have fallen 
down. Not because they vanished for a sudden beatitude, at all levels of a consecrating 
job; rather, because those doubts found a curious confirmation. The secret manifesto by 
the crowd of consumers on the dethronement of the genius and the destruction of last 
heraldic distinctions, have been the acknowledgment to the proletarian of the spirit of 
his right to artistic labour. The client-reader has become the master of this new kind of 
industry. In such a situation, mediocrity has become the only positive form of talent. 
[...]. The reader, nowadays, is difficult to recognize. Whether he accepts whatever 
product from the industry of recent years, or he rejects any market innovation with the 
same unconcern [...]. But there is no reader who can distinguish the poet from the 
swindler, because there is no reader who needs a poet and who is waiting for him. There 
is a cultivated reader and a less-cultivated one. That is all. Habit is the good genius of 
the latter, novelty the opium compound of the former”.21
Now, assuming that the need and waiting fo r  the word o f  a poet and o f  a 
thinker are based on the perception o f the menace which, in the light o f  the rediscovery 
o f the question o f Being, is impending on the future o f our knowledge and our destiny, 
what is the essence o f the “age o f science and technology” we are in?
Far from vituperating the development of science and technology in the 
modern world, the matter is to start clarifying the question: here lies the urgency, first of 
all, of re-awakening in man a sense (a need, so to say) for an existential possibility other
21 B. Pasternak, La reazione di Wassermann, in Quintessenza, a cura di C. G. De
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than the one which, from Descartes to Nietzsche, has come to think of his relationship 
to the world exclusively in terms of calculability and possible dominancy 
(“mathematical projection of nature”). Only thanks to the re-awakening of the sense for 
Being can modern science and technology be understood in their sense and limits, and 
rises the possibility of another thought which takes a “step backwards” with regard to 
the (modern) philosophical position that founds and sustains them: here is the basis of 
the need for a new interpretation of man’s essence as Dasein, in which the Cartesian 
ego cogito proves not to be false, but insufficient, insofar as it has its foundation in 
Dasein itself (see infra, chap. 2).22 If Being, according to Nietzsche, is “the final wisp of 
evaporating reality” (Götzen-Dämmerung), writes Heidegger: “Does Nietzsche speak 
the truth? Or is he himself only the final victim of a long-standing errancy and neglect, 
but as this victim the unrecognised witness to a new necessity? Is it Being’s fault that 
Being is so confused, and is it the fault of the word that it remains so empty, or is it our 
fault, because in all our bustling and chasing after beings, we have nevertheless fallen 
out of Being? What if the fault is not our own, we of today, nor that of our immediate or 
most distant forebears, but rather is based in a happening that runs through Western 
history from the inception onward, a happening that the eyes of all historians will never 
reach, but which nevertheless happens -  formerly, today, and in the future? What if  it 
were possible that human beings, that peoples in their greatest machinations and 
exploits, have a relation to beings but have long since fallen out o f  Being, without 
knowing it, and what i f  this were the innermost and most powerful ground o f  their 
decline? [Cf. BT, § 38, especially p. 179 ff.]”.23
Michelis, Marsilio, Venezia 1970, p. 4.
22 With regard to this topic, please refer to F.-W. von Hermann, Subjekt und 
Dasein. Interpretationen zu “Sein und Z eit”, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1985.
3 M. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1953 (Engl. 
Trans. An Introduction to M etaphysics, Yale University Press, New Haven 1959, p. 39, our 
italics).
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c) The forgetfulness of Being as the ground of the age of science and technology
“Now adays, M artin H eidegger’s work 
appears as a radical, perhaps decisive, questioning on the 
destiny o f Modern Times, the age o f science and 
technology. [...]. All thoughts born after Heidegger’s first 
book, Sein und Zeit, published in 1927, are then directed 
toward this question of technology in which, as Jean 
Beaufret recited, «the last step of his pathway» can be 
recognized nowadays” (E IX).
The clarification of the position taken by modern philosophy and, in 
particular, by Nietzsche with regard to the question of Being compels us to present one 
of the fundamental guiding-words of Heidegger’s pathway of thinking, in virtue of 
which we will be able to perceive the unitary sense of his philosophical project.24 The 
guiding-word sounds: “forgetfulness of Being” (Seinsvergessenheit). Thanks to this, the 
reason why Heidegger sees in Nietzsche “the final victim of a long-standing errancy and 
neglect” will become more comprehensible. This errancy and neglect, which can be 
perceived only in the light of the rediscovery of the question of Being, will make 
necessary what Heidegger in Sein und Zeit calls a “de-obstruction of the history of 
ontology” (BT § 6), insofar as the entire philosophical tradition has been determined 
right from the beginning by the oblivion of Being as its own source. In this sense, 
although the locution “forgetfulness of Being” appears for the first time in Heidegger’s 
work twenty years after Sein und Zeit, and precisely in Humanismusbrief, “the place 
from which the whole book [Sein und Zeit] has been experienced and thought is the one 
of the forgetfulness of Being [...]”.25
Let us now assume as a guide to our analyses the words pronounced by 
Beaufret in his Entretiens avec Frédéric de Towarnicki. The French philosopher writes: 
“Certainly, philosophers have not forgotten to talk about Being. [...]. But, according to 
Heidegger, they have only talked about it in the dimension of an oblivion, and about a
24 According to Zaccaria, there are four guiding themes in Heidegger’s Denkweg: 
“the A n-denken, namely the re-thinking addressed to the Greek beginning of thought, the 
phenomenological and historical pondering of Metaphysics through the determination and 
unfolding of its guiding question (the question of Being as such), the necessity and urgency of a 
thought which is no longer metaphysical and then -  once again -  initial, and finally the 
historical need for a dialogue between Denken and Dichten” (IGP 16-17).
25 J. Beaufret, L ’oubli de l ’être, in D ialogue avec Heidegger, t. 4, Minuit, Paris
1 9 8 5 , p .  9 .
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sort of oblivion which gradually becomes forgetful of itself, to such an extent that, 
nowadays, it has become an unquestionable fact. The most outstanding feature o f what 
is called «philosophy» today is the forgetfulness o f the source o f  philosophy itself, 
forgetfulness which is pushed up to the oblivion o f this forgetfulness! This forgetfulness 
«to the square» is the dimension itself, namely the diametrical dimension of the so- 
called modern philosophy and this is the reason why it finds it useless to research the 
source, so dear to Heidegger, i.e. the «un-said», through the Latin of scholastic 
philosophy, by Descartes or Leibniz, up to the Greek by Plato and Aristotle and, even, 
before them” (E 37, our italics).
It is beyond the aim of our dissertation to catch in a unitary way the 
meaning of the reference to the entire history of philosophy, from Parmenides to 
Nietzsche. We do then limit our analyses to the ambit enucleated by Beaufret with 
regard to modern philosophy, which determines the interpretation of Being that founds 
the epoch we ourselves live in: “This forgetfulness «to the square» is the dimension 
itself, namely the diametrical dimension of the so-called modern philosophy [...]”. The 
problematic core from which our entire dissertation originates is clearly expressed in 
this sentence: the sense of the existential analytic of Dasein has its foundation in the 
elucidation of the limits of the decisive and highly problematical turn expressed by the 
“mathematical projection of nature” (in comparison with the Greek age), in virtue of 
which Being was reduced to “mere objectivity for science, and today, it is mere material 
(Bestand: standing reserve) for the technological mastery of the world” (QA 83). On 
this issue writes Beaufret: “Everything [the glance on «things themselves»] depends on 
what, in the presence of beings, appears to be preponderant and initial [constitutive], 
and in relationship to which the rest [ . ]  is nothing but [something] ulterior and «of 
second rank», said Plato. Now, in today’s world, no matter in presence o f what we are, 
the initial and principal trait [o f things themselves] is always determined by the answer 
to the question: how much? For instance, how many parts should the cake be divided 
into, so that each of those who are owed it may have his part, if not equal at least 
proportional to his social rank? This is what Heidegger calls «mathematical projection
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of nature», which Descartes, better than anyone else, has brought to word” (E 51, our 
italics).
Assuming that the objective of modern man is to become certain of his own 
world in view of its possible mastery and controllability, it is necessary that the 
Cartesian ego cogitative man “places the thing before himself as an object”(E 17) and 
reduces its Being (“presence”) to those traits that can be calculated and measured: here 
lies the mathematical projection of nature, which is made possible by the role played by 
man as the one that sets the standards of the Being of being. In Heidegger’s 
interpretation, in fact, the well known Cartesian locution ego cogito, ergo sum means: 
“man becomes the fundament and measure (Grund und Maß), set by himself, of every 
certainty and truth”.26
*
In order to show in what sense the forgetfulness of Being determines the 
essence of the modern interpretation of the relationship between man and world, let us 
remind ourselves that, in view of the comprehension of the fundamental core of the 
Heideggerian thought, the question of Being, we do have to clarify what the “question 
of the sense of Being” -  to which Heidegger refers at the very beginning of Sein und 
Zeit -  is. As pointed out by Beaufret, “decisive in the question of the sense of Being is 
not the meaning the word «Being» could have, but the acquisition of a sense, as of a 
«sixth sense»” (E 40) for the being in its Being, for its taking place: “Being” does not 
mean the mere presence-at-hand o f  a being, but its shining in the stupefying 
phenomenon o f its coming to light. Far from simply gathering information on the things 
that can be encountered in the world, man’s task is to “equal the thing in the opening of 
its manifestation or of its p resen ce .” (E 25). At this point we are thus able to perceive 
how, not by chance, the sense of wonder and astonishment may have attuned the Greek 
beginning of thought: in welcoming the instantaneous blow o f the taking place o f  the 
world, it has guarded the extent o f  man’s existence as Dasein, who “opens himself to
26 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche II, HGA 6.2, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 
118. For a “hermeneutical discussion on the Cartesian ontology” in Sein und Zeit, see 
paragraphs 19-21 and 43 a.
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the presence itself o f things” (E 17, our italics) and “shines, so to say, there where all 
things instantaneously are” (E 17, our italics). In this sense the Greek determination of 
man as psyché, insofar as it is “in its own way, the presence of beings as they are [in 
their Being]” (Aristotle [E 18]), constitutes the foundation of m an’s modern 
interpretation as “calculating subject”: any pretence o f dominance on beings is made 
possible by a precedent, though forgotten, perception o f their Being. The reduction of 
the Being of the being to the mere objectivity for science, smoothes the way to its 
interpretation in terms of mere standing reserve: the forgetfulness “to the square” of 
Being is definitely at work here, insofar as the questioning itself about what Being is, 
today has become an empty intellectual sophistry which does not get to any useful 
result.27 The time has now come, to say it in Beaufret’s words, to prepare ourselves to 
perceive “that famous sense of Being Heidegger wanted to awake in other men with his 
book Sein und Zeit” (E 42-43).
*
Now -  starting from the forgetfulness of Being -  what are the constitutive 
phenomena of the epoch of science and technology? In his 1938 essay entitled Die Zeit 
des Weltbildes [The Age of the World Picture] Heidegger presents its most significant 
manifestations: science, machine technology, “the process of art’s moving into the 
purview of aesthetics” (meant as a way of expression of man’s life28), Kultur [culture] 
(as a way of conceiving and projecting any human action) and, finally, Entgötterung (to 
say with Zaccaria’s words, “the upside-down of the divine” resulting in the so-called 
religious “lived experience”). Now, Heidegger writes: “What conception o f beings and 
what interpretation o f  truth lies at the basis o f these phenomena?”.29 In other words: if
27 From here the decision Heidegger took to become rector at the University of 
Freiburg in 1933-1934 (see infra, chap. 3), in order to foster the renewal of knowing “starting 
from  its essential ground [the phenomenon of Being], which is precisely the essential ground o f  
the sciences, that is to say from  the essence o f  truth itself’ (QA 16, our italics).
28 In order to understand the turn made by Modern Times with regard to the 
aesthetical interpretation of art, see: F. Fédier, L ’art, Lettrage, Paris 2000; F. Vezin, La question 
de l ’oeuvre d ’art (in La fê te  de la pensée, Lettrage, Paris 2001, pp. 259-273).
29 M. Heidegger, H olzwege, HGA 5, hrsg. von F.-W. von Hermann, Klostermann, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1977 (Engl. Trans. O ff the Beaten Track, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2002, p. 58, our italics).
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all these phenomena, as such, are a “decisive way through which all what is shows itself 
to us”30, what interpretation (of the sense) of Being constitutes their foundation?
Let us now point out that in this writing we will limit our field of 
investigation to the phenomenon of modern science, dwelling more specifically upon 
the sense o f the difference raised by Heidegger between philosophy and science. In fact, 
our analyses have the sole objective to highlight the phenomenon of every phenomenon, 
Being, namely to awake the understanding of its sense, and, then, to show the need and 
the urgency of re-asking the question “What is Being”?, just in the epoch of the history 
of humanity in which the question of Being does no longer appear to us in its vivid and 
intimately problematic nature and shows itself as just something useless and 
unproductive i f  compared to the scientific method which is continuously making 
progress in every ambit o f the being.
Indeed, the need Heidegger is the spokesman of, becomes more 
comprehensible, just when science and technology, nowadays, claim in an absolutist 
way to be the (objective) measure of truth, does it not? Can sciences really fulfil the 
search for truth or, rather, is there a particular knowledge that anticipates them (in an 
ontological sense) -  philosophy -, which thoroughly shakes the sense o f their truth? In 
which sense, then, can we talk -  as Husserl did in 1935 -  about a crisis o f sciences “in 
view of their constant successes”? In other words: in what sense has the exclusive 
dominance of the interpretation of truth by the mathematical projection of nature -  
which has supplanted the Greek view of things -  meant a “turning-away from the 
questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity”31?
d) The sense for Being as preparation to the transformation of 
an experience of time and history
Let us point out right from the start that the analyses we will develop in our 
research are somehow limited, insofar as the question of time will not be studied in
30 M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Neske, Pfullingen 1954, p. 45.
31 We do remind that Husserl’s quotations we here refer to stem from his The 
Crisis o f  the Sciences as Expression o f  the Radical Life-Crisis o f  European Humanity (CES 3-
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depth and will then remain somehow in the background (see infra, § 3). In this respect, 
this writing is incomplete and provisional -  just as the existential analytic of Dasein, 
which “merely brings out the Being of this being, without giving the interpretation of its 
sense. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial 
way of interpreting Being may be laid bare [time]” (BT 38).
However, we believe it is advisable to formulate some observations which 
would let us set the question of time against the background of the problematic we are 
dealing with, i.e. the question of Being and its forgetfulness in modern science and 
technology. Let us remind ourselves Beaufret’s words on this matter, which show us 
just how the rising o f a sense for Being determines the possibility o f  an experience o f  
time the way it is thought o f in Sein und Zeit. The French philosopher writes: “Valéry 
wrote on this subject [the word «Being»]: «This mysterious verb, of no value, this verb 
to-be that has made such a great career in the void». According to Heidegger, it is just 
the opposite. To be is not at all a null and mysterious verb, but the verb of verbs, it is 
the one that brings the most. It is only seemingly undetermined, as it is the chance fo r  a 
sense for Being to open, which just makes this transformation o f the experience itself o f  
time possible. I  would add: not only o f time, but o f history [...]” (E 45, our italics).
An accurate reading of this quotation lets us enucleate some questions, 
which prove in our opinion fundamental in view of a clarification of the sense of Part 
One of Sein und Zeit and, more specifically, of the relationship between the rediscovery 
of the question of Being and man’s new essence as Dasein. First of all, the matter is: 1) 
to clarify how and with regard to what the experience of time, as it is thought of in Sein 
und Zeit, constitutes a “transformation”; 2) to clarify in what sense this transformation 
lets us approach a preliminary experience of history. The hypothesis is that, in order to 
approach an experience both o f time and o f  history, it is necessary to see clearly into 
the locution “sense for Being” 3
18); see also, in the same work, Philosophy and the Crisis o f  European Humanity (CES 269­
299).
32 Let us remind ourselves that the sense for Being lead us to understand the 
revolution itself of the essence of knowing and science fostered by Heidegger in 1933, which 
deals, in its turn, with the assumption of a decision about the future of the German people and of 
its history (see infra, chap. 3)!
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*To a question by de Towarnicki who asked: “Nowadays, Heidegger’s work 
appears more and more as a reflection on our time, on modern Times. What was 
Heidegger’s itinerary? Or, as he says, his «path of thought»?”, Beaufret answered: “[...] 
Heidegger was the author of a book named Being and Time; and I thought that, when 
we would meet [in 1946], he would talk to me about time; indeed, he did not talk about 
time, but about Being and about Being in its opposition to «being». Then, it should be 
admitted that Sein und Zeit [ . ]  is the configuration under which the difference and the 
participation of Being and being have appeared to Heidegger for the first time. Then 
Sein und Zeit will be the book on the difference between Being and being. It is worth 
noting that the word «difference», which is very common in Heidegger’s writings, does 
not really appear thematically in his well-known first book, namely Being and Time, but 
that the locution «ontological difference» [...] appears in his teaching only in the 
months following the publication of Sein und Zeit [...]. [...]; and from this point of 
view one starts perceiving that time, in the title Being and Time, will be the name that 
takes the difference between Being and being [...]” (E 11-12).
Assuming that our entire dissertation turns around the difference between 
Being and being, we cannot get out of asking from now on what its sense is (see infra, 
§§ 2 ff.). However, though it still remains obscure, let us limit ourselves for the moment 
being, to point out how the question of time transforms itself, according to Beaufret, 
into the question of the difference between Being and being: only the acquisition of a 
sense for this difference will be capable of letting us perceive the disclosure of that 
dimension -  the opening-clearing of Being - , which, by revealing to man his own Being 
in the world, lets him seize the possibility of a future and the invitation to fulfil the 
existential mission to which each of us has been destined. Beaufret writes: “When this 
difference [between Being and being] is not thought of, it happens that man is simply 
harassed by beings, on which he gathers, he says, some «information»; but, in doing so, 
he is completely outside the domain of philosophy, i.e. outside any experience of Being, 
outside any experience of time. And, for him, time passes moment after moment, with 
no chance for any other experience of time” (E 46).
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From what has been said, it follows that the transformation o f  the 
experience o f time and history has its foundation in the sense for the difference between 
Being and being. Now, what kind of knowledge has come to free itself more and more 
of this difference in favour of beings only, insofar as one cannot gather information on 
Being as it is not a real predicate of a thing? Heidegger’s answer is univocal: science. 
The possible access to the question o f  time and history requires, firs t o f  all, an 
elucidation o f  the difference between philosophy and science on the grounds o f  their 
interpretations o f  time: science, in fact, has definitely interpreted time in terms of a 
mere sequence and passing of instants -  on which the chronological measurement of 
time is based - , so not to have “any opening in favour of time, as it appears in 
Heidegger’s way of thinking” (E 46). The transformation of the experience of time and 
history is then possible only in case the limits of the scientific interpretation of time, i.e. 
of the difference between Being and being, are clearly perceived.
If we now assume that history becomes “the object of a science” (BT 427) 
and that is being interpreted in the light of the scientific determination of time, we 
would be inclined to think that man’s history can be seen as the “sum of the momentary 
actualities of Experiences which come along successively and disappear” (BT 426). 
But, as shown by Heidegger, “In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to 
show that this being is not «temporal» because «it stands in history», but that, on the 
contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very 
basis of its Being” (BT 428).
The existence of Dasein, i.e. his Being historical, can be reduced neither to 
his temporal duration nor to the sum of the experiences that happen in the course of his 
life: Dasein, in fact, can have a history and a destiny, insofar as it seizes its own 
essence from the relationship with time as sense for the difference between Being and 
being. The destiny of a man and of a people (as community of human beings) names 
that dimension where man, on the grounds of the phenomenon of the opening of Being, 
perceives the possibilities thanks to which the authentic sense for his own existence 
comes to shape (see IGP 125-130). According to this perspective, the past, far from 
becoming a merely gone-by and once and for all obsolete event, emerges again in all its
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splendour as indicating power, as the source that has started history and given shape to 
the destiny each of us is called to.33 “Only for the man who finds in himself a passion 
for the future, can the idea of the past assume a meaning and constitute a value” 
(Valéry)34. It is not by chance, in fact, that the future itself o f  knowledge and o f truth 
and, at the same time, the destiny o f Western humanity (and also o f the German people 
in 1933) are founded on the rediscovery o f the question o f Being as the fundamental 
theme o f Greek philosophy.
§ 2. Determination o f the essence ofphilosophy in comparison with positive sciences 
(sciences o f beings): philosophy as critical science (science o f Being)
a) Preliminary clarification of the question of the sense for Being, on the grounds of the 
repetition of the guiding-question of Metaphysics: “what is a being?”
We do have, at this point, to clarify the sense of the locution “difference 
between Being and being”, insofar as thanks to it we will be able to understand what 
Heidegger in a passage already quoted determined as the origin of the “decline” our 
epoch is facing -  i.e. its having a relation (only) to beings and, in so doing, its having 
fallen out of Being.
To this purpose we take as a starting point of our reflections a note 
concerning Heidegger’s spiritual biography: as reported by William Richardson in the 
letter (already quoted) Heidegger sent him, the first philosophical work to which the 
latter incessantly dedicated since 1907 was the dissertation by Franz Brentano, 
Husserl’s master, entitled Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach 
Aristoteles -  on the title page of which, the phrase, Aristotle starts his research on the 
being with, appears. Its commonly accepted translation sounds: “a being is said in many
33 Heidegger writes: “ [...] for the tradition, experienced in the right way, provides 
us the present that stands over against us as the matter of thinking and, for that reason, is at 
issue. Genuine tradition is so far from being the dragging weight of what is past that it much 
rather frees us for what approaches us as present, and thus becomes the enduring directive 
toward the matter of thinking” (PM 324).
34 P. Valéry, Regards sur le monde actuel et autres essais, in Œuvres II, Gallimard, 
Paris 1960, p. 917.
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ways”. The fact that Heidegger’s thought has been determined by this sentence 
indicates that the elucidation of the question of Being is not the mere fruit of an 
extemporaneous and totally arbitrary decision by the German philosopher; on the 
contrary, it originates from the very core of the history of Western philosophy: as 
reminded by Beaufret, one of the most worrying perils that menace our epoch is the 
complete lack of care with regard to its own spiritual tradition (E 38), i.e. to the 
question that has started the whole history of philosophical thought (from Plato to 
Nietzsche) -  as the particular kind of knowledge that has marked in a decisive way the 
destiny itself of Western humanity.
In this sense, we may say that Heidegger’s meditation until the publication 
of Sein und Zeit and all along the entire course of his philosophical existence should be 
interpreted as an uninterrupted dialogue with the guiding-question of the Platonic- 
Aristotelian Metaphysics, which asks: “what is a being?”. More precisely, assuming 
that: 1) Heidegger’s translation of the Aristotelian sentence sounds: “A being becomes 
manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in many ways”35; 2) as reported by Heidegger, 
Aristotle himself left undetermined the trait that joins the four Greek interpretations of 
Being -  Being as property (Eigenschaft), as possibility and actuality (Möglichkeit und 
Wirklichkeit), as truth (Wahrheit) and as scheme of the categories (Schema der 
Kategorien) - ,  the task of a thought that meditates once again on the manifold 
expressibleness of the Being of being can be formulated starting from the following 
question: what is the unitary determination o f the Being o f  being? Or else: what does 
Being mean?
*
Let us start with some remarks about the meaning of the question that asks 
what a being is, in order to point out that, though it is a being which is primarily 
questioned here, the question on the sense of Being itself, on its truth, and on its relation 
to man’s essence -  with no mediation of any being -  is implicitly at stake. Now: under 
what perspective does a being become the theme of an analysis? Better: according to
35 M. Heidegger, Letter to W. Richardson, op. cit., pp. VIII-XXIII.
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what posture does the possibility itself of the question about the Being of being become 
comprehensible?36
We do have to admit that the question about what a being is appears at first 
sight, on one hand, a mere game of words in which an empty depth is hidden, and, on 
the other, a vague and confused entity because too vast, insofar as it is not clear at all 
what is being looked for in it. If the word “being”, as present participle of the verb “to 
be”, literally means “that what is” (ens), what else could we say of it and of its sense but 
taking note that it names an obvious fact, i.e. the mere assessment of its being present- 
at-hand? What mystery would hide itself in the banal statement that a being is? What 
could a being “do” but be? Moreover, which being is inquired in this question: the sum 
of all “things” and “facts” that constitute the world? Or a particular being -  man, or 
even God?
How can we find a way of access to the question we started from? We must 
admit that these last questions leave us in a state of confusion and bewilderment, as it is 
not clear what direction we have to take in our analyses. To this purpose, a phrase by 
Aristotle may be of help, as it throws light upon the essence of philosophy and its 
theme. The phrase sounds: “There is a particular type of knowledge [or competence], 
which studies a being qua being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own 
nature” (Metaphysics, T 1,1003 a 21)37.
Now, the matter is to understand the meaning of the expression “a being qua 
being”: the theme of philosophy is neither a specific being, nor a given regional ambit 
of the being (nature, history, art etc.), but the being as such, i.e. the being in its Being. 
Assuming that the Being of being cannot be reduced to the mere ascertainment of its 
presence, the enigmatical Aristotelian locution can be understood only in case the 
nature of the phenomenon of Being, which goes with the taking place of the being itself
-  without ever abandoning it -  comes to light. Heidegger writes: “To be sure -  only 
beings, but what «is» with them? They, beings, «are». But what does it mean, they
36 We do follow now as our guiding-line some particularly effective observations 
by Zaccaria (see Per un’ermeneutica del tema di fondo della filosofia, IGP 111-198) concerning 
the aporetical condition of modern man with regard to the question of the sense for Being, for 
its truth.
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«are»? What does Being consist of? What is the proposition «beings are» supposed to 
mean if we heed the above mentioned misgivings, cast Being aside as an abstraction, 
even obliterate it, and then only allow beings to count? Then only «beings» remain. But 
what does it mean that beings «remain» -  does it mean anything other than that beings 
and only «beings» are? And if  we want only to hold fast to beings, to avoid the 
«abstraction» of Being, to remain steadfast and exclusively with beings, and 
accordingly say beings are beings, then we also still say the «is» and thus still think in 
terms o f Being. Being continually overtakes us as that which we can never not think,3S.
In other words: in the light of the following examples given by Heidegger 
himself -  “this man is from Swabia”; “the book is yours”; the enemy is in retreat”; “red 
is port”; “God is”; “there is a flood in China”; “the goblet is silver”; “Above all 
summits/Is r e s t . ” (Goethe)39 - , we may ask: what kind o f richness is concealed behind 
this seemingly empty identicalness o f the word “is”? From here the hypothesis that the 
locution “a being is” -  which at first sight seems lacking in sense, as the predicates that 
are used to complete the basic structure of a sentence are missing - , names in the 
clearest way the stupefying phenomenon o f the being in its Being, o f its taking place in 
comparison with the nothing, o f its coming to light and being in vigour as such in the 
midst o f  the whole world. Far from demanding a description of how this or that being is, 
the question “what is a being?” can be formulated only once the enchanting 
phenomenon that the being is has come into presence. Heidegger writes: “All being is 
in Being. To hear such a thing sounds trivial to our ear, if not, indeed, offensive, for no 
one needs to bother about the fact that being belongs in Being. All the world knows that 
being is that which is. What else remains for being but to be? And yet, just this fact that 
being is gathered together in Being, that in the appearance o f Being being appears, that
37 Aristotle, M etaphysics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA -  London, 
England 1933 (translation slightly modified).
38 M. Heidegger, G rundbegriffe, HGA 51, hrsg. von P. Jaeger, Klostermann, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1981 (Engl. Trans. Basic Concepts, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
1993, p. 68, our italics).
39 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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astonished the Greeks and first astonished them and them alone. Being [small «b»] in 
Being -  that became the most astonishing thing for the Greeks”.40
b) Positive sciences as sciences of beings
Philosophy is that knowledge which, in an exclusive way in respect of any 
other cognitive knowledge, asks the question (first by rank) on the being in its Being 
(taking place): Being is the authentic and sole question of philosophy. In negative 
terms: philosophy is not the science o f  a being (positive science), but the science o f  
Being (critical science). Philosophy is ontology (phenomenology). In this sense, it is 
necessary to show the essence and task of philosophy in respect of non-philosophical 
sciences (both “exact sciences” and “sciences of Spirit”). We should, thus, be able to 
catch in an instantaneous glance the peculiar “nature” of Greek’s interpretation of 
Being.
Thanks to Heidegger’s 1926 university course entitled Grundbegriffe der 
antiken Philosophie41, we now concentrate our attention on that non-philosophical 
science that modern physics is, in order to identify the foundation of all non- 
philosophical sciences -  as “positive sciences”. Physics, in fact, does not start its 
research by stating what physics is, but “directly” places itself in the ambit of its 
research, thus assuming its own regional ambit (space, time, nature) as “already given” 
(a “fact”!), without asking in a critical way what “space”, “time”, “nature” are. And
40 M. Heidegger, Was ist das -  die Philosophie?, Neske, Pfullingen 1956 (Engl. 
Trans. What is Philosophy?, Vision Press Limited, London 1958, p. 49, our italics).
41 M. Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, SS 1926, HGA 22, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1993: in particular, Vorbemerkungen, § 3. Among Heideggerian 
works that deal with the question of the difference between philosophy and positive sciences, 
see: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, SS 1925, HGA 20 (Engl. Trans. H istory o f  
the Concept o f  time: Prolegomena, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1985, Preparatory 
Part, § 4); Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, SS 1927, HGA 24 (Engl. Trans. The Basic 
Problems o f  Phenomenology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1982, Introduction, § 3); 
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, SS 1928, HGA 26 (Engl. 
Trans. The M etaphysical Foundations o f  Logic, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1984, 
Introduction, II-IV). As far as the “secondary literature” is concerned, please refer to: J. 
Beaufret, Dialogue avec Heidegger, Philosophie moderne, t. 2, Minuit, Paris 1973; ID., Le 
destin de l ’être et la métaphysique & Philosophie et science, in Dialogue avec Heidegger, t. 3, 
Minuit, Paris 1974.
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more precisely, each positive science carves out its own reference ontic ambit and 
becomes specialized.42
According to Heidegger, the fact that sciences take their own regional ambit 
as something “already given” has its own foundation in the very essence of these 
sciences: they are positive sciences. “Positive” comes from lat. “pon_re”: to place; 
“positum ” means: something that lies, there, as something that is already placed. 
Positive sciences are such that their object o f  investigation is immediately given, is 
something “present”, “real”, “actual” -  “true”! Space-time distances, nature, body, 
matter, mass are beings, are “data”, are facts which merely stand-against ready for  
“natural” experience and knowledge. Positive sciences are, thus, the sciences o f  
beings, as they exclusively refer to beings, and never to their Being (takingplace). This 
is the reason why the physicist, for instance, answers the question “what is physics?” by 
merely asking and processing given physical questions. Should the physicist ask himself 
radical questions on physics, on its objects and methods, he could not do it with the help 
of physical concepts: let us think of one who tries to prove the essence of physics by 
taking advantage of the experiment! Heidegger recites: “For example: Physics moves in 
space and time and movement. What movement is, what space is, what time is cannot 
be decided by science as science. Therefore science does not think. With its methods, it 
cannot think at all in this sense. I cannot say, for instance, what physics is, using the
42 As a consequence, for instance, we talk about a chemical phenomenon in the 
case when the body properties under examination undergo a considerable permanent change, 
and about a physical phenomenon in the case when no permanent changes take place. “Physics” 
is then defined as: “the science which studies the properties of matter and radiation, meaning by 
matter any mass and by radiation any phenomenon characterized by wave-motion” . More 
particularly, inside the so-called “classical physics” we can distinguish the following disciplines 
having separate objects and methods: mechanics, thermology and thermodynamics, electrology, 
optics, acoustics and wave phenomena. Instead, inside the so-called “contemporary physics” -  
characterized by the theories o f relativity and of quantum mechanics -  we can distinguish 
atomic and nuclear physics, physics of elementary particles, physics of the solid state and 
physics of low temperatures. Nevertheless, the division between chemistry and physics is less 
and less clear-cut, because, thanks to the discoveries of atom and nuclear physics, atom and 
nuclear phenomena prove to be the foundations of the Being of matter, and today one feels 
more and more the urgency of explaining events such as the reactions of chemical combination 
of elements by the properties of molecules, atoms, nucleuses, etc. The study based on this 
perspective has been founded within the field of physics and has been developed through the 
elaboration of mathematical methods: but in the last few years chemists’ interest in questions 
that deal with the atomic structure of matter has grown and the common field of these two 
sciences is now being investigated by physio-chemistry.
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methods of physics. I can only think what physics is, using the methods of philosophical 
questioning” (QA 83-84).
In other words: assuming that “nature” was defined by modern Metaphysics 
and science in terms of exteriority, as opposed to the interiority of consciousness; or, 
also, in terms of causal connection; or, even, as determined, at each phase of cultural 
development of mankind, as the sphere of possible reference objects of observation 
techniques mankind avails of, which given interpretation of Being (of being) is assumed 
by positive sciences? What must have already been accepted, though not explicitly, so 
as to have the being (alone) investigated? If, in fact, the scientific method determines 
what the objects of science must be and what the essential parameters that constitute 
their essence are, “The primary thing is not nature on its own addressing the human 
being, but what is decisive is how the human being, in light o f the domination o f nature, 
must represent nature”43.
Then, how does philosophy differ from positive sciences? What is the theme 
of philosophy? What do we mean by “critical science”?
c) Philosophy as critical science: the difference between Being and being
“Critical” derives from the Greek krinein, namely “to share, to differ”. 
Thus, if philosophy is a critical science, so that its being critical constitutes its main 
character, the matter is to understand what this differentiation consists of. But what else 
can be differentiated from a being but another being?
We try to answer this last question thanks to our precedent investigations: 
now, in fact, the phrase “a being is” means: “being appears in the appearance of Being”. 
Being, then, can be “differentiated” from and in a being. The difference does not 
concern a being in respect o f another being, but being and Being itself (as what lets a 
being appear as such).
43 M. Heidegger, Zollikoner Seminare, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1987 (Engl. 
Trans. ZoUikon seminars, protocols, conversations, letters, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston 2001, p. 128, our italics).
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Now, we know what a being is: the table, the chair, the door; but Being? 
Being seems to be nothing “real”: in other words, under the concept of “Being” we 
cannot think of anything. Still, each of us must have (somehow) understood what 
“Being” means, in order to be able to comprehend the sense of the following sentences: 
“the weather is fine”, “roses are in bloom”. We must have “experience” of Being, and 
still are embarrassed when we have to say more clearly what it “is”. Being, in respect o f  
common-sense experience -  which deals with beings alone -  though it is something 
known, remains somehow “concealed”. Beaufret writes on this purpose: “Where is 
Being then? Neither in what is seen in the foreground, as when I say: this tree is in 
blossom; nor in the background, as when I say: it is an apple tree; but in the much more 
unusual proximity, in which the tree appears in front of me simply to let itself be seen 
the way it is. In other words, this question is asking neither about a foreground nor 
about a background, but about the ground itself, which holds both the one and the other, 
without nevertheless identifying itself with any of them, and therefore holds itself back 
both from the one and the other” (DH 1 29, our italics).
It is then necessary to identify a suitable method -  phenomenology (see BT 
§ 7) -  which allows to perceive a being in its Being, i.e. which lets us see the true and 
essential phenomenon: Being (the taking place of a being) in its difference in respect to 
a being. The task of philosophy is just to keep Being in glance and to differentiate it 
from the being. In short, the theme of philosophy is Being, never a being. Writes 
Heidegger in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes [The Origin of the Work of Art]: “We 
must address to the being and, on insisting with the being itself, we must think of its 
Being -  where, however, this «thinking of Being» finds its tune in letting the being 
repose in its own taking place”44.
Now, we are in a position to understand more deeply the constituent 
difference between philosophy and positive sciences: non-philosophical sciences always 
and only deal with a being, caught in its being “already placed”, in its standing-there- 
against (according to modern interpretation: Gegen-stand). Positive sciences research a 
being, without having to expressly ask for Being; philosophy, instead, is critical.
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“Critical” does not mean, however, that it criticizes the results of positive sciences: 
what it eyes is the Being, which must be assumed by positive sciences, even though 
they do not place it as their theme, as it constitutes the foundation of their own 
possibility. In fact, Being does not stand there-before “available”, but is “concealed” in 
the experience itself and, though not expressly, must have been given and understood 
before any experience of this or that being (“before”, i.e. in regard of a being in its 
possibility of Being what it is). Heidegger recites: “A few examples should help. Over 
there, on the other side of the street, stands the high school building. A being. [...]. 
Where now is the Being of this high school? It is, after all. The building is. The Being 
of this being belongs to it if anything does, and nevertheless we do not find this Being 
within the being. Moreover, Being does not consist in our observing beings. The 
building stands there even if we do not observe it. We can come across it only because 
it already is”45.
*
Thanks to the analyses done by Heidegger in his 1941 Grundbegriffe (see, 
in particular, § 4: The nondiscoverability o f the “is”), we attempt, now, a second way to 
approach the interpretation of the phenomenon of Being.
In the light of the constitutive difference between philosophy and positive 
sciences, we may now analyse the following sentence: “the rose is red”. Its being-red is 
a property of the rose, which we really see on the rose itself -  according to Kant, “red” 
is a real predicate of the rose. Where, instead, do we see its “is”? At first sight nowhere! 
However, when we say: “the rose is”, we are just referring to the rose, to its “Being”: 
really, the sentence “the rose is”, though lacking of the predicate attributes which 
express its properties, mentions the rose in the simplest and richest way -  in its taking 
place. Also, just thanks to the fact that the rose is (it shows and appears in its splendour) 
it can be seen of this or of that colour! In other words: the “is” must somehow “belong” 
in a constitutive way to the rose we really have before our eyes, but we cannot find it
44 G. Zaccaria, H ölderlin  e il tem po di povertà . Un sem inario sull'enigm a della  
poesia , Ibis, Pavia 2000, p. 48.
45 M. Heidegger, Einführung in die M etaphysik, op. cit., p. 35-36.
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“directly” on the rose -  as if it were retraceable, as a colour or a shape widespread in 
space, as something “real”, sensibly (ontically) perceivable. Then, where is, and what 
does the Being of the being consist of?46
These questions seem to be specious, and somehow useless: who else but 
the botanist could say what the rose is, why and how it blooms? What else should we 
know about the rose but its structure and its physiologic process -  thanks to which we 
gather the different plants under wider and wider systematic categories, according to 
natural similarities and differences among the single species? Really, botany, as positive 
science, continues to acquire new knowledge, with no need of knowing anything about 
Being: the being, Heidegger says, is more than enough! Indeed, what may there be 
“beyond” a being? Being, perhaps? But Being is nothing real. Heidegger recites: 
“Being, however, is not an existing quality found in beings. Unlike beings, Being 
cannot be represented or brought forth in the manner of an object. As that which is 
altogether other than all beings, Being is that which is not. But this nothing essentially 
prevails as Being. [...]. [ . ]  we must prepare ourselves solely in readiness to experience 
in the nothing the pervasive expanse o f that which gives every being the warrant to be. 
[...]. Without Being [ . ]  all beings would remain in an absence of Being” (PM 233, our 
italics). And again: “One cannot, in fact, talk about and deal with Nothing as if it were a 
thing [...]; Nothing remains in principle inaccessible to all science. Whoever truly wants 
to talk o f  Nothing must necessarily become unscientific. But this is a great misfortune 
only if one believes that scientific thinking alone is the authentic, rigorous thinking, that 
it alone can and must be made the measure even of philosophical thinking. But the
46 It is worth remembering a few verses by Angelus Silesius, as quoted by 
Heidegger in his D er Satz vom Grund  (HGA 10, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1997; Engl. 
Trans. The P rin cip le  o f  Reason, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1991): “The rose is 
without why (ohn warum): it blooms because (weil) it blooms,/It pays no attention to itself, asks 
not whether it is seen” (p. 35). These verses show a way of perceiving the Being of the rose that 
diverges from the typical modern attitude, which investigates every thing with regard to its why. 
The possible domination of the world by man presupposes that the simple “arising-on-its-own” 
(p. 38) of the rose enchanting the poet is forgotten, in favour of obtaining that information that 
may account for its being what it is (nihil est sine ratione): the reduction of the presence of the 
rose to a mere object (of scientific investigation) requires, in fact, the determination of the 
causes and conditions of its blooming.
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reverse is the case. All scientific thinking is just a derivative and rigidified form o f  
philosophical thinking”47.
In this sense, according to Heidegger, there must be “something” more than 
beings, something which surely “is” not in the sense of a being, but which however 
must be “given” before the being, so that the being itself becomes accessible, so that, 
namely, our relation to it is made possible: its Being (taking-place). Heidegger writes: 
“Being is in no way as immediately familiar and overt to us as are particular beings. It is 
not as though Being keeps itself completely concealed. If this happened, then even 
beings could never lie over against and be familiar to us. Indeed Being must of itself 
and already beforehand shine, so that particular beings can appear. Were Being not to 
shine, then there would be no province within which an «over against» can settle. From 
this we come to see that, compared to beings which are immediately accessible, Being 
manifests the character o f  holding itself back, o f  concealing itself in a certain
manner”48.
Our “relation” to a being (with this or that being) is made possible in 
advance by its taking-place and, co-originally, by our understanding or, better, 
perception of its taking-place. Really, our relation to Being, our understanding of it, 
constitutes that opening of the world (of beings as a whole) thanks to which we are in 
the world and inside which only, that what is appears as it is. In other words: “If the 
thematizing of the present-at-hand -  the scientific projection of nature -  is to become 
possible, Dasein must transcend the entities thematized. Transcendence does not consist 
in Objectifying, but is presupposed by it” (BT 415, our italics) (see infra, chap. 2).
To explain the difference between being and Being is the most urgent task 
of philosophy, which it must always assume upon itself, now more than ever. If 
philosophy is the science of Being, then the question arises, as an initial and final issue: 
what does “Being” mean? And also: what is the new determination of man’s essence 
likely to be, just in the light of its relation to Being? In fact, what does Dasein mean? 
Heidegger writes: “Nobody understands what «I» think here [«here» means: in my 
Denkweg, which finds in Sein und Zeit an important «experiment»]: let Dasein rise
47 M. Heidegger, Einführung in die M etaphysik, op. cit., pp. 27-28, our italics.
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directly starting from the truth of Being [...], with the purpose of founding just here (in 
Da-sein) the being caught as a whole and as such...”49.
§ 3. Note on time: “time” and “ontological difference” 
in the light o f the “topology o f Being”
a) Being, time and temporality
The goal our writing sets itself is to contribute to the preparation for a 
listening of the meaning Sein und Zeit takes inside Heidegger’s pathway of thinking 
and, in a wider sense, inside the possible future which is destined to that particular kind 
of knowledge that commonly goes under the name of “philosophy”. In this perspective, 
the first necessary task is to elucidate the title itself o f  the debut work of the German 
philosopher, under the hypothesis that it brings to light a question -  that of Being and 
time - , which, according to Heidegger, founds the possibility itself of philosophy, 
though the entire metaphysical tradition (from Parmenides to Nietzsche) did not take 
that question upon itself as explicit theme of research. For this reason it proves 
necessary to show that Sein und Zeit puts radically into question the limits inherent in 
the approach itself of the different metaphysical positions taken by all thinkers in the 
course of the history of European-Western thought, thanks to the discovery of the 
question which reveals the ground of the key question that, starting from the Greek 
world, determined the development and the contemporary outcome of philosophical 
knowledge. Heidegger’s task is then to show the insufficiency of the (Aristotelian) 
question that asks “what is a being?”, insofar as it proves unoriginal, as it leaves not 
investigated (though presupposed) that question which, according to Heidegger, 
determines the ground of its own possibility. In fact, the question Heidegger puts, 
sounds: what is Being? In other words, in the light of the title itself of Sein und Zeit, we 
may approach the question about Being in the following way: in what sense does the
48 M. Heidegger, D er Satz vom Grund, op. cit., p. 63, our italics.
49 G. Zaccaria, «Essere»? ... e «tem po»?..., op. cit, p. 148.
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reference to the phenomenon o f time contribute to show the origin o f the insufficiency o f  
the question that asks what a being is?
Let us leave, for the time being, this question not attended. Nonetheless, we 
do have to point out that our analyses will not focus in detail on Heidegger’s entire 
debut work, insofar as we will linger on the approach itself of the relationship between 
Being and time as it is thematized inside the first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit, 
whose aim is to find a way o f  access which is capable of bringing to light the necessity 
of the question about Being as such, right in an epoch when he who dares ask this 
question, is charged with a methodological error. Now, it is well-known by those who 
are acquainted with Sein und Zeit that Heidegger determines man as the clue which may 
lead to perceive Being, insofar as his essence proves to be determined by an 
understanding of Being. This is the reason why Heidegger characterizes man’s nature in 
terms of Dasein, which is an expression that is commonly used in German as a 
synonym of “existence”, though it may take quite a different emphasis under the 
perspective opened by the question of Being: in fact, a thorough analysis of the word, 
which is composed by the verb “sein” (to be) and the particle “D a” (literally, “here, 
there”), leads us to perceive that man is the being that is (has to be) the “Da”, namely -  
and in so doing we just skim over a question that will keep us busy in the course of the 
whole second chapter -  the opening and clearing of Being (Lichtung), which has to take 
upon himself the call and appeal made by Being itself. In this perspective, all the 
analyses concerning Dasein' s constitution-of-Being (in particular, the whole structure 
of “Being in the world” and the phenomenon of “disclosedness” as Erschlossenheit) 
will bring to light that reference of Being to man, of which the word Dasein constitutes 
the brightest trace.
*
However, it is undeniable that the statements we have just made prove 
unfounded, unless it becomes clear what “Being” means and in what sense Heidegger 
perceives a relationship between Being and time, especially once we keep in mind that 
the paragraphs just after those under our analysis (BT §§ 45-83) will start an
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interpretation of Dasein right in terms of temporality (Zeitlichkeit). The study of the 
first forty-four paragraphs would then prove groundless, in case the reason was not 
made clear why Heidegger perceives time as the horizon for any understanding of Being 
as such. Moreover, the elucidation itself of the so-called “ontological difference”, which 
plays a major role inside the clarification of the limits inherent in any metaphysical 
position, would be undermined in its pretences, in case that difference were not driven 
back to the sense of the project of Sein und Zeit, although the expression “ontological 
difference” does not explicitly appear inside the two only published sections of Sein und 
Zeit, but can be found for the very first time in the 1927 summer semester course 
entitled Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, which, according to Heidegger’s 
own intentions, should be interpreted as the elaboration of those sections which, though 
announced inside the general outline of the work (BT § 8), did not come to light.50
b) Time as locality of the manifestation of Being:
Anwesenheit as Gegen-wart
Although Sein und Zeit is incomplete -  it is essential to remember that the 
third division of the first part, which should have dealt in an explicit way with the 
relationship between Being and time (“Time and Being”), thus elucidating the sense 
itself of Dasein' s interpretation in terms of temporality, was not published - , our 
hypothesis, on the basis of Jean Beaufret’s remarks, is that time, in the title Sein und
50 Let us keep in mind that the f ir s t  draft of the third division of the first part of 
Sein und Zeit was burned by Heidegger himself, who became aware -  on the occasion of a stay 
in Heidelberg at Karl Jaspers’ in January 1927 -  of its insufficiency and incomprehensibleness. 
Although Heidegger’s conviction of elaborating the third division (during the same year) in a 
clearer way proved unfruitful and brought in the following years (1927-1930) to publications 
which Heidegger himself considered as mere “ Umwege”, we are not allowed to interpret the 
insufficiency we referred to as an uncertainty of the direction of the investigation and of its 
ambit, but rather as a lack of an adequate elaboration (see M. Heidegger, Besinnung, HGA 66, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 414; see also T. Kisiel, D as Versagen von Sein und Zeit: 
1927-1930, in M artin  H eidegger. Sein und Zeit, “Klassiker Auslegen”, hrsg. von T. Rentsch, 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2001, pp. 253-279). Moreover, Jean Beaufret states that such an 
elaboration cannot be seen in terms of a mere continuation of Sein und Z eit, as a sequel of a 
serial novel; the French philosopher is of the opinion that the works that follow Sein und Zeit 
are nothing but the resumption of an attem pt of thought, which brings up for discussion again, 
without abandoning it, the initial approach of the investigation. Thus paraphrasing a sentence by 
Leibniz, Beaufret thinks that Heidegger could have said with regard to Sein und Zeit: “With
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Zeit, is “the word which names the difference between Being and being” (E 12). Once 
we keep in mind, in fact, that time plays the role of “announcing Being in the being” (E 
41), and in this sense shows itself as the horizon for an understanding of Being and not 
as a criterion for a naïve distinction among the different regions of beings -  “high above 
the Eternal, down below the temporal [the transient]” (E 41) - , we should be able to 
understand the well-known Heideggerian expression “sense of [for] Being”, in which 
“sense”, far from indicating in the direction of an elucidation of the meaning of the 
word “Being”, brings to light the necessity of obtaining a “sixth sense” for (time as) the 
difference between Being and being (E 40), namely for the question which, though 
never explicitly investigated in the course of Western thought, lies at the ground of the 
philosophical enterprise as such.
In this perspective, the interpretation of time in terms of “ontological 
difference” shows in the brightest way how Heidegger, notwithstanding his decision not 
to publish the third division of Sein und Zeit, did not abandon the question which lay at 
its ground; on the contrary, as declared by the author during the course held in 1941 on 
Schelling’s Treatise on liberty, “Sein und Zeit has not become for me a bygone 
question. Still today I have not «moved further», were it only for the fact that I know 
better and better that I do not have to move «further»; maybe I have come a little bit 
closer to what I tried in Sein und Z eit’.51 In confirmation of the role played by the 
ontological difference, let us listen to a second passage taken from a 1940 text entitled
Sein und Zeit I thought I had already reached my goal; but, as I started meditating on time as the 
locality of Being, I was thrown back in the high sea” (Le chemin de H eidegger, op. cit., p. 94).
51 M. Heidegger, D ie  M etaph ysik  des deu tschen  Idealism us. Zur erneuten  
Auslegung von Schelling: P hilosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen  
F reih eit und d ie  dam it zusam m enhängenden G egenstände (1809), HGA 49, Klostermann, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1991, pp. 26-27. We deem it opportune to point out that Heidegger’s non­
necessity of moving “further”, beyond the theoretical core Sein und Zeit originates from, is due 
to the fact that the question of Being is the theme on which Heidegger’s entire pathway of 
thinking will focus right from its inception, and with regard to which Sein und Zeit itself is 
nothing but a p ro v is io n a l  stage, insofar as the phenomenon of time constitutes the first sight 
(horizon) of Being in its disclosing and clearing. The term itself of “horizon”, which will be 
later abandoned as endangered by its possible interpretability in metaphysical terms (as sign of a 
capability by the subject, as if Being were confined to man’s understanding of it), is the first 
attempt to indicate in the direction of the dimension opened by Being, which will be later called
-  namely on the basis of a meditation on Being as such, without any mediation by beings (not 
even by man) -  O ffenheit, L ich tu n g , W ahrheit des Seins, A le th e ia  and Unverborgenheit 
(Entbergung) des Seins and, finally, E reign is  (see W.-F. von Hermann, D asein  und Subjekt, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1985, pp. 79-80).
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The European Nihilism: “The distinction between Being and being is meant as the ground 
of the possibility of ontology [namely, of Metaphysics]. [...]. To nominate the ontological 
difference means that a historical moment has come, when there is the necessity and it 
becomes necessary to put questions on the fundament and ground of «onto-logy». This is 
the reason why in Sein und Zeit one speaks of «fundamental ontology»”. 52 Let us now 
explain the meaning of this quotation by saying: right in the historical moment when the 
forgetfulness of Being -  which was already present inside the Greek interpretation of Being
-  comes to unfold its essence and reigns supreme in the modern age (Nihilism), a 
meditation on the presuppositions of any metaphysical position as such, namely on the 
phenomenon of Being as difference between Being and being, becomes more and more 
urgent; the analytic itself of Dasein in Sein und Zeit, insofar as it is a fundamental ontology, 
originates from the investigation on the ground of ontology itself (as knowledge that derives 
from the question that asks what a being is).
However, we still have to make clear why Heidegger decided not to publish the 
second part of Sein und Zeit: this is the only way, thanks to which we will be able to understand 
the sense of the turning that took place inside his pathway of thinking after 1927, which led him 
to a radical deepening of the question that gave rise to his debut work, in particular starting from 
the 1930 lecture entitled Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (see E 16), where the capital word of the 
Heideggerian thought starts clearing its own way: Ereignis!
*
Let us now take a step back and point out the issues we have left 
unattended, which all centre on the relationship between Being and time. We may 
summarize them in form of questions: 1) for what reason does the second division of 
Sein und Zeit interpret Dasein in terms of temporality? What role does time play in the 
elucidation of the question of Being, better: of the sense of Being?; 2) for what reason 
did Heidegger decide not to publish the second part of Sein und Zeit? What about the 
stages after 1927 with regard to the unaccomplished project?; in other words: in what
52 M. Heidegger, Il nichilism o europeo, in N ietzsch e, Adelphi, Milan 1988, pp.
7 0 5 - 7 0 6 .
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sense does the question of time find in the ontological difference its “natural” 
completion?53
As proof of the fact that Sein und Zeit represents the attempt to elucidate the 
element on which any metaphysical meditation is grounded (though never investigated 
and not expressly investigable), and to clarify the temporal nature of Being, let us 
present an anecdote told by Heidegger concerning a discovery he made during a walk in 
the Black Forest with regard to the (hidden) meaning of the word that names the Greek 
interpretation of Being (of beings): ousia (Seiendheit).54 The anecdote centres on the 
German translation of the Greek ousia, which Heidegger interpreted as Anwesen 
(literally “estate, holding”, “substance, possessions”) or, more precisely, as 
Anwesenheit, where the suffix “heit” (from heiter) lets the sense inherent in Anwesen 
shine. The problem is, Anwesenheit in German is a synonym of Gegenwart, “present”, 
so that Anwesenheit, namely Being, thanks to Gegenwart “speaks the language of time” 
(DQ 20). Here we are confronted with the explicit relationship between Being and time, 
insofar as time announces Being in beings and determines the coming to light of the 
horizon (the dimension) for any understanding of Being. Concerning this, Beaufret 
writes: “By thinking Being «under the horizon of time», not vice versa, Heidegger 
invites his reader to take a step back from Metaphysics and its question of Being up to a 
more radical thought which is, as he said in 1927, the question of the sense of Being
53 In order to clarify the nature of the method that guides our dissertation, we deem 
it opportune to say that the attempt of answering these questions is based on the remarks 
Heidegger himself made on the occasion of his thirty-year dialogue with the French philosopher 
Jean Beaufret, whose work proves in this perspective the very first source from which we may 
obtain information and clues for an understanding of the sense of Heidegger’s pathway of 
thinking after Sein und Z eit, as he became starting from 1946 Heidegger’s privileged 
interlocutor. In confirmation to this, one may read Eryck de Rubercy and Dominique Le 
Buhan’s D ouze questions posées  à Jean Beaufret à p ropos de M artin H eidegger (Aubier, Paris 
1975, 1983; let us bear in mind that the two questions-answers specifically dedicated to Sein 
und Z eit have been elaborated again by Jean Beaufret in his essay Le chemin de H eidegger). 
Moreover, it goes without saying that the “privilege” granted to Beaufret was not based on a 
mere “personal liking”, but rather on a friendship which had its roots -  as shown by a letter 
Heidegger sent him on 22 February 1975 -  in the common care of the “Sache des D enkens”, 
namely of what deeply concerns thought (DQ 71-77).
54 With regard to this word, we deem it necessary to remember that this 
interpretation of Being (of beings) determined in the course of the history of Western 
philosophy the ground of any other elaboration of the question of Being, although it proves to 
be, as a result of the determination of Being starting from beings only, the first sign of that 
forgetfulness of Being which has reached nowadays its definitively accomplished unfolding.
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itself, whose before-taste (avant-goût) is the wonder that Being does not appear in its 
own locality but in a «clearing of time» (clairière de temps)” (DQ 25).
Let us meditate at this stage on the meaning of this quotation: the temporal 
nature of Being represents the first occasion of a sight (“sense”) of Being announcing 
itself in beings, i.e. of a sight of the difference between Being and being starting from 
time as locality of its manifestation and coming to light. It is thanks to time -  to its 
secret manifestation -  that we may start perceiving Being in beings, beings in their 
Being (taking place). It is just the peculiar -  “secret” -  nature of the manifestation of 
Being as time that makes Heidegger change his route after Sein und Zeit, in order to 
bring to light the “hidden” essence of Being through the so-called “ontological 
difference”: as Beaufret points out, “in the years that immediately follow Sein und Zeit 
the perspective starts changing” (DQ 27). If, in fact, the forgetfulness of Being Sein und 
Zeit originates from, could give the impression of being nothing but the fruit of mere 
carelessness by the first metaphysical thinkers (DQ 27), Heidegger interpreted it later as 
a phenomenon which deeply belongs to Being itself, whose own nature would be that of 
self-concealing, thus giving beings space and time to manifest themselves (DQ 28). The 
fact that the trait of self-concealment belongs to Being, in such an intimate way that this 
latter may appear as nothing, represents the occasion for a meditation on the difference 
between Being and being, so that, thanks to it, that first “secret temporality of Being” 
(DQ 21) announcing itself in Sein und Zeit may be further investigated as locality 
(topos) of the manifestation of Being.
*
Concerning this, a precise indication on how to perceive the topological 
nature of time, namely its capability of building up a dimension inside which Being 
may announce itself, is given us by Zaccaria, who urges to think the word Gegenwart in 
terms of “turning-towards” (Gegen-wart). This etymological interpretation proves 
fundamental, as the traditional way of understanding Being in terms of consistency and 
stability runs the risk of compromising a genuine comprehension of what “present” 
means, insofar as we would be tempted to reduce the temporal trait that appears in
67
Gegenwart to the mere duration of beings as present-at-hand: in fact, “the «turning- 
towards» brings out clearly what normally remains covered, namely the constitutive 
trait of the taking place and staying in the proximity” (IGP 183). In this sense, the 
covering of the intimate “motility” of time as what announces Being in beings veils the 
coming to light of that dimension -  Being -  which may give rise to the relation between 
man and his own world, namely the beings man may encounter and investigate. Once 
we interpret “Being” not only in terms of “being present”, but rather -  in the light of the 
phenomenon of time -  as “taking place”, we may start perceiving that trait of the 
timeliness of Being which, in its turning towards and letting a horizon instantaneously 
come to light, makes man’s intimate nature as Dasein shine in a renewed (if not 
unprecedented) way; man becomes then, to say it in Zaccaria’s words, “the being which 
cannot refrain from the task of meeting that taking-place which turns continuously 
towards and addresses him” (IGP 192).
Here we have come then to show the reason why Heidegger in Sein und Zeit 
interprets Dasein -  namely man as that being which understands Being -  in terms of 
temporality. In this direction, the existential phenomenon that better shows the 
adequacy of Zaccaria’s remarks, is what Heidegger in Sein und Zeit calls “anticipatory 
decision” (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, BT § 62), inside which the analyses related to 
death (BT §§ 46-53) and conscience (BT §§ 54-60) find their climax, and that opens to 
the fundamental § 65 entitled Temporality as ontological sense o f  Care, which 
culminates, in its turn, in the temporal determination of Care in terms of “instant” 
(Augenblick).55
55 In order to elucidate the instantaneous nature of time (Being), let us follow 
Zaccaria’s suggestion (IGP 237) of meditating on an Italian dialectal expression that sounds 
“con tr'o ra  [untimely; literally: “against time”]”: it refers to that moment of the day in which, 
especially in the summer and particularly in the South, the temperature is so high that any 
activity becomes impossible. This is the reason why he who wanders about under the burning 
sun is considered to be not entirely “in his place”. In other words: only a genuine understanding 
of time (as favourable instant) grants each human being his own place on the Earth and frees 
him towards his most authentic taking place.
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c) Time and Heidegger’s “reversal”: the difference between Being and being
It becomes necessary, at this point, to point out that our decision not to 
analyse in detail the second division of Sein und Zeit is based on Heidegger’s turning 
(Kehre) after 1927, whose aim was determined by the necessity of seeing clearly into 
that ontological “dimension”, from which a thought of the relation between Being and 
time had risen, namely from the experience of the forgetfulness of Being. Once we 
remember that the language of Metaphysics (still used in Sein und Zeit) prevented from 
seeing in an adequate way the turning showed by a thought that has its ground on the 
clearing of Being (Lichtung des Seins) -  of which time represented a first sight - , in 
comparison with a thought that is centred on subjectivity and on an anthropological 
approach, we may start perceiving the necessity of a leap right in the middle of the 
locality of Being’s manifestation. Let us keep in mind, first of all, that Heidegger 
himself reminds us that an adequate determination of the locality of Being was attained 
fo r  the very first time only on the occasion of the lecture entitled Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit (1930), which, however, did not deal intentionally with the question that gave 
rise to Sein und Zeit, namely the interpretation of Being under the horizon of time. That 
is why we do have to follow in our turn Heidegger’s change of route: only thanks to this 
renovated approach of the relation between Being and time, Heidegger was able to fulfil 
the project he started in 1927, which “ended” only in 1962 with the publication of the 
well-known lecture Time and Being. Concerning this, let us listen to the words with 
which Heidegger, in a letter addressed to William Richarson in April 1962, elucidates 
the sense of his turning: “The thinking of the reversal (Kehre) is a change in my 
thought. But this change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of 
abandoning the fundamental issue, of Being and Time. The thinking of the reversal 
results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] “Being and Time,” sc. 
by inquiring into that perspective which already in Being and Time (p. 39) was 
designated as «Time and Being»”.56
*
56 W. Richardson, H eidegger: Through Phenom enology to Thought, Nijhoff, The 
Hague 1963, p. XVI.
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At this point, the impasse our argumentation finds itself in -  namely, the 
decision not to deal with the second division of Sein und Zeit - ,  may be considered, on 
the one hand, as solved, insofar as it has been brought back to its historical- 
philosophical constitutive references, but, on the other, as increased and even harder, as 
our work is now confronted with the need of explaining the “reversal” that kept 
Heidegger busy starting from the Thirties and led him to the composition of his second 
masterpiece, Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-38) -  whose subtitle enigmatically recites: 
Vom Ereignis. How can we now enter the meaning of this fundamental key word, in 
order to launch again the sense itself of the approach of the question, as it was put and 
investigated inside Sein und Zeit?57
In this perspective, to think of a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II proves 
insufficient, insofar as the turning in Heidegger’s thought cannot be interpreted in terms 
of a radical change of direction inside his philosophical pathway. As Heidegger himself 
writes to Richardson, “the distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified 
only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger 
I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II . But the 
thought o f Heidegger I  becomes possible only i f  it is contained in Heidegger IT”.58 If we 
assume that the proper sense of the key word Dasein may be perceived only on the basis 
of Heidegger’s reversal -  which Heidegger mentioned for the first time, as it shows in his
57 An analysis in detail of the sense of E reign is  and K eh re  inside Heidegger’s 
thought lies outside the tasks of our writing: we do make reference to them, only insofar as to 
locate the question of the ontological difference inside his philosophy -  namely, inside the 
necessary developments which the Heideggerian investigation on the phenomenon of Being 
takes -  proves essential. In other words: the “necessity” we are talking about indicates in the 
direction of the need of finding those words that are capable of saying in the easiest and, at the 
same time, clearest way the thing to-be-thought, without the ambition of exhausting the 
question once and for all. Let us just enumerate those crucial places inside Heidegger’s work 
where the question of E re ig n is  is expressly debated: the H um anism usbrief, the four 1949 
lectures entitled E inblick in das, was ist (among which one may find a text entitled D ie Kehre) 
and Identität und D ifferenz (HGA 11). Likewise, for a first introduction to Beiträge, see W.-F. 
von Hermann, Wege ins Ereignis. Zu H eideggers “B eiträgen zur P h ilo soph ie”, Klostermann, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1994. By the same author, see also his fundamental D ie S elbstin terpreta tion  
M artin H eideggers (Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1964), inside which one may find a 
chapter entirely dedicated to the question of the reversal (pp. 264-278): here von Hermann 
presents and comments upon some passages in which Heidegger gives a more mature 
elaboration of some key concepts already present in Sein und Z eit, starting from the new 
alethological-cosmological (and not horizontal-transcendental) approach.
58 W. Richardson, H eidegger: Through Phenom enology to Thought, op. cit., p. 
XXII (our italics).
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letter to Richardson (p. XVI), inside the Humanismusbrief -  , we are compelled, in our 
turn, to change course inside our writing.59 Concerning this, we will rely once again on 
Jean Beaufret, who formulates two remarks that prove essential to our purposes; Beaufret 
writes: 1) “We may say that the truth of Being, as Lichtung, lies in the fact that Being 
differs from beings, and that it differs in the sense that «Being conceals itself right in its 
disclosing in beings». And this is what Heidegger will call Ereignis” (E XI); 2) “As I 
have already said, Heidegger was the author of a book entitled Being and time (L’Etre et 
le Temps); and I thought that, when we would meet. he would talk to me about time; 
indeed, he did not talk about time, but rather about Being and about Being in its 
opposition to «beings» (étant). [...]. As a consequence, we may say that Sein und Zeit is 
the book of the difference between Being and being” (E 11).
We now deem it opportune to point out the reason, according to which we 
have chosen these two passages in view of the elucidation of the relationship between 
Heidegger I and II. The question the two passages centre on, deals in fact with what is 
commonly identified as “ontological difference”, which contributes to a first sight of the 
content inherent in the key word of the thought of Heidegger II: Ereignis. If we were 
allowed to express ourselves through an image, we could say that the ontological 
difference represents the “theoretical bridge” connecting Sein und Zeit and Heidegger
59 With regard to the 1930 lecture we mentioned above, we deem it relevant to 
point out that, although a systematic treatment of those pages -  which represent “the watermark 
of all Heidegger’s following work” (DQ 28) -  lies outside our purposes, the question of truth 
will play a decisive role also inside our writing, insofar as the forty-fourth paragraph of Sein 
und Zeit, with which the first section of the Heideggerian G rundw erk  stops and whose theme is 
constituted right by a meditation on truth, represents, as stated also by Gérard Guest, the 
theoretical climax of the work. Our main concern will be to prepare ourselves for a “transitive” 
listening of the word “truth”, thanks to which it may start resounding in its rooting and opening 
character -  in opposition, for instance, to its common understanding in terms of adequacy of a 
sentence to an ascertainable state of facts: to what kind of truth would Heidegger refer with the 
use of the enigmatic expression “truth of the existence”, if not to a peculiar “comportment” man 
assumes with regard to the phenomenon of Being, by virtue of which he could square himself 
inside the world in which he is thrown right from the beginning, and mature and blossom? 
Concerning this, let us bear in mind that the expression “to mature” names the way in which the 
D asein  is “in the time”: as Vezin points out at page 573 of his translation of Sein und Zeit, the 
German verb “zeitigen” is used by Heidegger as a synonym of “reifen” (to mature, to ripen); in 
this sense, Zeit, time, should be understood as “season” -  hence, the sense of the expression “the 
season of love”, in which there comes a time in a man’s life to open oneself to the sweet 
delights of the most genuine enthusiasm and to shine at the height of one’s own Being!
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II60: in this perspective, the ontological difference is the only way -  although we would 
rely, in doing so, on an interpretation that eludes the commonly accepted way of 
explaining the topic by reconstructing chronologically the “development” of 
Heidegger’s thought, as Heidegger I would be interpreted starting from Heidegger II -  
to start realizing the revolutionary significance inherent in the key word Dasein and, at 
the same time, perceiving the sense of that phenomenon that in Sein und Zeit goes under 
the name of “time”, with all the consequences that it may bring for an understanding of 
the phenomena of “history” and “destiny” (of a single man or of a whole people) that 
play such a decisive role in the second section of Sein und Zeit (Temporality and 
historicity, §§ 72-77) and, with regard to our dissertation, in the third chapter of our 
writing, which is strongly grounded on the hypothesis that Heidegger’s commitment to 
National-Socialism as University rector was based only on the will to educate the 
“future leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German people” (Rektoratsrede, our 
italics).61
The incompleteness of Sein und Zeit and the consequent turning in 
Heidegger’s pathway of thinking would then urge to investigate the question of the 
ontological difference, which represents in this perspective the supporting axis of our
60 For a theoretical-genealogical reconstruction of the relationship between Sein 
und Z eit and the ontological difference, see: W.-F. von Hermann, H eideggers “Grundproblem e  
der P hänom enologie”. Zur “Zweiten H ä lfte” von “Sein und Z e it”, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. 
M. 1991; J. Greisch, Ontologie e t tem poralité, PUF, Paris 1994 (in particular, Troisième partie . 
Temps et être. L ’invention de la difference ontologique).
61 To put into question the explanation of a phenomenon in chronological terms 
may seem the fruit of an extemporary and arbitrary decision, insofar as there would lack the 
presuppositions for a scientifically adequate understanding of a fact, which should be 
interpreted -  strictly speaking -  as an effect of a temporally preceding cause. However, we are 
supported in our hypothesis by a question Kenneth Maly -  one of the two American translators 
of B eiträge zur P h ilosoph ie  -  puts in an essay of his entitled Reticence and Resonance in the 
Work o f  Translating  (in Babette E. Babich [ed.], From  Phenom enology to Thought, E rrancy  
an d  D estre : E ssays in H onor o f  W illiam  J. R ichardson , Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1995, p. 149), in which the author asks: “Can one «start» with 
Heidegger from the «start»? Where would one «start»?”, and then answers: “One cannot start 
with Heidegger by «starting» with his earlier texts and moving to the later ones”. In this sense, 
Maly’s words may help those who start reading Heidegger observe with a critical eye all the 
“intellectual biographies” dedicated to the life and thought of the German philosopher in the 
course of the last ten years (let us think about the cases of Hugo Ott and Rüdiger Safranski): 
what interpretation of history (and historiography) should guide a genuine presentation of the 
(spiritual) “facts” the personal existence of a man is made of? What fact should one start from 
in the case of Heidegger? For an adequate historical-existential Heidegger biography, please 
refer to Vezin’s essay entitled E ssai biographique (H 9-28).
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entire dissertation, insofar as only by virtue of it both the existential analytic of Dasein 
in Sein und Zeit and Heidegger’s political commitment between 1933 and 1934 would 
be adequately brought back to that dimension -  the phenomenon of Being - , from 
which all his pathway of thinking (in the strict sense of the term) started through the 
land of the difference between Being and being. Let us take notice not to misunderstand 
the expressions “pathway” and “land” in terms of mere images with a vaguely poetic 
flavour, as they name in a very simple way that peculiar (namely, stupefying) 
phenomenon that man’s existence right in the middle of his own world is: in case we 
listened carefully to Beaufret’s first quotation, we would be in a position to say that 
only the perception of the movement inherent in the difference between Being and 
being -  the self concealment of Being in each manifestation of a being -  preserves and 
grants that dazzling and instantaneous clearing of a world, inside which every human 
being may find his own stay, as a space-and-time locality where men -  thus 
paraphrasing the title of a well-known lecture Heidegger held in 1951 -  could build,
dwell and think.62
Thanks to the phenomenon of Ereignis we have then been able to find the 
origin of that possibility of man’s existence Heidegger describes as Eigentlichkeit (see 
infra, chap. 2, § 2.d): the common linguistic-etymological root of the two German 
words -  the adjective “eigen” or the verb “eignen” (literally: “proper”, hence for 
instance “Eigentum”, “property”) -  shows that the self concealment o f Being inside the
62 Let us point out that the German expression “W eg” -  “pathway” -  plays such an 
essential role that Heidegger himself wanted his works to be interpreted in terms of “ Wege, 
nicht Werke” -  “pathways, not works” - , in order to emphasize the non exhaustiveness of his 
analyses, namely the intimate interrogative nature of his attempts of interpreting the works 
belonging to the Western philosophical tradition, attempts which would represent only one 
possible way inside the question of Being. These remarks would also contribute, in the second 
place, to explode the myth which assigns to philosophy the task of formulating eternal truths, 
and which makes it take an “absolutistic” primacy inside the determination of the true 
knowledge: the inexhaustible richness of the phenomenon of Being is such, that the different 
approaches in the course of the history of Western philosophy may be intended as (finite) 
attempts of a common passion for that one and only dimension inside which the history and 
destiny of a determined epoch of the world history, and of the peoples that take part in it, may 
build up spiritually. The (relative) smallness of the results attained from time to time by the 
different historical communities, far from reducing itself to a more or less folkloric cult of the 
“province”, could start showing itself as the mild shining of that inexhaustibleness we were 
referring to: as proof of that, one may read the wonderful text Heidegger wrote in 1949 entitled 
D er F eldw eg  (HGA 13, pp. 87-90), which has been translated also by Jean Beaufret (in F. de
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difference between Being and being discloses and opens the playing field to the forces 
that constitute in its ground the possibility each man “owns” (as donated by Being) o f  
being up to his own destiny. Right inside the horizon cleared by the ontological 
difference, the possibility of history -  which has to be interpreted at this point in broad 
terms of future (ad-vent: An- and Zu-kunft) - ,  may take place in the middle of a 
community of human beings. In this perspective only can existence manifest itself as an 
adventure, whose tenor is constituted not by the unleashing of one’s own free will, but 
rather by the perception o f  the risk exposing each man to the task o f  finding and 
embodying what deeply concerns his being, thus rooting him in his own world, in his 
own having-to-be himself, beyond any presumed superiority in terms o f sex, religion, 
social condition, culture, race...!
d) Note on the temporality of Dasein in Sein und Zeit
Supposed that the incompleteness of Sein und Zeit is recognizable in the non 
explicit treatment of the question of the temporality (Temporalität) of Being (Sein und 
Zeit, in fact, keeps itself within the limits of an analysis of the phenomenon of time in 
the light of the temporality of Dasein only), we deem it opportune to investigate briefly 
this preliminary interpretation of time, in order to lay the foundations for its future 
elaboration starting from Being itself -  as already pointed out, this new elaboration will 
be made possible only on the basis of the question of the ontological difference, which 
determines the locality of the secret manifestation of Being starting from its self- 
concealing nature. As far as the preliminary interpretation of time is concerned, we will 
focus, thanks to Walter Biemel’s analyses in his Le concept de monde chez Heidegger, 
only on two paragraphs which appear in the second division of Sein und Zeit, namely on 
paragraph 65 (Temporality as ontological sense o f  Care) and 69 (particularly, with 
regard to the relationship between temporality and transcendence, starting from which 
any knowledge concerning this or that being present in the world may be grounded).63
Towarnicki, A la rencontre de H eidegger. Souvenirs d ’un m essager de la F orêt-n oire , 
Gallimard, Paris 1994, pp. 303-308).
63 W. Biemel, Le concept de monde chez H eidegger, Louvain 1950: in particular, 
Le souci et la tem poralité (chap. VII) and Le problèm e de la trascendence (chap. IX).
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As a matter of fact, paragraph 65 may be considered as the moment when 
all the analyses developed in the previous paragraphs reach their climax and let a 
decisive interpretation of the essence of Dasein come to light, namely that of 
“anticipatory decision” (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). It is now worth meditating on 
the two words that compose this decisive expression, insofar as it will bring to light the 
relevance of the phenomenon of the temporality of D asein  with regard to the 
phenomenon itself of time as horizon for any understanding of Being. The temporal 
nature of Dasein's essence shines in the expression “anticipatory”, as the decision that 
lets Dasein come to its authentic Self (namely, to take roots right in the middle of his 
own world) is founded on an a priori (in advance) understanding of that dimension, 
inside which man can perceive a possible sense of his existence, of his “Being in the 
world”. In other words: the world could not disclose itself to man, in case an 
understanding that anticipates its sense (namely, the possibility) had not already 
occurred -  here lies the difference between man and animal with regard to their Being. 
Such a comprehension would be the sign of the perception of that clearing o f Being, 
inside which the beings that can be from time to time encountered in the world take 
place. It is now emblematic how this clearing of Being shows itself in the 
(disconcerting) phenomena of angst and death, in which, as any immediate reference to 
this or that being fails, Being itself (in its self-concealing trait: Being as Nothing) would 
show in all its splendour, thus letting existence appear to Dasein as a possibility of 
authenticity, namely as opening. Now, as Biemel writes, it is right this “becoming 
[oneself] that takes place in the anticipation” which Heidegger calls “future 
(Zukunft)”.64 The fact that D asein  is “zukunftig” -  “porteur d ’avenir”65 -  may be 
interpreted as the reflection in that being man is of that dimension -  Being: time -  
which lets the mild relationship between man and world clear itself as a whole, as if 
time were the invitation (call) addressed to man to enter the strife his existence (as 
possibility) is. This is the reason why temporality (in its triple and unitary ecstatic 
articulation of future, present and past) constitutes the ontological sense of Care as 
authentic way man-Dasein is. The “decision” we referred to would not be grounded
64 Ibidem , p. 122.
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then on an alleged will of self assertion, but rather on man’s willingness to listen to a 
call (that of Being in its turning-towards) that lets everyone -  according to one’s own 
possibilities -  square in one’s destiny! It goes without saying that the merely 
chronological interpretation of time -  in terms of a sequence of points “in the time” -  
proves insufficient, insofar as it would keep covered, by presupposing a substantial 
equivalence of the moments composing time, that trait of triggering, which only can let 
the start itself of the relation between man and world spring and unfold in its entirety.66 
The words themselves Geschick (destiny) and Geschichte (history), right in their 
etymological reference to the traits of starting and opening (schicken) and generating 
(geschehen), would prove to be the clearest sign of the onset of the donation of 
disclosedness of that dimension, inside which man’s possibility of creating, namely of 
building up the truth of one’s existence in the bosom of a world we all share, may 
mature and blossom.67
*
65 Ibidem, p. 122.
66 For an analysis of the Metaphysical interpretation of time (in particular, Aristotle 
and Hegel), see the sixth chapter inside the second section of Sein und Z eit (§§ 78-82); 
moreover, according to Heidegger, Bergson’s own conception of time would be grounded on 
the Aristotelian approach (BT chap. 6, note 30). Also Husserl’s F or a phenom enology o f  the 
inner conscience o f  time belongs to a Metaphysical approach of the question of time: as pointed 
out by the German editor Rudolf Boehm, the first edition (1929) of Husserl’s work was edited 
by Heidegger himself, who “limited his contribution to an accurate rereading of Husserl’s 
manuscript and to very small interventions within the text, though a wider review would have 
been appreciated by Husserl” (E. Husserl, Zur Phänom enologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins: 
1893-1917, hrsg. von R. Boehm, «Husserliana», Bd. X, Nijhoff, The Hague 1966; It. trans. P er  
la fenom enologia  della  coscienza interna de l tem po, Franco Angeli, Milan 1992, p. 22). The 
reason for such a limited contribution by Heidegger could be recognized in the definitive “self 
reduction” of the Husserlian thought to a “phenomenological treatment of reason” (see 
Husserl’s diary, 25 September 1906), in comparison with the start of a new perspective of 
thought which would give rise a little after to Sein und Zeit! For a thorough investigation of the 
relation Husserl-Heidegger at the time of the publication of Sein und Zeit, see E. Husserl-M. 
Heidegger, Fenom enologia. Storia di un d issid io  (1927), ed. by R. Cristin, Unicopli, Milan 
1986.
67 As a proof of what we are saying, let us listen to a remark made by Vezin at page 
535 of his translation of Sein und Z eit with regard to the meaning of the German expression 
“g e sc h ic h tlic h ”, which names D a s e ir i s  way of being-historical: in the light of the close 
etymological relationship between G eschichte  (which has to be radically distinguished from 
H istorie) and G eschick, we may say that D a s e in s being-historical has nothing to do with the 
mere presence inside a given epoch or with the mere historiographical report of the train of 
events an existence is made of, but rather with a destiny which determines his own Being. For 
this reason, Vezin suggests we may translate the expression “das Geschehen” (literally, “the 
occurring”) with “aventure”, adventure, right “thinking about the numerous cases in which 
history [in an existential sense] is characterized as «human adventure»”.
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Thanks to the analyses we have dedicated to the question of time, we are 
now in a position to understand in a clearer way what role the interpretation of Dasein 
in terms of temporality plays in Sein und Zeit: once we assume that time announces 
Being in beings, the temporality of Dasein represents the ontological condition o f  
possibility of an understanding of Being and, as a consequence, of the difference 
between Being and being. But what sort of time is Heidegger referring to? Is he 
referring to the time we experience in the watch? In other words: are we sure that the 
nature of time can be truly perceived in terms of that sequence of hours and minutes, on 
which the possibility itself of that measuring instrument the watch is has its ground? 
Supposed that time is the time of the watch, it is clear however that, even in case the 
watch breaks, time would keep “existing” in some ways. How can we approach this 
different time horizon then?
Let us think, for instance, about the expression: “it is high time t o . ”. It 
goes without saying that this expression reveals an experience of time which cannot be 
taken back to the time of the watch, insofar as any time measuring is made possible 
thanks to a previous clearing of time Dasein can realize, and which determines the 
possibility itself of that taking shape of a horizon inside which man can project his own 
existence. The expression “it is high time t o . ” is the sign of a sighting of a possibility 
man’s own Being centres on: it names a decision that cor-responds to an invitation that 
has the character of urgency and necessity. By its announcing Being in beings, time 
announces in man the possibility of his being himself, thus calling him back to what he 
has to be. Insofar as time (as Gegenwart) is the dimension inside which beings quiver 
and their being present is transfigured into a turning-towards, the temporality of Dasein 
represents the condition of possibility that man is filled with wonder with regard to the 
rich simplicity of beings, with regard to their Being! “Time” becomes then the first 
name with which Heidegger characterizes that shining dimension which, while self 
concealing, preserves and guards the possibility of man’s dwelling on the Earth. This is 
the reason why Beaufret paraphrases a well-known Cézanne’s sentence by saying: 
“When time shines in all its richness, it is Being itself that is at the height of its powers” 
(DQ 20). In other words: right when man realizes his own mild relation to the
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dimension the world he dwells on is, there rises the possibility of a new beginning, 
which is as delicate and virginal as the morning -  to say it in Mallarmé’s words (DQ 
25) -  that starts a new day and a history to come. Future and destiny may now take on 
their authentic sense and, only thanks to such a sight, start breathing in all their clearing 
vastness.
§ 4. Remarks on the essence o f science and its positivistic interpretation
a) Introduction: the crisis of the sciences as the 
“expression of the radical life-crisis of European humanity” (E. Husserl)
Now, let us take a few steps back (see supra, §§ 1-2) and attempt to clarify 
the sense of scientific knowledge in our time, thanks to some remarks made by Edmund 
Husserl in his Prague conference (1935) entitled The crisis o f  the sciences as the 
expression o f the radical life-crisis o f European humanity (CES 3-18).68 At this stage 
we do have to point out that the text was introduced by Husserl himself as follows: “The 
work [...] makes the attempt, by way of a teleological-historical reflection upon the 
origins of our critical scientific and philosophical situation, to establish the unavoidable 
necessity of a transcendental-phenomenological reorientation of philosophy” (CES 3).
Every single word of this quotation would need a clarification here. To this 
purpose, as we must find a way of access to its sense, it is our first aim to clarify what 
Husserl means by “unavoidable necessity” and, also, to realize how the spiritual history 
of European humanity, as reported by Walter Biemel, German editor of the Krisis, has 
been understood since its origins (the Greeks) “as the spreading of the philosophical 
theory, which in Husserl’s perspective represents [...] a way to catch the being as a 
whole (ein Erfassen des Seienden in seiner Ganzheit). [...]. First of all, this change [...] 
allows the birth of European sciences, which later on become more and more
68 This first approach should help us read, in a more adequate way, a short text 
written in 1937 by Heidegger, at the height of Hitler’s regime, entitled D ie Bedrohung der  
Wissenschaft (see infra, § 4.b). We do have to remind ourselves that our reflections on this text 
directly relate to the analyses on his political involvement in 1933-34 in favour of National 
Socialism (see infra, chap. 3).
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outstanding and, in the end, deny their reference to philosophy (ihren Bezug zur 
Philosophie verkennen)”69.
Let us make reflections on the sense of this last phrase: that sciences have 
more and more freed themselves from philosophical knowledge -  thus disregarding 
their origin -  may be interpreted as the root o f  the crisis which upsets European 
contemporary humanity. According to Husserl, this is the reason why scientific 
knowledge itself is passing through a crisis, notwithstanding its continuous progress (let 
us think about the extraordinary revolution of physics over the first thirty years of the 
twentieth century, thanks to the new theories by Einstein, Planck and Heisenberg). 
Husserl writes: “Physics, whether represented by a Newton or a Planck or an Einstein, 
or whomever else in the future, was always and remains exact science” (CES 4). 
Though compelling to abandon, also theoretically, the determinism Galileo and 
Newton’s Physics are based on, so that only statistical laws can be formulated, quantum 
physics has its own foundation on Descartes’ mathematical projection of nature, insofar 
as truth has been reduced to calculability and exactness. That is why, according to 
Husserl’s aim, “It may be, however, that motives arise [...] for subjecting the scientific 
character of all sciences [the ground of their own possibility -  that is, their significance 
for human existence] to a serious and quite necessary critique without sacrificing their 
primary sense of scientific discipline, so unimpeachable within the legitimacy of their 
methodic accomplishments” (CES 5).
Now, in no way do we want to synthesize in a few words the problem, such 
as it appears according to Husserl’s perspective.70 We only try to define the starting
69 W. Biemel, Einleitung des H erausgegebers, p. XVIII.
70 See G. Zaccaria, IGP §  17. L ’Europa: da H usserl a H eidegger, pp. 113-120. It is 
worth noticing that our dissertation does not deal with a punctual elucidation of the 
philosophical difference between Husserl and Heidegger; it is enough to say that the former 
interprets man, in continuity with modern metaphysical tradition, in terms of subjectivity (CES 
5) and anim al ra tion a le  (CES 15). To say it in Beaufret’s words: “[ . ]  the title that better 
defines Husserl’s philosophy as a whole is the one he gave to a collection which has been 
published very late, although the texts that build it were pronounced in Paris in 1929: Cartesian  
m editations” (E 21). Moreover: “All modern philosophy [Descartes, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, 
N ie tzsche .] is philosophy of subjectivity; Husserl’s phenomenology is one of its most 
beautiful jewels” (E 23). In the same perspective writes Hans-Georg Gadamer in W ahrheit und 
M e th o d e  (in G esam m elte Werke, vol. 2, J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen 1986): “Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Being and History on the basis of absolute temporality did not have the same 
sense it had in Husserl. This temporality, in fact, was not the one of «conscience», or of the
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point of his reflections. In our opinion, it constitutes the way of access to acknowledge 
that problem, the extent of which allows to perceive the necessity of a “transcendental- 
phenomenological reorientation of philosophy” as primordial knowledge: “the queen of 
sciences” (CES 9). Husserl writes: “The exclusiveness with which the total world-view 
of modern man, in the second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by 
the positive sciences and be blinded by the «prosperity» they produced, meant an 
indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity. 
Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people” (CES 5-6). And again, 
later on: “Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the 
world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact” (CES 6).
The positivistic reduction o f the idea o f science to mere factual science then 
appears, to Husserl, as the sign o f the lack o f foundation o f the scientific knowledge 
itself, by now even more released from that horizon o f sense -  the “realm o f Being” 
according to Heidegger, “beings as a whole” according to Husserl -  which constituted 
the theme ofphilosophy, inside which, only, the knowledge o f this or that regional ambit 
o f the being can be settled. Here lies the need for a new foundation of the sense of 
scientific knowledge, and co-originally for a more adequate determination of the sense 
itself of human existence: the hypotheses is that the reduction of the truth made by 
positive sciences, once they have released themselves from their constitutive 
foundation, keeps man away from the decisive questions concerning the authentic sense 
of his existence. As Heidegger writes: “He who, today, with a wide view and free from 
prejudices, reflects in depth on the situation of science, necessarily reaches a view that 
sounds like that, in short: the more that injunction becomes strong and exclusive, which
-  through technology, the need for practical effects and political needs -  asks science to 
continually produce results, the more scientific knowledge will need philosophy, i f  it 
wants to survive such injunction” (EP 176, our italics).
transcendental original ego. [ . ] .  Heidegger’s thesis was that Being itself is time. In so thinking 
he went well beyond any subjectivism of modern philosophy; [ . ] ” (p. 261). For an analysis of 
the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, please refer to: J Beaufret, H u sserl e t H eidegger, in 
D ialogue avec H eidegger, t. 3, op. cit.; W. F. von Hermann, D er B egriff der Phänom enologie in 
H eidegger und H usserl, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1981.
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Assuming that the sense of scientific knowledge is determined by the 
requirements the dominance of this or that world view enforces (Heidegger is here 
referring to National Socialism), the need of a re-foundation of science itself from its 
background theme -  Being -  will become more and more urgent. In other words: the 
more science is submitted to gaining useful effects, the more Being as such is forgotten.
b) Notes on M. Heidegger, Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft (1937)
“The most awful and acute menace 
impending on science, nowadays, consists of this: it 
proceeds well as has never happened, that is to say, it is 
supported and encouraged as regards its usefulness and 
capacity to advance. This means that it does no longer 
insist on truth, and that it has renounced essential 
knowledge -  despite all cloaks in terms of «world view» 
which are only «disguised» uses of sciences” (EP 168­
169).
Let us now start the analysis of Heidegger’s text (emblematically) entitled 
Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft, noting that, as the German editor of Politische 
Schriften, Hartmut Tietjen, points out, “the text [...] <was composed> in view of a job to 
be done, inside a very small circle, with some lecturers at the Faculty of Science and 
Medicine of the University of Freiburg during the winter semester of 1937/38” (EP 
307). Moreover, Tietjen himself points out that this work had nothing to do with 
University courses “officially set up under the patronage of the [National Socialist] 
Party” (EP 307). Rather, it was made possible by the firm will of a part of the German 
University to understand in an authentic way -  thus, answering a need -  the essence of 
science as “building of scientific knowledge” (EP 167): then, not the implementation of 
a pre-constituted “idea” of science but, rather, the foundation itself of its scientific 
nature, of the sense of its knowledge. Heidegger writes: “Science and its knowledge -  
are they really necessary?” (EP 177, our italics).
It is peculiar that such a working circle was guided by Heidegger himself, in 
the hope that, thanks to the contribution o f philosophy, science might have acquired, in 
the process of building up its knowledge, clearness and orientation, thus rising to the 
rank of a true knowledge, i.e. not bound to political or ideological necessities. “No
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scientific knowledge can know, starting from itself, the form of knowledge 
accomplished starting from itself”’ (EP 174). In this sense, only starting from the 
acknowledgment of the intrinsic limit, peculiar to each science, is it possible that “[...] 
the will towards meditation and the individual [scientist’s] strength to ask, may reach 
intimate concentration, common belonging and firmness so that, from here, and only 
from here, a new foundation of the place of scientific research and of researching 
teaching [the University] may originate” (EP 173).
Now, how to interpret the “intrinsic limit”? And more precisely: how to 
interpret the sense of this “intrinsic limit”, in the light of science release from 
philosophy we referred to? Heidegger continues: “But this limit proper to scientific 
knowledge is not a lack; it is, rather, only the indication that in it, not yet unfolded, lies 
its original essence -  essence which belongs to it by right and which must become live, 
assuming that the knowledge of science, to be just like that, must have a consciousness 
of itself corresponding to its own essence. If science, insofar as it represents itself as 
knowledge, does not have such awareness of itself, then it knows nothing of its Being, 
and therefore it cannot even know what it really wants. Perhaps, once reduced to its 
own results, scientific knowledge may practically become indispensable; however, it 
will never put itself in a good light on its own as spiritual effectiveness able to give 
shape and educate inside the history o f our people and, therefore, inside the history o f  
the West and, in general, o f the «world»” (EP 174, our italics).
The acknowledgment of the (constitutive) intrinsic limit of every (positive) 
science lies in the need for a new foundation of truth -  that is in the acknowledgment of 
the “very serious situation” (EP 168) of European humanity. In other words: what is the 
nature of the relationship between the “knowledge of science” and the “awareness of 
itself” Heidegger talks about?
Now, the matter is, to start, thanks to the “knowledge of the phenomenon of 
the forgetfulness of Being and of the devastation of truth” (EP 188), a meditation with 
regard to the sense (truth) of scientific knowledge -  assuming that it does not turn into 
deceptive capacity of supplying useful results for the progress of “civil society”. 
According to Heidegger, this corresponds to the well-known phenomenon of
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specialization and, even before, of technicalization of science as an “order of procedures 
closed in itself”’ (EP 169). Then, every science (be it exact or of Spirit) reaches a greater
, , , from its own regional ambit, just insofar as, Heidegger writes, « . and greater release b J > bb » this
relationship is no longer necessary to them [scientists] to obtain results and then satisfy
the requirements o f their field o f research and o f its progress” (EP 170, our italics).
In this sense, assuming that it is true what is useful -  this seems to be the 
foundation according to which science plays a decisive role inside the contemporary 
interpretation of Being in terms of “world view” and “values” (be they Nazi, Bolshevik or 
Democratic) -, it is not surprising that science itself is then “engaged by industry” (EP 170). 
Indeed, if philosophical knowledge constitutes the foundation of scientific knowledge in the 
strict sense of the word, a question comes up: what does “to know” mean? or: what does 
“truth” mean? Heidegger writes: “If scientific knowledge is not in a position to operate by 
assigning the law and opening within the point of view of the truth of essence, then it has no 
sense as spiritual power: so science, as knowledge, becomes a technique of knowledge and 
planning in different techniques and usage” (EP 185).
Assuming that scientific knowledge reaches a self-awareness, i.e. of its 
sense inside that knowledge which gives roots to a people and to the whole humanity in 
their own being in the world - , “decisive is knowledge inside the route ways of the first 
cognitive acquisitions regarding phenomena, decisive is the happening of the initial 
appearance [the difference between Being and being]” (EP 180).
The release from primary (philosophical) knowledge by sciences which, 
“without philosophy seem to flourish and gain unity in virtue of their setting and attaining 
[useful] objectives” (EP 180) is the sign, according to Heidegger, of the will of “not-io- 
think any longer, not to think or to ask” (EP 180). In this sense “the menace [impending on 
science] comes from the fact that everybody wants to have (or to find) his quiet in science, 
instead of committing himself in the worry about asking” (EP 172-173).
Meditation on truth -  as the dimension which can be perceived thanks to the 
will of historical humanity to set up the spiritual foundation of its own existence, 
“which only takes place if we lay its foundations and build it up, only if we prepare its 
construction” (EP 172) -  is that original knowledge which can only found humanity
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right in the midst of the spiritual destiny that it is delivered to. Here is the greatness of 
every people in its possibility of authentically creating and dwelling in the world: every 
criterion of usefulness -  perhaps even of usefulness for the whole people -  then appears 
to be highly inadequate, if compared to the historical-destiny request which decides for 
any human knowledge as such.
c) Note on the essence of the “world view”, on the ground of Nihilism 
as accomplished unfolding of the forgetfulness of Being
The Heideggerian hypothesis that National Socialism, Bolshevism and 
world Democracy originate from the same foundation seems extremely problematical: 
one thinks, in fact, that the first two phenomena, as clear expression of totalitarian 
regimes, should be differentiated from the “world democracy”, of which the United 
States and Western Europe seem to be today, with no doubt, the model for the entire 
planet. What is more contradictory than supposing a common trait between the essence 
of Totalitarianism and the one of democracy, being the latter the “answer” to the 
brutalities and crimes committed by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union?
Let us limit ourselves to pointing out that the sense o f  Heidegger’s 
interpretation o f the twentieth century world history cannot be perceived starting from a 
politological or historiographical point o f  view: a philosophical interpretation only -  
which is based on the decision taken from time to time on the question of Being -  can 
make us perceive the background trait that joins the essence o f the three historical 
phenomena we are dealing with. More precisely, our hypothesis is that their common 
essence may be seen only thanks to the concept o f “world-view” (Weltanschauung), 
according to which the task o f philosophy would be to supply practical instructions for  
an interpretation and understanding o f reality and o f  the sense o f  existence. Now, 
before taking sides with this or that world view, the matter is to understand how the 
ontological assumptions any world view is based on, show its being positivistic: the 
world and the man it refers to, in fact, must be “real”, must exist de facto, in order to be 
regulated and adjustable. At the same time, truth cannot be assumed but in terms of 
utility, i.e. as a “means of the will to power” (EP 205), and then “remains in itself a
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mere «idea», i.e. a subjective representation” (EP 205) which is functional to the value 
system that is from time to time assumed as inexorable.
In this perspective, the world view proves founded, in its turn, on the 
spiritual phenomenon o f  Western Nihilism, as accomplished unfolding of the 
forgetfulness of Being on which the knowledge and the truth that emerge from Western 
metaphysical tradition, in particular from Descartes to Nietzsche (“mathematical 
projection of nature”), are based: “the essence of Nihilism is the history in which Being 
itself is considered as nothing (in der es mit dem Sein selbst nichts ist)”71. This is the 
reason why Heidegger from 1935 has come to interpret National Socialism as “the 
encounter of technology in its planetary agreement with man as subject” (RV 231).
It becomes necessary then to comprehend the planetary nature of the 
encounter between technology and the determination of man as subject, once we 
acknowledge that the possibility o f  modern technology is based on the change o f the 
(Greek) essence o f truth: to understand the nature of this change is the presupposition 
which only lets us perceive the essence of nihilism and the relationship among the 
historical phenomena we are referring to (see infra, chap. 3). In other words: the essence 
of Nihilism cannot be reduced to National Socialism and Bolshevism, however extreme 
they might have been. Fédier writes: “The course [ . ]  aims at clarifying the idea of 
Nihilism in such a way that Totalitarianism, in the strict and political sense of the term, 
may appear as a pre-figuration in which Nihilism shows itself for the first and last time
-  i.e. before hiding itself in order to better dominate (unknown) as the only figure of 
reality. The fundamental question of our work sounds: in what sense and from what 
point of view does Totalitarianism not exhaust Nihilism? In other terms: how do we 
perceive today’s appearance of Nihilism? In what way does Nihilism elude the 
contemporaries thanks to its capacity of hiding in the mere identity (only partial): 
Nihilism=Totalitarianism?”72.
71 M. Heidegger, N ietzsche II, op. cit., p. 304.
72 F. Fédier, Totalitarism o e nichilism o, a cura di M. Borghi, Università Bocconi, 
Ricerca di base 1995-1998, Working paper n. 17, Milan 1999.
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d) Notes on H. Hahn -  O. Neurath - R. Carnap,
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung (1929)
In order to elucidate the positivistic reduction of the idea of science to mere 
factual science that Husserl talks about and, even more, the sense of the revolution of 
the essence of knowing and science that animates Heidegger’s writings, let us assume as 
a clarifying example of the nature of the positivistic interpretation a text written in 1929 
by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap entitled Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, which may be 
considered the programmatic manifesto of the scientific movement that goes under the 
name of Vienna Circle.
As already said, on the basis of the modern “forgetfulness to the square” of 
the difference between Being and being, the reduction of sciences to factual sciences, 
insofar as it presupposes a reduction of the truth of the world (i.e. of the Being of the 
being) to the sum of all the information on the beings we may encounter in it, implies a 
definitive weakening, i f  not even the elimination, o f the guiding role philosophy should 
have inside scientific research. Assuming that only empirical knowledge -  i.e. “based 
on immediate data (auf dem unmittelbar Gegebenen)” (WW 19) -  may determine “the 
limits of contents of genuine science” (WW 19), “some supporters of the scientific 
conception of the world, in order to further point out their contrast with philosophical 
(metaphysical) systems, do not want, in any way, to give their work the name 
«philosophy». [...]: no philosophy is given as basic or universal science, near or above 
the different branches of empiric science; no way of all sorts is given to derive concrete 
knowledge apart from experience; and , finally, no world of ideas is given, which 
transcends the sensible one” (WW 28).
In this sense it is not by chance that most of the members of the Vienna 
Circle, though some of them taught philosophy, were not philosophers, as their original 
field of research concerned other subjects: Hahn, for instance, was a mathematician and 
Neurath a sociologist73. The nature o f the “unification of science 
(Einheitswissenschaft)” (WW 15) projected by the Circle radically diverges from the
73 It is worth reading the Second Part of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, which 
contains, according to the authors’ intentions, “a biography [...] that aims at assuring an outlook
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intensions of the “phenomenological laboratory” presented inside Die Bedrohung der 
Wissenschaft, whose works were led by Heidegger himself as philosopher. More 
precisely: i f  the will o f unifying the different positive sciences through the elaboration o f  
a common method (the logical analysis) -  that would fix  in the exactest way the 
criterion according to which an assert could be considered scientific -  is based on a 
non-investigated presupposition, insofar as it is assumed as self-evident that only 
empirical knowledge is true, the objective o f Heidegger’s working group is, first o f  all, 
to investigate the sense itself o f scientific knowledge: the hypothesis, in fact, is that 
scientific knowledge cannot determine its orientation only by itself. This is the reason 
why the crisis of scientific knowledge both Husserl and Heidegger talk about cannot be 
reduced to the gnoseological problem of the “crisis of the fundamentals” which shook 
science in the first half of the twentieth century74; in other words: the unification o f  
science fostered by the Circle is not sufficient, insofar as the nature o f  the crisis o f  
European sciences is not strictly scientific. We may then say that the Circle’s 
interpretation is a positivistic one: if, in fact, “to speak means to resort to concepts, or to 
lead back to scientifically definable states of fact (Tatbestände)” (WW 17), we must 
admit that both the metaphysician and the theologian supply no “theories, information, 
but poems or myths” (WW 17). Once we admit the anti-metaphysical nature of the 
researches fostered by the Circle, we may understand how, just insofar as the sense of 
any scientific assertion has to be brought back to a directly verifiable state of fact, “the 
clarification of traditional philosophic questions leads, in part, to unmask them as
on the themes discussed by Vienna Circle’s members and sympathizers” (WW 8). We merely 
point out that neither the name of Husserl, nor, least of all, the one of Heidegger appear in it.
74 Let us think about the effort made, for example, by the most important 
contemporary physicists with regard to a clarification, often in its popular form, of the ambit 
and method of their science. First of all, let us think about M. Planck (W ege zur physikalischen  
Erkenntnis, 1933; Sinn und Grenzen der exakten W issenschaft, 1942); W. Heisenberg (D a s  
N aturbild  in der heutigen Physik , 1945; Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der N aturwissenschaft, 
1948); E. Schrödinger (Science and Humanism. P h ysics in Our Time, 1950) and N. Bohr 
(Atom theorie und N aturbeschreibung, 1931; Atom  P hysics and Human K now ledge, 1958). In 
order to see how science cannot but refuse the question of Being as its theme, let us remember 
some words by A.S. Eddington, an English physicist who guided the expedition to Prince island 
to check Einstein’s theories, with regard to the concept of existence: “For me [...] «to exist» is a 
rather emphatic form of «to be». [...]. But when a philosopher says: «familiar chairs and tables 
exist», i.e., familiar chairs and tables a r e .  I wait for him to conclude [!]. Yes? What were you 
about to say that they are? But he does not finish his statement. Philosophy seems to me as full
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pseudo-problems; in part, to turn them into empiric questions, thus subject to the 
judgment of experimental science” (WW 15).
Now, once philosophy, which previously held the guiding role inside 
knowledge, has been supplanted by a world view -  as it is, in this case, the scientific 
one - , that, according to Heidegger, “claims to give the directives for life conduct” (EP 
43), the interpretative model assumed as absolutely indisputable leaves its mark on any 
dimension of the human existence in the world. According to the Circle’s intentions, in 
fact, the scientific conception of the world should mould “the forms of personal and 
public activity, of instruction, of educational praxis, of architecture” and also contribute 
to promote “the organization of economic and social life according to rational 
principles” (WW 30) and “the development of modern production principles, more and 
more refined from the techno-mechanical point of view, and less and less sensitive to 
metaphysical needs” (WW 29). Every new project cannot but be reduced to a 
“variously articulated reproduction”75 -  with regard to the different ontic ambits -  o f  
the only sense o f Being assumed as true: here lies the origin o f  the illusion o f the 
continuous progresses granted by the scientific method, insofar as they would be but the 
fruit o f that unidirectional interpretation. In this perspective, the change o f paradigm 
the progress o f  science consists o f  -  a new theory, in fact, guarantees a wider 
explanatory competency - , may be interpreted as the ultra-strengthening o f  the 
indisputable sense o f Being that founds the scientific view as such.
The fact that inside any world view operates a “Control Apparatus”76, which 
aims at guaranteeing the conformity of every thing to the paradigm that has been 
assumed as valid, brings to light the totalitarian nature of the world view as such: 
without recalling the system of violence set up by totalitarian regimes in the twentieth 
century, the epoch of “World Democracy” itself we live in, though not necessarily 
committing manifestly criminal deeds, would be pervaded by the same “perversion of 
the sense of orientating, indicating and guiding”77.
of incomplete statements, and I do not know what to do with it” (Philosophy o f  P hysica l 
Science [1939], p. 178).
G. Zaccaria, Hölderlin e il tempo di povertà , op. cit., p. 15.
76 Ibidem , p. 14.
77 Ibidem , p. 88.
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§ 5. Conclusive reflections: on the need o f interpreting man’s essence as Dasein 
in the light o f the sense o f the expression “everything functions”
The major element this chapter is based on deals with listening to Heidegger’s 
thought, thanks to which the urgency of asking (in a new way) the question which has 
determined philosophy, though implicitly, since the beginning of its history -  what is 
Being? -  comes to light. At a time when putting Being into question seems useless, in 
favour of the uncontested and more and more efficient dominance of the scientific method -  
which is made possible only in the light of the phenomenon of the forgetfulness of Being -  
Sein und Zeit, if understood in its deep meaning, invites the man of our time to assume his 
responsibilities towards his own destiny, just insofar as the question of Being starts to 
appear once again in its problematic nature. Indeed, the analyses on the constituent 
difference between philosophy and positive sciences aim at highlighting the sense of the 
phenomenon of Being and at showing how positive sciences themselves arise from it, 
though the question of Being does not appear to be investigated and cannot be investigated 
by sciences themselves. Heidegger writes to this regard: “However, the roots of the sciences 
in their essential ground have died” (QA 43).
Yet, the continuous progress of sciences would lead to think of everything 
but a crisis: in fact, it is said that “everything functions”. Well then Heidegger writes: 
“Everything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny. Everything functions and the 
functioning drives us further and further to more functioning, and technology tears 
people away and uproots them from the earth more and more” (QA 55).
The matter is now to understand in a more explicit way what the locution 
“everything functions” means. The principle that makes science enjoy such a great credit is 
that it guarantees in an efficient way the attainment of a goal assumed as useful: why should 
we interrupt then a procedure that assures an always increasing yield?
The tragic aspect of this way of thinking finds in the experience of Nazi 
extermination camps the climax of the utilitarian perversion -  true is what is useful -  
Western humanity relies on. Let us take as a cue for our reflection what Franz Stangl, 
commanding officer at Treblinka between 1942 and 1943, said during an interview with
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the journalist Gitta Sereny. With regard to the atrocities committed by the Nazis when 
mass-murdering human beings, whom Stangl himself defines as “c a rg o . they were 
cargo”, to the question asking: “Could you not have changed that? In your position, 
could you not have stopped the nakedness, the whips, the horror of the cattle pens?”, 
Stangl answered: “No, no, no. This was the system [the Totenlager]. [...]. It worked. 
And because it worked, it was irreversible”78.
It is clear that the matter is to understand the sense of the last sentence: 
according to Stangl, in fact, the irreversibility of the programmatic death system was 
based on its working, i.e. on its “productive” efficiency. Far from refusing to 
acknowledge the incommensurability of the Nazi crime in comparison with any other 
crime previously committed in world history, our task is to show how this crime also, 
though extreme, has its foundation in the interpretation o f  acting in terms o f causing a 
useful effect, be it in favour o f a people (the German one in case o f National Socialism) 
or, according to a “more democratic” view, o f  the whole humanity. Here is once again 
the devastating trait that hides itself inside the illusion re-echoing in the expression 
“everything functions”: assuming that the utilitarian view of the sense of Being is 
correlated with the interpretation of man, to whom everything is accessible, as “measure 
of all things (Maß aller Dinge)” (WW 15), how are we to determine man’s essence in 
view of his taking more and more root on the earth, in his own world?
Here is what François Fédier suggests: thanks to the re-discovery of a more 
ancient sense of the word (Saint Bernard, twelfth century) that better defines the essence 
itself of Utilitarianism -  rendement [yield] - , we will be able to estimate the relevance 
of the change (better: inversion, in comparison with the Greek and medieval 
interpretations) of the sense for Being, and thus of science and technology, that has 
taken place as a result of the pre-eminence of the mathematical projection of nature with 
regard to the relationship between modern man and his world in terms of mastery and 
control. Fédier writes: “Our example is, then, an example of change. The matter is what 
we mean by the [French] word rendement. Naturally, nowadays, we all mean it in a 
univocal and perfectly clear sense, to the point that it could also be useful to
78 G. Sereny, Into that darkness, André Deutsch Limited, London 1974, pp. 201-202.
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characterize the era of technology as the era of the overall rendement. Now, if we take 
advantage of that surprising instrument of knowledge of our language the Trésor de la 
Langue française is, we can find a very ancient usage of the word rendement, which is 
poles apart of the meaning we give to it. In the twelfth century, in Saint Bernard’s 
Sermons, the expression rendement de grâces may be found -  which clearly means to 
«render thanks», i.e. to thank. If I say that this meaning is poles apart of what we mean 
nowadays by rendement, I want to say precisely that: if for a man of the Middle Ages 
rendement means to respond to a gift he has received, for us rendement is, in relation to 
what was the object of any investment, the capacity of «yielding interests», i.e. to give 
more than the initial investment. Change is thus an inversion: the obligation for the 
human being to reciprocate a gift with a gift, becomes, for an entrepreneur, the hope 
that something gives him back the price of his suffering, plus a reasonable percentage. 
The disappearance of the former meaning in favour of the latter gives the extent and 
depth of this change. The same kind of inversion can be seen in the change of truth 
which gives rise to the apparition of modern technology” (RV 213-214).
In this sense, if  we interpret -  in agreement with Heidegger -  positive 
sciences, in their essence, as man’s “comportments” towards everything that is, the 
crisis of scientific knowledge, as was perceived in advance by Heidegger and by 
Husserl, concerns the foundation which sustains human acting and destiny. To say it 
with Husserl, the crisis of sciences must be interpreted as the crisis of the sense of the 
existence of European humanity.
Indeed, the scientific interpretation of the world dominates every action of 
ours. It ensures continuous success and proves to be the most suitable interpretation in 
our time, insofar as it has the necessary capabilities to attain the target our humanity has 
set: the availability and controllability of all beings, thanks to a more and more effective 
method and to operational devices ensuring the complete monitoring of every (artistic- 
spiritual and industrial) “production” process. Mindful of the words of the Russian poet 
Boris Pasternak we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, let us now listen to what 
Heidegger writes: “It is even more important to ask whether appropriateness to our time 
is the measure for the «inner truth» of human actions, or whether «thinking and poetry»,
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despite all censure of this phrase, are not the actions that most provide us with a 
measure” (QA 55).
Thus, should the doubt raised by Heidegger -  about the obvious and natural 
way our age has assumed scientific interpretation as true -  be proven to be founded, 
philosophy should assume as its own the essential task of thinking in a critical way (i.e. 
phenomenologically) about the foundation which supports scientific action and that, 
however, necessarily remains un-thought -  Being - , in its constitutive relation to man. 
As Beaufret says, “Man really comes to light as a man, only in virtue of the coming to 
light, in himself, of philosophy” (DH 1 22).
Thus, the need to understand the meaning of the guiding-word Dasein, so 
often misunderstood, and to start a new interpretation of the constituent feature of 
human existence in the light of the re-proposition of the question of Being. Heidegger 
writes:
“«W e are»
Who are we?
But then are we?
What does «Being» mean? We «are» as and insofar as we 
run into ourselves as we run into the tree or into the house. But is it 
like that that we meet ourselves? And assuming that this is the case, 
do we comprehend the way we are?
Who decides with regard to «Being»?
Or, rather, is it Being that decides with regard to every 
who and to every questioning? And how does this take place? What is 
Being? How must it be disclosed and, thus, re-driven to its truth? 
What is truth?
We stick to the extreme point of this questioning” (HGA 
69, p. 8; IGP 7).
§ 6. Recapitulation and link to the second chapter
In order to prepare the field for an analysis of the role played by Sein und 
Zeit inside Heidegger’s pathway of thinking, it has proved decisive to show the 
theoretical horizon from which this first fundamental work of his takes its start. On the 
basis of what Heidegger himself says in his Humanismusbrief -  according to which the
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fundamental experience of the forgetfulness of Being constitutes the dimension from 
which Sein und Zeit originates - , our aim has been to supply an initial elucidation of the 
sense of the enigmatical locution that sounds: “forgetfulness of Being”. More precisely, 
under the guidance of the numerous remarks Heidegger made on this issue inside the 
works that precede and follow Sein und Zeit, we have dwelled upon the difference 
between philosophical and scientific knowledge (where the latter has to be intended, 
particularly, in its modern meaning), insofar as the scientific knowledge is 
methodologically grounded on that forgetfulness of Being “to the square” -  to say it in 
Beaufret’s words - , according to which Being seems just an empty nothing and any 
investigation on it a useless sophistry (see also infra, chap. 2, § 5.b). Assuming that the 
aim of Sein und Zeit is to reawaken a sense for Being, the confrontation between the 
neo-positivistic interpretation fostered by the Vienna Circle and Heidegger’s analyses in 
his Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft has contributed -  also thanks to the “mediation” of 
Husserl’s late fundamental work Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften -  to point 
out the menace impending on the sense itself of the scientific knowledge and, in a wider 
perspective, of knowledge as such, once the ontological difference between Being and 
being is no longer acknowledged as the ground of any theoretical and practical 
comportment man may assume with regard to his own world. The pretence exercised by 
the scientific knowledge of constituting the one and only measure of the truth, together 
with the interpretation of the relationship between man and world in terms of “subject” 
and “object” -  on which the modern scientific knowledge is grounded - , represent a 
worrying reduction of the existential possibilities potentially destined to man by a wider 
understanding of the phenomenon of Being. Under this perspective, it proves urgent to 
investigate the relationship between man and Being that is to be seen in Heidegger’s 
first ontological key word: Dasein, which becomes the occasion for a meditation both 
on the phenomenon of Being and on the new interpretation of man, who is -  not by 
chance -  perceived in Sein und Zeit as that being which, just as its “essence” is 
determined by the understanding of Being, constitutes the privileged way of access to 
the elucidation of Being as such.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE QUESTION OF THE SENSE FOR BEING IN SEIN UND ZEIT, §§ 1-44: 
DASEIN, DISCLOSEDNESS, AND TRUTH 
(EXISTENCE -  BEING IN THE WORLD -  DISPOSITION)
§ 1. Methodological considerations: Being and Dasein
a) The circular nature of man’s relation to Being 
and its implications with regard to history and politics (Löwith and Lukács)
In the light of the problematic that has been outlined in the first chapter, we 
start a more detailed study of the first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit by pointing 
out, right from the start, the role played by the determination of man’s essence in terms 
of Dasein in view of the elucidation of the question of Being. In particular, the fifth 
paragraph recites: “The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an 
interpretation of the sense of Being in general”. In other words: man is investigated, 
only insofar as he is the site where Being (the difference between Being and being) 
manifests itself. A relation of this sort starts between Being and man: “Being, or the 
manifestation of Being, needs human beings and that, vice versa, human beings are only 
human beings if they are standing in the manifestation of Being” (QA 82). In this sense, 
Heidegger writes: “One cannot ask about Being without asking about the essence of 
human beings” (QA 82).
Between Being and man a circle sets up which, at first, may appear of a 
vicious nature, out of which one has to come. If we, instead, with Heidegger, “insist on 
the extreme point” (IGP 1) of this “coming and going” between Being and man, we can 
make the hypothesis that the existential analytic prepares an understanding of the 
question of the sense of Being, insofar as it rises, by awakening it, that sense for Being 
which constitutes the very dimension of (the truth of) his existence -  and inside which 
the possibility takes shape of a time, of a humanity, in which each one may have his 
own stay (see infra, chap. 3).
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*In a diametrically opposite sense, as regards the interpretative path we are 
following, move Karl Löwith’s comments in his Heidegger Denker in dürftiger Zeit19, 
according to whom the problem of the circular nature of the relation of Being to man, 
which Löwith himself acknowledges as “the most essential question among all 
philosophical and theological ones”, would have been faced by Heidegger in an 
undecided and ambiguous way, being unclear “whether Being has its facundity in God, 
or in the world, or in the soul”. Such a background indecision inside Heidegger’s 
philosophical project would have led him to assume an ambiguous attitude towards the 
history of Western Metaphysics, insofar as the initial modesty with which Heidegger 
qualified his task in terms of “shepherd of Being” and “advocate of the West” would 
have transformed very soon into the capacity of formulating in a peremptory way his 
own judgment “looking down on” the assumed greatness and significance of the 
“already-gone-by epoch [from Plato to Nietzsche] of the forgetfulness of Being” -  an 
epoch which would not have been able either to “meditate or question the concealed 
truth of Being”. That same indecision would be at the base of the mistake Heidegger 
made at the time of his commitment in favour of Hitler in 1933, since it would have 
made possible his “uncritical hardening” on a thought of history far from the reality of 
facts, thus revealing a complete lack of “political sense”.
That the background ambiguity of Heidegger’s thought leads to an 
interpretation of history in terms of a “mystified pseudo-history of Being” is what also 
the Marxist philosopher Georgy Lukács maintains (as reported by Löwith in note 7, p. 
175), in particular in Die Zerstörung der Vernunft: “The Ash Wednesday of Parasitical 
Subjectivism (Heidegger, Jaspers)”80. His interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy, 
which is understood in terms of subjectivism, pseudo-objectivism and irrationalism 
(“the unsurmountable subjectivism of the phenomenology, the pseudo-objectivity of the 
ontology” [pp. 504-505]) literally destroys Heidegger’s analyses on the questions of
79 K. Löwith, H eidegger D enker in dürftiger Zeit, Sämtliche Schriften 8, J.B.
Metzlersche und C.E. Poeschel, Stuttgart 1984, p. 163.
80 G. Lukács, D ie Zerstörung der Vernunft, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin 1955 (Engl. 
Trans. The destruction o f  reason, The Merlin Press, London 1980, pp. 489-522).
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“existence”, of “time” and, consequently of “history”: “the road to Being means a 
casting aside of all objective conditions of reality” (p. 506).
We are not in a position, in this context, to go through the analyses carried out 
by Lukács. However, it is worth remembering, at this stage, that Heidegger’s philosophy is 
defined as “diseased” (p. 509) and, later on, “pre-fascist” (p. 510): the crisis of monopolistic 
capitalism after the First World War and the danger represented by Bolshevik Communism 
compel Heidegger, in order to supply a philosophy of life which might still have given man 
hope, to “disparage real history as «unauthentic»” (p. 516) and to acknowledge as 
“authentic” only that history which concerns the individual’s psychological inner and real 
life. Set free, in this way, from “social actions and decisions” (p. 516), man -  “the modern 
philistine” (p. 517) -, being even more aware of his own nullity and of the desperate “state 
of disorientation and perplexity” (p. 516) of his existence, would thus have found himself in 
the best conditions to be blindly converted to Hitler’s activism, which would have appeared 
as the sole possibility of freeing himself from the mortal emptiness that surrounded him and 
by which he himself was terrified.
*
That the sense for Being (for the difference of Being and being) we have talked 
about up to now, does not constitute anything fantastic or “pseudo-objective” -  to say it in 
Lukács’ words -  is what emerges from Heidegger’s analyses devoted to those constituent 
phenomena of man’s existence anxiety (BT § 40) and death (BT §§ 46-53) are, phenomena 
in which we may perceive in the clearest way how unavoidable for man his relation to 
Being (as Nothing) is. To this purpose, let us think about the fact that the (Earty Greek) 
determination of the human being as “mortal” is far different from the metaphysical one as 
“rational animal”. If, in fact, as Heidegger emphasizes, the expression animal rationale 
defines man starting from reason (Vernunft), i.e. starting from his relationship mainly with 
beings (which seems to be in human experience the commonest and thus the nearest one)81, 
how about the sense for the difference of Being and being -  in particular in the modern era
81 See M. Heidegger, Grundfragen der Philosophie. A usgewählte “P ro b lem e” der  
“L og ik ”, HGA 45, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1984 (Engl. Trans. B asic Q uestions o f
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as inaugurated by Descartes, who thinks of man as “subject” and of the world as “object”, 
in the light of the truth now reduced to undoubted certainty?
Heidegger’s hypothesis is to show the “derivative”, or rather insufficient, 
character of the modern interpretation of the relation between Being and man, insofar as 
the determination of man’s essence on the ground of his relation to Being founds any 
possible knowledge of a being as an object.82 Inside the perspective opened by the 
glancing of the difference between Being and being, an understanding of the sense of 
man’s relation to Being may, thus, be made ready. To this purpose our analyses 
concerning the first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit will attain their target 
through the elucidation of the existential moment of the “disposition” (Befindlichkeit), 
as Dasein, which will prove to be exposed (attuned) to the Being of the being, unveils in 
its own disclosedness to Being, that is to say, to itself as human being and to its own 
world (BT §§ 31-34). On the basis of Dasein's essential constitution as “Being in the 
world” (BT § 12), its interpretation as care (BT §§ 41-44), which starts soon after the 
analyses on anxiety, will appear, in fact, as comprehensible only thanks to the sense for 
the difference between Being (Nothing) and being which takes place in a decisive way 
just in the existential phenomenon of angst. Angst, thus, becomes Dasein's distinctive 
disposition as direct disclosure to Being itself.
b) The forgetfulness of Being and 
the de-obstruction of the history of Metaphysics
Now, it is not by chance that some of the most incisive analyses of the 
phenomenon of anxiety are contained in the renowned 1929 text entitled Was ist 
M etaphysik?, since the question which gives the essay its title “questions beyond 
Metaphysics” (PM 231), that is to say, beyond the forgetfulness of Being. That such
Philosophy: Selected  “P ro b lem s” o f  “L o g ic ”, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1994, § 
9a).
82 On this purpose, Heidegger writes: “In the course of this history [the history of 
ontology] certain distinctive domains of Being have come into view and have served as the 
primary guides for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito  of Descartes, the subject, the «I», 
reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in 
accordance with the thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected” 
(BT 44).
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overcoming is not confined to an abandonment or a refusal of Metaphysics finds 
confirmation in Heidegger’s words as follows: “Granted, however, that not only do 
beings stem from Being, but that Being too, in a still more originary manner, itself rests 
within its own truth [...], then it is necessary to ask what metaphysics is in its ground” 
(PM 232).
Let us take a slower pace. According to Heidegger’s intentions, twofold is 
the task in working out the question of Being in Sein und Zeit: to lay bare the horizon 
for an interpretation of the sense for Being corresponds, in fact, “the task of de- 
obstructing (Destruktion) the history of ontology” (BT § 6)83. What Heidegger makes 
toward Metaphysics is not a destruction in the strict sense of the word, but rather its de­
obstruction with regard to the forgetfulness o f Being, thanks to which the philosophers’ 
thought, from Plato to Nietzsche, would “be accomplished, cleared up, transfigured!” (E 
36). Once we assume that, as Beaufret writes, “the difference between Being and being 
is thought of everywhere, but nowhere differentiated enough” (E 36), Heidegger’s 
originality should not be interpreted as a new thesis on Being, which would add to those 
already formulated by former philosophers; rather, it consists in giving evidence to what 
is “un-said” in Metaphysics as the horizon which, just because it shows itself “in 
excess” (i.e. “for overabundance”), “refuses” (E 32) to let itself be said. Let us think 
about what Aristotle says: “Just as it is with bats’ eyes in respect of daylight, so it is 
with the glance of our thought in respect of those things which are by nature more 
displayed” (Metaphysics, a  1, 993 b 9, translation slightly modified).
Referring to the renowned image by Descartes that identifies Metaphysics 
with the “roots of philosophy”, Heidegger asks: “In what soil do the roots of the tree of 
philosophy take hold? [...] What is the basis and element of the essence of 
metaphysics?” (PM 277). To think like that does not mean that Heidegger’s purpose is
83 To our purposes, it has to be made clear that Heidegger’s entire University 
teaching in Freiburg (1919-1923) -  which has been published in HGA 56/57-63 -  and in 
Marburg (1923-1928) -  HGA 17-26 -  was devoted to the elucidation of the sense of the history 
of Western philosophy. On this topic, please refer to: T. Kisiel, The G enesis o f  H e id eg g er’s 
B eing and Time, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1993; F. Schalow, 
Q uestioning the Search fo r  G enesis: A L ook a t H e id e g g e r’s E arly  F reiburg  and M arburg  
Lectures & T. S. Kalariparambil, Towards Sketching the “G en esis” o f  B eing and Time, in 
H eidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2000; J. A. Escudero, D er ju n ge  H eidegger und 
der H orizont der Seinsfrage, in H eidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2001.
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to “bury the past in nullity” (BT 44), but rather to “stake out the positive possibilities” 
(BT 44) -  and this always means: to keep within their limits (within their own ground) -  
of the decisive interpretations in the history of ontology, that is to say, of Metaphysics, 
in our case of the modern one, which sees in Descartes the beginner of that “Copernican 
revolution” of thought which was accomplished by Kant and by Hegel himself, who 
thinks that “with him (namely, with Descartes), we properly enter upon a self­
supporting philosophy. Here, we can say that we are home and, like the sailor who has 
journeyed on the stormy sea for a long time, cry: «Land-ho!»” (PM 325).
More exactly: Heidegger’s attempt is to show that the question of Being has 
been understood by philosophical tradition on the basis of the guiding-question 
(Leitfrage) of Metaphysics, which asks “what is a being?”: thus, it is not Being as such 
to be inquired, but, rather, a being -  the latter caught in its “being-ness” (Seiendheit). In 
this sense, the basic question (Grundfrage) of Metaphysics -  what is Being? -  differs 
from its guiding-question, insofar as it anticipates it. Heidegger writes: “[...] in 
Metaphysics Being itself remains un-thought, and not by chance, but in compliance 
with the asking suitable for Metaphysics. This asking and the relevant answering, 
thinking of beings as such, necessarily think of it starting from Being, but do not think 
of the latter, and the very reason is that, in compliance with the sense of the question 
more suitable to Metaphysics, Being is thought of as being in its Being. As Metaphysics 
thinks of -  starting from Being -  beings, it does not think of Being as such”84.
c) Plan of the chapter
Now, those analyses devoted to angst aim at awakening the sense of that 
dimension inside which man exists -  the sense of that difference between Being and 
being, which in angst comes to light insofar as “anxiety makes manifest the nothing” 
(PM 88), do they not? And again: “With the fundamental attunement of anxiety we 
have arrived at that occurrence in Dasein in which the nothing is manifest and from 
which it must be interrogated. How is it with the nothing?” (PM 89).
84 M. Heidegger, N ietzsche II, op. cit., p. 311.
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The question comes up spontaneous: why interrogate the Nothing if it is 
nothing? But, let us halt the many senseless questions we would ask if we took this path 
with no way out. Right from the beginning, in fact, we point out that, following 
Heidegger’s suggestion, “Nothing” means “no-thing: non-being”: “Nothing” does not 
indicate an empty nullity, but “something” which is even though it is not a being: Being 
itself. More precisely: “In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness 
of beings as such arises: that they are beings -  and not nothing” (PM 90).
It is just this “original openness” of a being in its Being to clarify the sense of 
that Da (a prefix commonly meant in a locative sense) which determines man’s Being as 
Dasein; this is the dimension of which we have to awake the sense: Being -  that is to say, 
the difference between being and non-being85. What does it mean, at this stage, that “With a 
studied indifference science abandons it as what «there is not»” (PM 85)?
Thus, granted that it is our aim to clarify in what sense the guiding-word 
Dasein highlights man’s constituent relation to Being, the clarification of the sense of 
angst and, even before -  following the paragraphs order of Sein und Zeit - , of the 
guiding-words “existence” and “Being in the world”, will constitute the way of access 
to a question which, as Heidegger himself says in a text written in the “far-off” 1919­
1921 with regard to the dimension of history -  that is to say: to Being itself, “is not 
merely something of which we have knowledge and about which we write books; 
rather, we ourselves are it, and have it as a task” (PM 29).
It is so clarified the ambit of our researches and, thus, the triple articulation 
of this chapter. And more precisely: (1) on the basis of the phenomenological de­
obstruction of the history of the metaphysical interpretation of the word “existence” and 
also, (2) thanks to the analyses related to Dasein' s fundamental constitution, “Being in 
the world”, the phenomenon which reveals itself in the disposition of angst (as a way of 
Being in the world) -  Being, in its difference from being -  will let us perceive the 
opening of that dimension -  (3) the truth (as alèthéia, not as certainty) -  with which 
Division One ends (BT § 44: Dasein, disclosedness, and truth). Let us remember what
85 This is the meaning of the Heideggerian locution that sounds “Andenken an das 
Sein” : as reminded by Roger Munier (Todtnauberg 1949, in M artin H eidegger, L’Herne, Paris 
1983, p. 154), it means “by thinking, to tarry in the proximity of Being itself”.
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Fédier writes with regard to the translation of Dasein: “[...] man’s Being can in no way 
be understood as «être-là»  (Being-there); it is necessary (in an undoubtedly 
«impossible» French) to mean this «ètre» in a transitive way and to say: «ètre le là» 
(Being the there), that is to say, to manifest the «là» (there) -  to give rise. Not: to give 
rise to something, but, first of all: to let the place where everything will likely take place 
reveal itself. The marvel of marvels is just this place (topos), which should be called 
non-place because, in a rigorous metaphysical sense, it is not” (H 214-215)86.
£ 2. Dasein as “existence” and the phenomenon o f the 
“understanding o f Being”
a) The priority of Dasein inside the question of Being
Let us clarify, from the beginning, the sense of the analyses with regard to 
Dasein by exposing what Heidegger himself writes in the Author’s preface to the 
seventh German edition [of Sein und Zeit] (1953): “While the previous editions have 
borne the designation «First Half», this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a 
century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be presented 
anew. Yet the road it has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to 
be stirred by the question of Being”.
The last two lines of this quotation highlight the nature of the question as 
raised by Heidegger -  that sense for Being (for the difference between Being and being) 
Beaufret was talking about -: our Dasein is stirred by the question of Being, that is to 
say, is constitutively concerned by it. In other words, to acquire a sense for Being is the 
possibility itself of being a man: this sense shapes that dimension inside which Dasein 
is in the world insofar as, unlike any other being which is present in the world, it exists. 
The matter is to find an access to a phenomenon as close to us as difficult to catch: in 
fact, it seems that the words “world” and “existence” are as more obvious as it may be
86 Let us bear in mind that this passage continues as follows: “No «race», no 
people, no language can «better» realize the essence of humanity than any other. The thought of 
D asein  is incompatible with any form of racism” (see infra, chap. 3)!
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and, like “Being”, have become dogmas. Thus, Heidegger’s effort does not consist in 
supplying another interpretation of man, but, rather, in highlighting what the possibility 
itself of being a man consists of: right on this, the different interpretations of Being and 
of man throughout the history of philosophy are to be founded. Thanks to the 
awakening of the sense for Being, the Greek interpretation of man as “mortal” and the 
Roman-modern one as animal rationale appear to be rooted in their own ground and 
limits. How, thus, may we have access to the phenomenon as singled out by the 
guiding-word Dasein, assuming that the element itself on which its “essence” rests -  
Being -  is, today more than ever, forgotten? In other words: the path to take, with 
regard to the problem of the sense of Being, needs, first of all, before answering it, an 
elucidation able to ask the question of Being again, starting from its relation to man.
But: what phenomenon is brought to light, in a way as to make the 
hypothesis subtending Heidegger’s analyses -  the relation between Being and man -  
appear as founded? That is to say: what does it mean that the “existential analytic” 
appears to be the most suitable way from a phenomenological point of view to seize the 
question which titles Sein und Zeit?
*
Let us dwell upon a proposition which is contained in the incipit of Sein und 
Zeit: “So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question o f the sense o f Being”. The 
analyses contained in the Introduction of Sein und Zeit make it clear what follows: the 
fact itself that we can ask ourselves about the sense of Being means that, somehow, we 
already know something of it: just the pre-understanding, however vague and 
undetermined, we may have of Being constitutes the way of access which assures 
Heidegger’s analyses their own foundation. The trait of vagueness and indeterminacy, 
not to be meant in a merely “negative” sense, discloses, in fact, an ambit of analysis 
which, just insofar as it assumes the mere everyday life phenomena as its own 
“evidence”, does not limit itself to take out of Dasein a more or less general concept of 
Being -  like a theory or a philosophical doctrine - , but shows how man’s whole 
existence, be he aware of it or not, is supported from time to time, at any instant, by the
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sense for the difference between Being and being. Heidegger’s words recite: “In the 
question of the sense of Being there is no «circular reasoning» but rather a remarkable 
«relatedness backward or forward» which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the 
inquiry itself as a mode of Being of a being. Here what is asked about has an essential 
pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning [...] of the 
question of Being. This only means, however, that there is a way -  perhaps even a very 
special one -  in which beings with the character of Dasein are related to the question of 
Being” (BT 28, translation slightly modified).
Heidegger, thus, emphasises the essential fact concerning man’s “essence”: 
the understanding of Being “belongs” to Dasein and constitutes it in its very Being. 
This “fact” determines the sense and structure of the pathway of thought that follows 
the phenomenon of Being. It is just starting from this average and vague understanding 
of Being that, according to Heidegger, we may, without grounding Being by deducting 
it from Dasein, lay “bare the grounds for it [Being] and exhibit them” (BT 28) which, 
just inside the preparation to the sense for Being, sets itself as the primary task of Sein 
und Zeit. A priority of D asein  is, so to speak, announced: “D asein  is ontically 
distinctive in that it is ontological” (BT 32). In other words: the question of Being, in its 
preparatory moment, needs the whole understanding of Dasein. The matter is to “give a 
proper explication of a being (Dasein), with regard to its Being [to its being concerned 
by Being, by non-being]” (BT 27, translation slightly modified).
b) Existence as comportment (posture) towards Being 
on the ground of the difference between Being and being
At this stage, in the light of the priority of Dasein we have just referred to, it 
is necessary to elucidate its constitution of Being (Seinsverfassung), whose structure we 
articulate, in order to perceive the phenomenon in question -  the existence of Dasein 
and its “Being in the world” - , in three moments. Heidegger writes: 1) “Dasein is a 
being which does not just occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished 
by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it”; 2) “[...] Dasein, in its 
Being, has a relationship towards (zu) that Being -  a relationship which itself is one of
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Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself 
in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly”; 3) “[...] with (mit) and 
through (durch) its Being, this Being is disclosed (erschlossen) to it [Dasein]” (BT 32).
Heidegger, thus, is in a position to supply a first characterisation of Dasein, 
just insofar as the understanding of Being constitutively determines its own “essence” 
as disclosedness. Let us consider: “That kind of Being towards which Dasein can 
comport itself in one way or another, and always comport itself somehow, we call it 
«existence» (Existenz)” (BT 32). And in more detail, the essence of Dasein, which is a 
pure expression of Being (Seinsausdruck), lies in the fact that “in each case it has its 
Being to be, and has it as its own” (BT 32-33).
With this character of Dasein, as the understanding of Being in the sense of 
“having always to be” (to care: to in-stand on the disclosedness to) “my” Being and the 
Being of what is not Dasein (the “world”) -  this means “to exist” - , we acquire the 
decisive determination of man’s essence: the analysis of every existential phenomenon, 
in fact, constantly comes back to Being according to that “understanding of Being” -  
veritas transcendentalis -  which founds every man’s comportment toward his own 
“world” (beings). Every Dasein ' s way of Being, in fact, has its own foundation in the 
possibility, whether assumed or not, of standing up to its own destiny, “destiny” of 
which we have the “inkling” only inside that dimension constituted by the relation of 
man to his having to be his own Being -  the sense for the difference of Being and being: 
Being, that is to say, time, history... a future (see supra, chap. 1, § 3).
A clearer explanation of what we are saying can be seen in the essential 
determination of Dasein -  which we will not face explicitly -  as “(thrown) projection” 
(geworfene Entwurf), insofar as it reveals the constituent trait of its understanding of 
Being (BT § 31). As to a glimpse at that dimension which addresses to man -  Being -  
and thanks to which he may feel himself called to give his existence a shape, in the form 
of a “projection” which roots himself in his own world, let us mention what Heidegger 
writes: “Only because the Being of the Da [read: Dasein] receives its Constitution 
through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection, only 
because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself
104
«Become what you are», and say this with understanding” (BT 186). Within this ambit 
there is the possibility for Dasein to see the sense, the truth -  which has from time to 
time to be built up - , of its existence, appear.
That this appearance is not a “daydream”, but rather the most genuine 
understanding of Being-oneself from each man, finds a peculiar confirmation in a poet’s 
words, Charles Baudelaire: “We are weighed down, every moment, by the conception 
and the sensation of Time. And there are but two means of escaping and forgetting this 
nightmare: Pleasure and Work. Pleasure consumes us. Work strengthens us. Let us 
chose”.87 Let us just note how the moment when man reaches a decision as regards his 
own existence is determined by the phenomenon of time: inside this dimension, the 
possibility of working opens for man, in the midst of beings as a whole, as the mode of 
resisting that terrifying nightmare in which each of us has always found himself being 
exposed to his own destiny of Being in the world. To refer to a poet’s words, in 
particular to Baudelaire’s, appears to be less arbitrary than it could seem at first sight, 
once we have remembered how thought and poetry, in the light of the stupefying 
phenomenon of the taking place of things, keep a decisive relationship inside 
Heidegger’s work, already starting from the analyses carried out in Sein und Zeit (BT § 
34) in connection with the existential phenomenon of language (Sprache), which 
appears in this sense far different from a conventional gathering of signs aiming at 
“representing” an object: if, in fact, Dasein names the instant which reveals the world in 
the splendour of its presence to man, “the poetical word -  Beaufret says -  saves the 
apparition, in the sense that, as Baudelaire said, it is the only one to give things back to 
the «shining truth of their native harmony»” (E 29).
The question of the sense for the difference between Being and being 
discloses to that being, that man is, the possibility of Being himself: the leap into the 
decision in favour of this difference is what is being prepared in Heidegger’s analytic of
87 C. Baudelaire, Journaux intimes, «Bibliothèque de la Pléiade», Gallimard, Paris 
(Engl. trans. In tim ate Journals, Panther, London 1969, p. 78). Let us bear in mind that any 
reference to poetry we will make is founded on the sense of Beaufret’s E ntretiens avec de 
T ow arn ick i, whose great merit is that of bringing to light, in a very delicate and almost un- 
showy way , the relation between thought and poetry, which both stem from the perception of 
the enigma and mystery man’s existence is and project a possible stay on the Earth (see supra, 
chap. 1 & infra, chap. 3).
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Dasein as “existence”. To awaken the sense for the difference between Being and being 
means to (potentially) invite each man to take the possibility of Being in the world -  in 
virtue of that sense -  over himself. The fact that our understanding of it is mostly 
inexplicit -  to such an extent as to become something obvious, if  not empty - , just 
reveals how unavoidable this question is in elucidating man’s “essence” itself. That 
everyday life levels out the richness of the difference between Being and being to the 
mere dimension of beings man deals with -  that is to say: that the first understanding of 
the sense of Being is reduced to the mere presence-at-hand of beings - , constitutes the 
possibility of its “forgetfulness (of forgetfulness)”. On the occasion of the Symposium 
in Beirut (1974) dedicated to him, Heidegger writes: “That is why a thinking is 
necessary that resolutely persists in discussing the old fundamental questions in a more 
questioning manner, the questions that prevail over the disquiet of mortals’ stay in the 
world continually anew. [...]. It is therefore necessary first to inquire about the origin of 
this danger [the unexpected essence of technology] and then to perceive its scope. But 
this demands that the question of what is characteristic of Being as such be asked. On 
this path of thinking, contemporary humans could perhaps be brought before a higher 
possibility of Dasein [of being the Da]. This is a possibility that they cannot prepare 
themselves, but that will also not be granted to them by the benevolence of Being 
without the action of their questioning thinking” (QA 253-254).
c) The existential analytic as “fundamental ontology”: 
the sense of “existence” (Heidegger, Sartre and Lukács)
The existential analytic of Dasein is defined by Heidegger as “fundamental 
ontology” (BT 34). But, in what sense does it act as the foundation of any other 
“regional ontology”? A few Heidegger’s words inside Humanismusbrief may help us: 
“For ontology always thinks solely the being in its Being. But as long as the truth of 
Being is not thought all ontology remains without its foundation. Therefore the thinking 
that in Being and Time tries to advance thought in a preliminary way into the truth of 
Being characterizes itself as «fundamental ontology». It strives to reach back into the 
essential ground from which thought concerning the truth of Being emerges” (PM 271).
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Let us dwell upon the locution “truth of Being”: in it, the trait of the 
“motility” of the difference between Being and being shines, which, in its 
differentiating, allows that dimension, inside which man exists, to rise: not by chance, 
as reminded by Zaccaria, the word with which Heidegger translates the Greek trait of 
truth as alèthéia (“Open-without-holding back” [Beaufret]) -  “Lichtung” -  means “das 
freie Offene”, “the free on-set of the expanse” (IGP 294), in which everything may take 
place and in which man, unlike the animal, succeeds in understanding the possibility 
itself o f  his Being in the world: that such disclosure o f a world gives rise to the 
attunement o f  a nightmare, this fact becomes the opportunity fo r  man to decide in 
favour o f himself, so accepting the harshness o f his destiny. In this possibility the truth 
o f his existence is preserved, which can be gained starting from that disquieting 
dimension in which Being itself appears as Nothing.
In other words: the access to a preparation of the question of the sense for 
Being consists of the elucidation of that “understanding of Being” which ontologically 
determines Dasein. The peculiarity is that the theme of Heidegger’s analyses is not, 
thus, something strange or unknown, but rather the “nearest” thing to men, as we 
ourselves are the being which assumes a priority in clarifying the question of Being and 
that, thus, must be first of all questioned with regard to its constitution of Being. 
Heidegger writes: “Dasein is ontically «closest» to itself and ontologically farthest; but 
pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger” (BT 37). This means that to the essence o f  
Dasein there belongs beforehand, pre-ontologically, an understanding o f Being and, 
co-originally, o f  its own Being -  though it appears, at first sight, as something vague 
and undetermined, and, in this sense, easy to misunderstand and to forget. Dasein, in 
fact, tends to understand its Being, first of all and mostly, starting from those beings 
with which it has been since the beginning and continually in daily relationship, that is 
to say, starting from the “world” as merely present-at-hand. In this sense what prevents 
the authentic comprehension of the phenomena which constitute man’s existence, is just 
this “extreme”, daily, familiarity with beings: the interpretation of Dasein, thus, meets 
peculiar difficulties, which however cannot merely be attributed to a “defect” of our 
cognitive (computing) capabilities. Hence, the need to determine the method of the
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research: phenomenology (BT § 7)88. Heidegger so writes: “Not only, however, does an 
understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this understanding develops or decays 
along with whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time” (BT 37).89
*
Now, let us try to give a first clarification of the way of Being of that being 
that we ourselves (everyone for oneself) “have always been” -  in a “transitive” sense: 
we have to be! To this end we highlight two characterisations, which give evidence to 
the existential character of Dasein's way of Being. Heidegger writes: 1) “The Being of 
any such being is in each case mine. These beings, in their Being, comport themselves 
towards their Being. As beings with such Being, they are delivered over to their own 
Being”; 2) “Being is that which is an issue for every such being” (BT 67).
Before proceeding with our analyses, let us linger over the meaning of the 
word “existence”, as the essence itself of Dasein lies in it. It is Heidegger himself, in 
particular in Humanismusbrief (PM 247 ff.) to specify that the term “existence” is not 
identifiable with the concept of the traditional ontology as “existentia”, insofar as 
“Existentia means in contrast actualitas, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as
88 Let us bear in mind a decisive remark made by Heidegger with regard to the 
question of method: “And the method of ontology [whose task is «to explain Being itself and to 
make the Being of beings stand out in full relief»] remains questionable in the highest degree as 
long as we merely consult those ontologies which have come down to us historically, or other 
essays of that character” (BT 49). We do point out, on the other hand, that Heidegger elucidates 
what phenomenology is through the clarification of the Greek concepts of “phenomenon” (BT § 
7a) and “logos” (BT § 7b).
89 And again: “[...] at first and for the most part in the everydayness of our D asein  
we let beings come toward us and present themselves before us in a remarkable 
undifferentiatedness. [...]. [...] here the beings that surround us are uniform ly m anifest as 
simply som ething p resen t at hand in the broadest sense [...]. [...]. It is the fact that beings can 
be manifest in this levelled out uniformity of the present at hand which gives to human 
everydayness its peculiar security, dependency, and almost inevitability, and which facilitates 
the ease with which we necessarily turn from one being to another in everydayness, and yet the 
specific manner of Being that is in each case entirely essential to beings is never acknowledged 
in its importance. [...]. That means that a com portm ent tow ard  beings transpires without first 
awakening any fundamental relationship of man toward beings -  [...] -  as demanded by these 
beings themselves in each case. [...]. [Our everyday comportment toward all beings] moves 
rather within a comportment which, from the perspective of those beings themselves, is 
uprooted and for that very reason is rampant and successful everywhere” (M. Heidegger, D ie  
G rundbegriffe der M etaphysik. W elt -  E ndlichkeit -  E insam keit, WS 1929/30, HGA 29/30, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1983; Engl. Trans. The Fundam ental Concepts o f  M etaphysics: 
World, Finitude, Solitude, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1995, pp. 275-276).
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Idea” (PM 249). Moreover, the word “existence” is used in Sein und Zeit just to mean 
man’s Being: man only exists -  the tree is, but does not exist; the house is, but does not 
exist; God is, but does not exist. The proposition: “man exists” means: Dasein is -  as 
“it has to be” its own Being and Being itself -  that being whose “essence” consists o f  
its relation to Being90. In this sense the Being in-each-case-mine of this “having to be” 
allows me to be myself as Dasein, that is to say, constitutes “my” being a man. 
Assuming that “to be” does not only mean “to subsist, to be present”, m an’s Being 
does not reduce itself to being present-at-hand, but, meant in a transitive sense, points 
out a task, a having-to-be: to hear the call to... On the other hand, in order that man 
may be called and handed over to..., he must have heard a call: what calls man to be 
himself? Something must impose itself as what gives a measure: from what, in fact, 
does man take the measure of his own existence?
To answer this call, we will try to comprehend the phenomenon o f angst, as the 
constituent attunement o f Dasein: in such context the Nothing will reveal itself as the 
dimension inside which human existence takes root. That such Nothing does not reduce itself 
to make everything null and that, rather, it discloses the relation of Being to man -  the feeling 
of time, Baudelaire said -  makes the French poet say: “The faculty of being able to meet the 
need of the moment; exactitude, in other words, must infallibly obtain its reward”91. Now, 
what does this reference to a “need” mean, which claims minute after minute man’s 
existence? Again, Baudelaire writes: “How many have been the presentiments and signs sent 
me already by God [!] that it is high time to act, to consider the present moment as the most 
important of all moments and to take for my everlasting delight my accustomed torment, that 
is to say, my work!”92. In what sense does the human dimension of work have to do with that 
exactitude to which he who cares for himself and for his own world is devoted from time to 
time, minute after minute? Let us take, for the last time, Baudelaire’s words into account:
90 Expressed in a language we are not prepared to and whose sense, however, we 
may start perceiving, this means that, to say it in Heidegger’s words: “As ek-sisting, the human 
being sustains D a-se in  in that he takes the D a , the Lichtung  of Being [the difference between 
Being and being], into «care»” (PM 249). This is what man, through his existence, has to be and 
already is, may he know it or not: to exist means to let the place [the dimension: the D a  -  the 
“there”] where any thing may take place disclose itself. The marvel of marvels is just this place 
[...]” (H 214-215) ^  Dasein: to let the marvel of marvels that the world is take place.
91 C. Baudelaire, Journaux intimes, op. cit., p. 80.
92 Ibid., p. 78.
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“Work engenders good habits, sobriety and chastity, from which result health, riches, 
continuous and strengthening inspiration and charity. Age quod agis”93. Existence is all that!
*
The new determination of the sense of the guiding-word “existence” just 
highlights the difference between Heidegger and Sartre: as emerges from a letter 
Heidegger wrote to Jean Wahl94, his philosophy has nothing to do with “existentialism”. 
Notwithstanding in his letter of 28 October 1945 Heidegger sees in Sartre, as the author 
of that “capital work” that L ’être et le néant (1943) is, a “companion to walk with”95 -  it 
is well known that Sartre was inspired by Sein und Zeit - , the conference the latter held 
on 29 October 1945 entitled L ’existentialisme est un humanisme marks the beginning of 
that misunderstanding to which the French philosopher fell victim as regards his 
“master’s” intentions. The turning point consists of the proposition in which Sartre 
couches the basic principle of existentialism: “existence precedes essence”. Granted that 
in it, according to Heidegger (PM 250), the expressions “existence” and “essence” are 
assumed with the same meaning as given by the metaphysical tradition, Sartre’s 
proposition, insofar as it aims at reversing Plato’s thesis, according to which essence 
would precede existence, would remain a metaphysical thesis, and thus founded in its 
turn on the forgetfulness o f Being.
Lukács’ own interpretation of Heidegger’s thought in terms of 
existentialism appears as founded on a deep misunderstanding of the meaning that 
existence assumes inside Sein und Zeit , that is to say, in view of a new determination of 
man’s essence that overcomes its modern interpretation as consciousness. Heidegger’s 
philosophy, which Lukács reduces to a new “philosophy of life” (see Dilthey, Simmel 
and Scheler), would aim at researching a nucleus of sheer subjectivity and at saving it 
from the general and impending collapse encumbering on the precarious destiny of 
imperialist Europe -  here is the reason of the emphasis with which “existentialists” refer
93 Ibid., p. 82.
94 See J. Wahl, E xisten ce  e t tran scen den ce, La Baconnière, Neuchâtel 1944
(Appendix).
95 In M. Heidegger, L ettera  s u l l ’um anism o, a cura di F. Volpi, Adelphi, Milan 
1995, pp. 109-110.
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to existence: Heidegger “always says «existence» (Dasein), thus giving the impression 
of an objectivity independent of human consciousness, although by «existence» he 
meant nothing more than human existence, indeed only, in the final analysis, its 
manifestation in the consciousness [!?]”96.
d) Authenticity and inauthenticity as Dasein' s ways of Being
The phenomenon of “Being in each case mine” determines the two 
fundamental possibilities of existence as Dasein' s ways of Being: authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity. These expressions must be assumed in their rigorous 
etymologic meaning as “what is proper (up) to” (eigen-) and “what is not proper (up) 
to” the possibility (destiny) of an existence as “mine”. For Dasein, in fact, to exist 
means to have its own foundation always starting from a possibility that it itself already 
is, or better, “has to be”. In fact, Heidegger writes: “Furthermore, in each case Dasein 
is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to 
the way in which it is in each case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very 
Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each 
case Dasein is its possibility, and it «has» this possibility, but not just as a property, as 
something present-at-hand would” (BT 68).
In this sense Dasein is from time to time a possibility o f  Being: it may 
decide in favour of itself and so “«choose» itself and win itself”’ (BT 68); namely, it can 
be up to itself -  at the climax of the chances every man is given in the vast frame of the 
world. The nature of that possibility Dasein from time to time is, emerges from the 
relation between authenticity and inauthenticity. Let us mention Heidegger’s words 
dedicated to the phenomenon of falling (Verfallen): “On no account, however, do the 
terms «inauthentic» and «non-authentic» signify «really not», as if  in this mode of 
Being, Dasein were altogether to lose its Being. «Inauthenticity» does not mean 
anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive 
kind of Being-in-the-world -  the kind which is completely fascinated by the «world» 
[...]. Not-Being-its-self functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its
96 G. Lukács, D ie Zerstörung der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 493-494.
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essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of not-Being has to be conceived as 
that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for 
the most part” (BT 220).
This means that man cannot but be: even in the inauthentic forms of his 
existence, Being is an issue for Dasein. Now, if we had to understand what authenticity 
means, the comprehension of Horace’s renowned locution carpe diem could help: seize 
the right moment to become what you are! Authenticity is characterized as having to 
win one’s existence beforehand -  squaring in oneself as regards one’s own 
possibilities: to decide! In Hegel’s words in his Inaugural Address, Delivered at the 
University o f Berlin (22 October 1818), the matter is to have “a heart which is still in 
good health”, that is to say, which has “the courage to demand truth, and it is in the 
realm of truth that philosophy is at home, which it [itself] constructs, and which we 
share in by studying it”97. Now, let us think of what Heidegger, in his position as rector 
and professor of philosophy at the University of Freiburg, writes to his students in 1933: 
“you do not have to become blind in your fight; rather, you have to keep lucid for action 
[existence]” (EP 117)! Thus the questions: in what sense does philosophic knowledge 
make man lucid as regards his own existence, his own destiny? Now, what does “to 
know” mean? And what does “truth” mean? Is, thus, study the human action in which 
the sense for the difference between Being and being may be awaken, where the truth 
itself is guarded? Is it not Heidegger himself who saw in the University students the 
future leaders and guardians of the spirit of a people? Hegel writes in this respect: “Here 
[in Berlin], the cultivation and flowering of the sciences is one of the most essential 
moments -  even of political life. In this university -  as the central university -  the 
centre of all spiritual culture (Geistesbildung) and of all science and truth, namely 
philosophy, must also find its place and be treated with special care”98.
97 G.W.F. Hegel, P olitica l W ritings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999,
p. 185.
98 Ibid., p. 182.
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§ 3. Dasein ’s “Being in the world” as its fundamental existential constitution
The analyses carried out in the second paragraph highlighted that the 
questi on of Being ne eds a suitab le way of access: in this direction the phenomenon
0 f  Dasein assume s, as said, a pri ority. At thi s stage , it is necessary to take a step 
forward and clarify what Heidegger names “the basic state [a priori] of Dasein”: 
“ Being in the worl d”, to such an extent that the previ ously expo se d Dasein's 
determinati ons of Being (“ exi stenc e ” and “mineness”) have their ground in this 
c onstituti on of Being. On the other hand, it has to be pointe d out that, even though 
this basic state is a nec e ssary structure of Dasein, it appears to be insufficient to 
wholly determine its Being: on the grounds of the analyses of this basic state, 
Heidegger will supply, in fact, an even more radical phenomenological 
interpretati on of Dasein -  name ly, as care for Being (BT § 41).
Now, to think of Dasein as “Being in the world” means to suitably 
determine its essenc e (its mo st intimate po ssib i l ity): Being in the worl d, ac cording 
to the languag e dear to Sein und Zeit, determine s Dasein at an exi stenti al - ontological
1 eve l. In thi s sense Dasein is not “in the worl d” only be c ause it actually exists (as 
though it were a chair, a table or any other being which is present-at-hand); to 
highlight the phenomenon of “Being in the world” in man is not just a mere 
ascertainment of a fact, but constitutes the second step made by Heidegger inside the 
prep aration to the sense for the di fferenc e of Being and be ing. He i deg g er’s attempt, 
in fact, move s from the intenti on to upro ot that interpretati on whi ch pl ac es man and 
the worl d in an undefined relationship of space-time inclusion, as though man did 
not represent but one of the addenda to that gre at “sum” whi ch de scrib e s the world 
as “a whole of facts”. In brief: man and world rise contemporarily, that is to say, the 
world appears in all its brightness where man cares about making it take place. 
Th ere is no world bu t sta rting from  D asein -  tha t is to say, fro m th e sense for th e 
difference between Being and being.
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a) “Being in the world” in the light of the phenomenon of “transcendence”
(Vom Wesen des Grundes, 1929)
“[The question of transcendence] is the 
originary and unitary ground of possibility of the truth of 
our understanding of Being. Such understanding, 
however -  as an unveiling projecting of Being -  is the 
primordial activity of human existence, in which all 
existing in the midst of beings must be rooted” (PM 124).
To clarify the sense of Dasein' s Being in the world, let us, now, divert from 
our path and trust in Heidegger’s words as pronounced inside the 1929 essay entitled 
Vom Wesen des Grundes [The essence of Reasons], in which the basic state of Dasein is 
interpreted starting from the phenomenon of transcendence, namely from the perception 
of the difference between Being and being: as reminded by Heidegger himself, “The 
thesis: To the essence of Dasein as such belongs Being-in-the-world, contains the 
problem of transcendence” (PM 111).
Before clarifying what transcendence means, it should be noted that the 
deviation we make is not far away from the targets of the analyses that were carried out 
inside Sein und Zeit, insofar as their sole objective, as explicitly declared by Heidegger 
himself in the title of Part One, is to reach an explication of time as “the transcendental 
horizon for the question of Being”. Now, granted that time is the name with which 
Heidegger identifies in Sein und Zeit the phenomenon of the difference between Being 
and being, it is not by chance that transcendence concerns, in a constituent way, the 
Being itself of Dasein, as this latter is interpreted as that being which assumes a priority 
inside the question of Being due to the fact that its existence appears to be founded as 
its most authentic possibility on that sense for the difference between Being and being, 
which alone allows that transformation of time experience Heidegger talks about in Sein 
und Zeit. In this sense the interpretation of the question of Being starting from 
transcendence does not aim at “deducing” the world starting from man: on the contrary, 
Heidegger writes, “As regards the reproach [...] of an «anthropocentric standpoint» in 
Being and Time, this objection [...] says nothing so long as one omits [...] to 
comprehend how, precisely through the elaboration of the transcendence of Dasein,
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«the human being» comes into the «centre» in such a way that his nothingness [finitude] 
amid beings as a whole can and must become a problem in the first place” (PM 371).
Inside this nothingness, in fact, the possible authenticity of existence is 
guarded: is it not just this nothingness the image reflected into Dasein o f that feeling o f  
weighing down caused by the sensation o f  time Beaudelaire talked about, which 
exposes man to his destiny in the midst o f the world and compels him, like a nightmare, 
to be able to seize the opportunity o f Being minute after minute? What, thus, does Being 
in the world mean?
At this stage, we do have to clarify in detail the expression “transcendence”, 
mindful of the fact that Dasein assumes an outstanding role in Heidegger’s analyses, 
only insofar as man’s existence is founded on his understanding relation to the 
phenomenon of Being. A short etymologic analysis allows us to comprehend how 
transcendence (lat. trascend_re: trans+scando: “to go beyond”) means “going beyond, 
surpassing”: now, granted that it is Dasein itself the being which surpasses, so that to 
exist means going beyond from time to time, it is our task to determine what is 
surpassed in every man’s comportment or action in his existence.
Before proceeding with our investigations, we deem it right to remind 
ourselves that the modern philosophical tradition has interpreted the phenomenon of 
transcendence as the relationship between a subject and an object. If, on the other hand, 
Dasein constitutes an overcoming o f the interpretation o f  m an’s Being as subject, to 
determine transcendence merely as a relationship between subject and object is no 
longer sufficient, since it is just this “relationship between” that has to be explained. 
This means that the problem of the subject-object relationship, in its essence, is not just 
a gnoseological question, that is to say, it must not be put, primarily, in terms of a 
subject which knows an object, almost as if Dasein existed before as subject, and then, 
in case some objects were present, surpassed the “barrier” which would separate man 
from the world outside and went beyond them. In the case of transcendence, we have to 
do with something which precedes any gnoseological problem, since the matter is, 
rather, to highlight in it the ontological phenomenon which discloses the possibility 
itself man’s existence consists of and which allows in advance his cognitive relation
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with beings. Granted that it is the understanding of Being that lets a being as such be 
encountered and makes from time to time its objectification possible, we can say that 
transcendence, being founded on the sense for the difference between Being and being, 
is the basic state o f Dasein, insofar as it makes its Being in the world possible: to exist, 
in fact, means to have had to surpass a being in order to be able to encounter it as such.
If, thus, it is not the objects to be surpassed, it must be the world -  otherwise 
said, beings as a whole -  what toward which the surpassing from Dasein takes place, to 
which, in this way, not only the being that it is not, but also the being that it itself is, is 
revealed, coming “toward it as it «itself». Transcendence constitutes selfhood 
(Selbstheit)” (PM 108). Here is, thus, the dimension inside which man’s possible stay in 
his own world takes shape in all its vastness: Dasein's potentiality for Being itself -  in 
the sense of bearing and honouring that contract with Being in virtue of which man 
“gives rise” to the world -  is what for the sake of which it exists. Nothing, in fact, is 
dearer to Dasein than the understanding of Being: in this way man can at last become 
himself. That it cares for its own Being -  Dasein exists for the sake of itself - , means 
that through its existence being a man (in the sense of: nobility and decorum of 
existence) is an issue for Dasein. We should make it clear that the trait of the “for the 
sake of himself” Heidegger talks about, cannot be reduced to an attitude with which 
man aims at controlling and assuring the world for himself; on the contrary, we should 
perceive in transcendence that same disclosing trait which comes from Heidegger’s 
locution “sense for Being”: if we paid attention to the existential phenomenon of 
“vocation” (Beruf) as call to..., we would start seeing that Dasein ’s Being consists in 
corresponding to the place o f places -  Fédier talked about that in terms of the marvel of 
marvels -  which the world is, and in dwelling and growing up in it, that is to say, in 
giving shape, every one according to one’s own destiny, to one’s own existence: a real 
stay! It is not by chance that Heidegger himself, in fact, thinks of the trait of the “for the 
sake of himself” in relation to the question of freedom. That freedom is not a mere 
personal judgement or will, finds just in vocation its more convincing confirmation: is it 
not Being itself, in fact, that calls every man to himself -  to what he has to be: that is to 
say, to his own destiny in the world? It is, thus, transcendence, as the “action” with
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which man gives rise to the disclosure of possibilities of dwelling in one’s own world, 
to set up the beginning of history meant in an existential sense (see supra, chap. 1, § 3): 
“Only if, amid beings in their totality, beings come to be «more in being» in the manner 
of the temporalizing (Zeitigung [“maturing”]) of Dasein are there the hours and days of 
beings’ entry into world. And only if  this primordial history, namely, transcendence, 
occurs, i.e., only if beings having the character of being-in-the-world irrupt into beings, 
is there the possibility of beings manifesting themselves” (PM 123).
b) Elucidation of the structure of the basic state of Dasein 
on the grounds of its decisive moment: “Being-in”
In order to comprehend the unitary sense of the structure of the fundamental 
constitution of Dasein as “Being in the world”, it is worth highlighting the moments it 
consists of. And in more detail: granted that the phenomenon of the world appear to be 
founded on Dasein, the analysis of the ontological structure of the worldhood of the 
world (Weltlichkeit) (BT §§ 14-24) can be started only once the meaning of “Being-in” 
has been properly clarified. According to Heidegger, in fact, it is the “Being-in” the trait 
which founds all the other co-original moments of Dasein (Cf. BT §§ 28-38).99
Further on, assuming that our aim is to awaken the sense for the difference 
between Being and being, that is to say, to comprehend the disclosure we have 
perceived in the analyses on transcendence, we will limit ourselves to investigate just 
one out of the three moments constituting the “Being-in” -  the “disposition [state of 
mind]” (§§ 29-30) as the Da of Dasein - ,  in the hope that the reflections on angst may 
lead us straight to the existential sense of Dasein: the care for the Being of the being 
(BT §§ 39-44). In the light of the difference between Being and being, of being and 
non-being, the phenomenon of angst -  as “bridge” (BT § 40) between the analyses
99 “Consequently, if we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed 
consent to nullify the primordial character of this phenomenon by deriving it from others -  that 
is to say, by an inappropriate analysis, in the sense of a dissolving or breaking up. But the fact 
that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of 
characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially 
they are equiprimordial. The phenomenon of equiprim ordiality of constitutive items has often 
been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive 
everything and anything from some simple «primal ground»” (BT 170).
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concerning “Being in the world” and those concerning “care” -  will allow us to notice 
as in that disclosing o f Being to man, which disposition is, both the sense o f  Dasein and 
the disclosure o f  truth (BT § 44), as the fundamental “presupposition” o f its Being in 
the world, are put into play.
Now, what does “Being-in” mean? First of all, the matter is to remember 
that with the locution “Being in the world” we do not refer to the fact that man is 
present-at-hand as any other being inside that space container the “world” would be100. 
If we follow the path of Sein und Zeit, we bump, at this stage, into some reflections of 
an etymologic nature: according to Heidegger (BT 80), the “in” of “Being-in” originally 
comes from “innan” -  to reside (wohnen), “habitare”, to dwell; “an” means: to be used 
to, to be familiar with, to look after something -  the Latin verb colo in the sense of 
habito and diligo101. In brief: to reside means to take care of, “to be alongside” the 
world. In this sense the expression “I am” (ich bin) -  which, in German, appears to be 
linked to the preposition “alongside” (bei) -  means: “I reside” or “dwell alongside” the 
world, as that which is familiar to me (BT 80). This means that “Being alongside” the 
world is an existential founded on the “Being-in”: the world is not merely “next to” 
Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein may encounter the things that are present-at-hand only 
thanks to the fact that it is in the world, that is to say, only if something as the world has 
already been disclosed to it from the beginning, so that beings may be accessible from 
time to time. Heidegger writes: “And if what is distinctive about Dasein indeed lies in 
the fact that in understanding Being it comports itself toward beings, then that potential 
for distinguishing in which the ontological difference becomes factical must have sunk 
the roots of its own possibility in the ground of the essence of Dasein. By way of
100 “In the first instance it is enough to see the ontological difference between 
Being-in as an existentiale and the category of the «insideness» which things present-at-hand 
can have with regard to one another. By thus delimiting Being-in, we are not denying every 
kind of «spatiality» to Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein itself has a «Being-in-space» of its own; 
but this in turn is possible only on the basis o f  Being-in-the-world in general. [...]. Not until we 
understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein  can we have any insight into 
Dasein"s existential spatiality” (BT 82-83). Please also refer to BT §§ 22-24.
101 Colo signifies: a) to take care of, to attend to something; b) to reside, to dwell, 
to tarry. Habito, as frequentative of habeo, means: to reside, but also to dwell on, to insist on 
(existence as Inständigkeit, in-standing, W 284). D iligo  (dis-lego, to chose, in opposition to 
negligere) means “to be fond of”, so that an unremitting and thorough attention is paid when 
doing something.
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anticipation, we shall call this ground of the ontological difference the transcendence of 
Dasein” (PM 106).
In other words: it is transcendence, which makes every single relation 
between man and beings possible. This relation reveals a being in its Being: this means 
that man’s relation to a being is founded on an a priori understanding of Being, which 
only guarantees the possibility for a being to manifest itself qua being, insofar as in the 
“light” of Being a being can show itself in its “that and how it is”. The transcendence, 
which has surpassed beings in advance, has made it possible for them to stay ontically 
before as beings and to be caught as what is over-against (ob-jectum) a subject. 
Transcendence founds itself on the “Being alongside”... a being: what Dasein is familiar 
with when existing, is disclosed in and thanks to this Being alongside its Being. The 
“Being-alongside” is disclosing -  i.e. lets into the truth - , as it constitutes the 
disclosedness inside which Dasein ' s own world takes shape in its Being: this Being- 
disclosing is, as the sense for the difference between Being and being, the constituent 
trait of the truth, of the Being-true -  shining possibility -  of the world and of the 
existence of a really human community102.
§ 4. “Being-in” as “disposition (attunement)”:
Dasein ’s disclosedness to Being
Previously, we supplied a first elucidation on the sense of Dasein' s “Being­
in”: its aim was to prepare the analysis of the “moments” which articulate the 
constitution of “Being in the world” starting from its own core. And more precisely: a 
more careful analysis of “Being-in” prepares the determination of Dasein' s original 
Being. Heidegger writes: “The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the- 
world is itself in every case its Da” (BT 171).
102 To quote Baudelaire once again, we may say: “I believe that I stake my destiny 
upon hours of uninterrupted work [the study as care] (op. cit., p. 81); and again: “Because I can 
understand the nature of a glorious existence, I believe myself capable of its realization” (op. 
cit., p. 82).
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Dasein, as Being in the world, is its Da. The preposition Da assumes a 
decisive role and is not just a mere play on words: its sense, on the other hand, is so 
easily subject to misunderstanding as to have compelled us not to translate the guiding- 
word Dasein. However, the interpretation Fédier gives to this word, allows us to 
perceive the direction to take to approach the existential phenomenon the sense of 
which, once more, Heidegger awakes: if Dasein, in fact, means “Being the there”: that 
is to say, giving rise, Da must be that same opening and clearing of Being (Lichtung) 
that man, as Being in the world, has to be insofar as he exists. To clarify the point, 
Heidegger writes: “According to the familiar signification of the word, the Da points to 
a «here» and a «yonder». [...]. «Here» and «yonder» are possible only in a Da -  that is 
to say, only if there is a being which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of 
the Da. This being carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In 
the expression Da we have in view this essential disclosedness. [...]. [...]. Dasein is its 
disclosedness (Erschloseenheit)” (BT 171).
*
At this stage we do have to point out that there are three co-original 
phenomena as singled out by Heidegger to clarify the structure of “Being-in”, i.e. of 
Being the Da: Da-sein as “disposition” (BT §§ 29-30), as “understanding” (BT §§ 31­
33) and as “language” (BT § 34). Also in this case, we make a choice which will restrict 
the ambit of our analyses: if, in fact, a deep comprehension of the problematic would 
make the sighting of the unitary sense of this triple determination as inevitable, 
however, the feeling of embarrassment before the question that asks for the sense of 
Being is so worrying as to compel us to single out from the beginning a well outlined 
phenomenal ambit from which to take the manifestation of the sense of the difference 
between Being and being in Dasein's existence. We limit our analyses to the elucidation 
of the first moment: the disposition; more precisely, we assume as the theme of our 
research a very peculiar disposition of Dasein, angst, granted that it is meant as man’s 
essential way of Being -  that is to say, as Dasein's constituent disclosedness to Being. It 
has to be remembered that the paragraph of Sein und Zeit dedicated to the phenomenon
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of angst (BT § 40) does not belong to the fifth chapter, but to the following one, in 
which Dasein' s existential sense as care is determined.103
*
The matter is to clarify how every disposition reveals that sense for the 
difference between Being and being inside which Dasein' s Being in the world takes 
shape -  inside which, that is to say, man and world co-originally come to light: Being, 
the non-being! Within this perspective, the disposition becomes an existential 
phenomenon worth of the utmost attention, notwithstanding, through its common 
interpretation in terms of “state of mind” and “mood”, it is considered as something 
merely momentary -  and thus unimportant. On the contrary, in Sein und Zeit it takes a 
decisive position: the analyses on angst touch one of the peaks of reflection on the sense 
for Being. In them there will come out that Being for man means “to give rise” to the 
world: to let it be, to take care of it104.
103 Let us bear in mind that the phenomenon of angst, in view of the awakening of 
the sense for the difference between Being and being, is also discussed by Heidegger in some 
works of his which follow the publication of Sein und Zeit. Among the works dealing with the 
phenomenon of angst, decisive for the purpose of the whole dissertation is the triad of essays 
present in Wegmarken which centre on Was ist M etaphysik? (1929). Moreover, not of less 
importance is remembering that this last text may just be interpreted as a meditation on the so- 
called “age of science and technology”: and just starting from this meditation the nature of 
Heidegger’s political involvement may be seized. That he assumed the office as rector of a 
University, is not by chance; if, in fact, the University is the place of the research of knowledge, 
is it not ju st up to it, firstly, the task o f  awakening a sense fo r  the difference between Being and 
being? This is the very ultimate purpose of our dissertation -  that of highlighting the sense of 
that difference as the foundation of knowledge which sets and guides a historical human 
community (see infra, chap. 3): according to Heidegger, in fact, Dasein ’s understanding o f  
Being is a phenomenon necessary to its existence, since without such disclosedness to Being we 
can in no way be human beings!
104 Let us explain the meaning of our translation of the German word 
“Befindlichkeit” (literally: “the state in which one may be found”, BT 172) with “disposition”. 
As a matter of fact, it is a rather imprecise calque of its French translation: Vezin, in fact, 
translates “Befindlichkeit” with “disposibilité”, in which the trait of motility -  to be inclined to, 
to be exposed to Being -  that is present in the German suffix “lich-keit” is brought to light. We 
should then say, in a maybe impossible English: “disposibility”. We should also clarify at this 
stage what the meaning of the prefix “dis-” is: our hypothesis is that it does not only indicate the 
trait of dispersion, as if man, in his Being thrown in the world, roamed an empty nullity all 
along his existence. On the contrary, it is just the phenomenon of angst that lets man take root in 
his own world, though in an enigmatic and disquieting way. Let us think about Heidegger’s 
interpretation of those feelings such as rage and hate: “when someone is stirred up and acts in 
an excited manner, one says: «He isn’t altogether himself»” (Nietzsche I, HGA 6.1, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1996; Nietzsche, vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London 1981, p. 46). Now: what does “being altogether” mean in this case?
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That the disposition reveals to Dasein its own Being in the world, that is to 
say: that Dasein is, from the beginning, in relationship with the Being of the world, to 
such a degree as to be “affected” (attuned) by it any moment of its existence -  means 
that this phenomenon reveals to man the possibility itself of its original disclosedness to 
beings (and to non-being). Dasein, in fact, means “Being the D a” -  that is to say, 
having to be the Da: the most authentic potentiality for Being is an issue for Dasein. To 
understand itself, its Being in the world, is Dasein's disclosedness.105 It is the sense for 
the difference between Being and being which, alone, puts man in that dimension, the 
Da, in which every really human community may take root. Inside such a dimension, 
what is the task of philosophy? And what the task of science? (see supra, chap. 1 & 
infra, chap. 3)
That the disposition is not caught (perceived) first of all and mostly in its 
disclosing trait (possibility for Being) does not exclude, as Heidegger says, that 
precisely those dispositions “which attune us in such a way that we feel as though there 
is no attunement there at all [...] are the most powerful”.106 Let us think about the 
“pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood” (Ungestimmtheit), which is “far from nothing at 
all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein becomes satiated with itself. Being has become 
manifest as a burden” (BT 173). Only since Dasein means to exist, that is to say: to 
have-to-be its own disclosedness, it may perceive existence as a burden -  may perceive 
the call to be up to its own possibilities. The possibility itself of being attuned by the 
world lies in the disclosing nature of man’s relation to the world. Heidegger writes: 
“Dasein would be unable to be pervasively attuned by beings as the being that it is [...], 
were it not for the fact that an irruption of world, and be it only a glimmer of world, 
accompanies such being absorbed by beings. [ . ]  and yet only as being-in-the-world is 
Dasein absorbed by beings” (PM 128).
105 In other words, every disposition is a phenomenon that shows how Dasein  is 
from time to time its disclosedness, its D a  (D a-sein ): it is right in the middle of the world (of 
beings as a whole), in fact, that we feel when we are in a state of mind. In this sense, just in 
virtue of its character of disclosure, the disposition assumes a fundamental methodological 
relevance as regards the existential analytic, insofar as the question of Being finds in Dasein the 
foundation to start from in view of an elucidation of Being itself.
106 M. Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, op. cit., p. 68.
122
*Dasein's Being in the world is such, in fact, that in the disposition (in which 
“one feels”) man does not find, first of all, himself, to find -  later on -  the world 
“outside” himself. It is the Being in the midst of beings as a whole -  the worldhood 
itself of the world -  which is the marvel of marvels: inside such perceiving, man 
understands that he has to be himself, that is to say, his own Da. The possibility itself 
for every man as such just lies in it, the possibility on which every (will of) knowledge 
of the “world” (and not vice versa) is founded. It is significant, in this sense, the non­
acknowledgement of the sense of this possibility in the modern age, which, being 
oriented as it is towards reason, goes so far, with Kant, as to interpret “feelings” as 
obstacles to knowledge.
Moreover: the disposition is being conscious of oneself and of the world to 
such a little extent that, as Heidegger writes: “even in the most indifferent and 
inoffensive everydayness the Being of Dasein can burst forth as a naked «that it is and 
has to be». The pure «that it is» shows itself, but the «whence» and the «whither» 
remain in darkness. The fact that it is just as everyday a matter for Dasein not to «give 
in» to such moods -  [...] -  is no evidence against the phenomenal facts of the case, in 
which the Being of the Da is disclosed moodwise in its «that-it-is»; [...]. [...]. [...] 
Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over to the Da” (BT 173-174).
Dasein's disclosedness bursts into its existence as an unfathomable enigma 
which leaves speechless, just insofar as it exposes it to the “that it is” of its Being in the 
world. So Pascal wrote (Pensées, 205): “When I consider the short duration of my life, 
swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can 
see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which 
know me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there; for 
there is no reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then. Who has put 
me here? By whose order and direction have this place and time been allotted to me? 
Memoria hospitis unius diei praetereuntis [The remembrance of a guest that tarrieth but 
a day -  Wisdom, v. 14]”.
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*As already announced, in our analyses we are not going to face the entire 
structure of “Being-in”: we will limit, therefore, to indicate only the direction followed 
in Heidegger’s analyses of the existential trait of “understanding” (Verstehen), as the 
enactment of that disclosedness to Being which reveals to Dasein the possibilities his 
being itself consists of. Heidegger writes: “With disclosedness and disposition, 
possibilities are given for Dasein to be its D a , to be its discoveredness in one way or 
another. The enactment on the level o f Being (Seinsvollzug) o f those possibilities o f  
being which we call discoveredness we shall designate as understanding. [...]. [...]. 
[Understanding] is the being-involved-with of disclosed concernability, specifically a 
disposed involvement such that it always co-discovers itself. Understanding as disposed 
disclosure and having disclosed the world is as such a disclosive self-finding”107.
And more precisely: the “object” of the understanding is not a being, but the 
Being itself of Dasein, as having-to-be the Da. To understand itself as the possibility of 
Being in the world means to perceive Being as opening, as truth! To be exposed to the 
truth of Being: “to perceive” the difference between Being and being. Fédier writes: “It 
is worth noting that the Greek expression to name the activity which is assumed to be 
the most «intellectual» of all [the theoretical activity], the verb noein, is in relationship 
with the capacity of perceiving in the sense offlairer la trace, «to scent the trace»”.108
In this sense, the nature of the understanding Heidegger talks about does not 
correspond to any cognitive knowledge: the matter is, in fact, to perceive the need for 
the truth as opening of Being. To this purpose, we could read the analyses dedicated to 
the character of “pro-jection” (Ent-wurf) of understanding, in which Dasein, by 
existing, corresponds in every way of its Being to the throw (Wurf) to which it is 
destined by the opening of Being as what to which it is exposed in its Being in the 
world. Thus, granted that the projection is founded on the phenomenon of the 
understanding of Being, any interpretation reducing it to an operation made by a subject
107 M. Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, SS 1925, HGA 20, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1979 (Engl. Trans. H istory o f  the Concept o f  Time, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington 1985, pp. 257-258).
108 F. Fédier, Totalitarismo e nichilismo, op. cit., p. 28.
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which represents an object appears to be insufficient. Heidegger writes: “As projecting, 
understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as 
possibilities” (BT 185).
§ 5. The disposition o f angst as Dasein ’s distinctive disclosedness
a) The question of angst in Sein und Zeit
We start at this stage the analyses on the phenomenon of angst as Dasein's 
distinctive disclosedness, insofar as it “provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly 
grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being” (BT 227). The matter is to comprehend 
in what sense and how angst leads Dasein straight “before ” its own Being, bringing to 
light “the” sense fo r the difference between Being and being. With reference to the 
analyses carried out in Sein und Zeit, let us analyse the phenomenon of angst according 
to its two structural moments: “that in the face of which” and “that about which” Dasein 
is anxious.
The “that in the face of which” Dasein is anxious is its Being in the world as 
thrown, that is to say, the “that-it-is” of its own existence as such. Dasein, in fact, is anxious 
in the face of something undetermined, which is in no place: notwithstanding angst may 
oppress Dasein and take its breath away, the “that in the face of which” cannot be identified 
with any of the beings man encounters in his own world. This being a non-being of the 
“that in the face of which” exposes man to his own world like to an enigma: Dasein's 
feeling of not-being-at-home, far from constituting an empty nothingness, reveals, instead, 
Dasein's possibility itself of Being in its disclosedness to the world, to its (of the world) 
Being -  that is to say, not caught as merely present-at-hand, but as “the marvel of marvels”. 
It is not the world, but the worldhood of the world to constitute the “that in the face of 
which” one has angst. In this sense Dasein has to be its own Da: in the phenomenon of 
angst the authentic -  founding -  trait of man’s existence is perceived, insofar as, by 
corresponding to the manifestation of the difference between Being and being, man 
accomplishes his relation to Being. That Dasein may square itself in its own existential
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possibilities, is founded on the understanding of Being -  that is to say, on the sense for the 
difference between non-being and being.
In other words: the fact that in angst the Being in the world becomes enigmatic 
and that any reference to this or to that being is suspended -  Heidegger says: “the world can 
offer nothing more” (BT 232), that is to say, “the totality of involvements of the ready-to- 
hand or present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence” (BT 
231) -, it does not mean that the world is “absent”. On the contrary, just in revealing itself 
as completely lacking significance, there is the possibility for Dasein to under stand its 
sense: just the indeterminacy of angst makes the vibrating presence of the world even more 
enigmatic -  a world, thus, which is not merely next to man and which shines the instant 
man perceives the possibility itself of his existence.
*
Let us now analyse the second constituent moment of angst: its “that about 
which” concerns the possibility itself that Dasein has of being itself. In Heidegger’s 
words, angst individualizes Dasein, disclosing it to the sense of its own solitude: as 
Dasein is not an isolated point in itself with a world aside, its solitude may expose it to 
the world -  better, to the sense itself of its Being in the world -  and may awaken the 
possibility of an authentic existence: “Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being- 
free for  the authenticity of its Being” (BT 232).
*
In this sense the “that in the face of which” and the “that about which” one 
has angst coincide, since they both bring to light the same phenomenon: Dasein' s Being 
in the world. In angst the worldhood of the world, together with “my” authentic 
potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, reveal the enigma of existence in all its unavoidable 
nature, in such a way that angst, allowing something as a “not-being-at-home” -  to the 
extent of feeling as hanging with no way of escape - , places Dasein face to face with 
itself with no half measures in a position to decide for itself, and lets perceive the 
existential sense of Being in the world as the opportunity to dwell alongside, to be
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intimate with, it. Heidegger writes: “[In angst] all things and we ourselves sink into 
indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. Rather, in their 
very receding, things turn toward us” (PM 88). Thus, far from annulling man and any 
project of his, angst makes him take root inside his own world and exposes him to his 
own destiny, insofar as, in its nullifying, it exposes Dasein to the primordial disclosure 
of beings as such, in their abyssal difference compared to the Nothing.
b) The question of angst in Was ist Metaphysik?: 
philosophy, science and the Nothing
We take as a guide, at this stage, Heidegger’s analyses in Was its 
Metaphysik?. The fact that beings as a whole vanish reveals angst as the phenomenon in 
which the Nothing comes to light. That this Nothing is not an empty concept is 
confirmed by the fact that, according to Heidegger, it “manifests these beings in their 
full and but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other -  with respect to 
the nothing” (PM 90). Heidegger continues: “[But this «with respect to the nothing»] 
we add in our talk is not some kind of appended clarification. Rather, it [i.e. Being] 
makes possible in advance the manifestness of beings in general” (PM 90).
The sense of the difference between Being (Nothing) and being is what the 
phenomenon of angst reveals: should such difference not be perceived, Dasein could 
not transcend beings -  that is to say, it could open itself (understand) neither to the 
beings that it is not, nor to the one that it is. In fact, Heidegger writes: “Without the 
original manifestness of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom” (PM 91).
Granted, thus, that the foundation of knowledge lies in awakening the sense 
of that difference, and that, thus, any knowledge of a determined region of being has in 
it its own possibility, “the presumed soberness of mind and superiority of science 
become laughable when it does not take the nothing seriously” (PM 95). If Dasein' s 
knowledge is not confined to “amass and classify bits of knowledge” (PM 95), science 
itself may disclose from time to time “the entire expanse of truth in nature and history” 
(PM 95): the experience of the Nothing becomes, in fact, the foundation of that going 
beyond beings as a whole, which alone allows to know this or that ontic ambit. From
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here the sense of the reference of angst to the phenomenon of transcendence, since angst 
brings Dasein straight face to face with the difference between Being and being.
To this purpose, we refer to Jean-François Courtine’s essay entitled 
Phénoménologie et science de l ’être109: according to Courtine, in fact, Was ist 
Metaphysik? is not a break compared to Sein und Zeit, insofar as, on the contrary, “it 
constitutes its decisive explication -  specifically with regard to the central analysis of 
angst” (p. 211).
More precisely, the 1929 writing can be interpreted as a clear leave of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, insofar as the latter, by defining philosophy as “rigorous 
science”, determines its significance from the idea of science; the matter would be, on 
the contrary, to “make the essential difference between all sciences (the periphery of the 
circle) and Metaphysics emerge, and, at the same time, to ensure their mutual 
connection by showing their primordial common belonging, their rooting in the essence 
of science -  of philosophy as science par excellence” (p. 216). In the language of Sein 
und Zeit, the matter is to determine the existential essence of science (p. 216); 
Heidegger writes: “The existential conception understands science as a way of existence 
and thus a mode of Being-in-the-world, which discovers or discloses either entities or 
Being. Yet a fully adequate existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out 
until the meaning o f Being and the «connection» between Being and truth have been 
clarified in terms of the temporality of existence [read: in terms of time as first locality 
of manifestation of the difference between Being and being]” (BT 408).
§ 6. The scientific-positivistic interpretation o f truth 
as derived mode o f the philosophical one
a) Foreword: Being and truth
It is worth remembering that this paragraph follows the course of Sein und 
Zeit, § 44, whose title recites: “Dasein, disclosedness, and truth”. It could be useful to
109 In Martin Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 211-221.
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remember the triple articulation of this paragraph: granted that the first two parts aim at 
showing “the primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the 
traditional [metaphysical] conception of truth”, the third part, just insofar as it reveals 
“the kind of Being which truth possesses”, comes to single out a decisive element of it: 
its having to be “presupposed” (vorausgesetzt)110. This is the trait of the truth of which 
Heidegger’s thought scents the trace: in this direction the interpretation of Dasein as 
disclosedness to Being reveals its own tenor. Heidegger writes: “Being and truth «are» 
equiprimordially” (BT 272). The interpretative hypothesis we have assumed -  to 
understand with Beaufret the locution “sense of Being” as “sense for the difference 
between Being and being” -  finds, now, in the relation between disclosedness and truth 
(“Being [well before any being] «is»”) the foundation of the relationship between Being 
and man. What does it mean, now, that Division Two of Sein und Zeit is entitled: 
“Dasein and temporality”? That is to say: in what sense does the relation between 
disclosedness and truth in Dasein indicate towards time as a possible horizon for any 
understanding of Being in general (see BT § 83)?
b) The reduction of Being to “Reality”
Now, the matter is to understand how, according to Heidegger, scientific 
knowledge is uprooted with regard to its own essential ground, just insofar as it restricts 
itself to collect and organise bits of knowledge around this or that being (also the 
investigations dealing with the sense of existence run the risk of interpreting Dasein as 
any other object of which science has knowledge). What is, thus, the scientific 
interpretation of Being? That is to say: what is the foundation according to which the 
difference between Being and being is forgotten (see supra, chap. 1)?
“Being” for modern Metaphysics means “presence”: in Heidegger’s words, 
“«Being» acquires the meaning of «Reality» (Realität)” (BT 245), of substantiality. In 
Kant, for example, the word with which Heidegger defines the constituent trait of man -  
Dasein -  is utilized to designate the Being-present-at-hand of both the world, the things,
110 Cf. G. Guest, Anabase -  Acheminement vers l ’amont de la “présupposition” -  
Le chemin de Sein und Zeit, in Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1988.
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and consciousness (BT 247). Thus, the fact that science does not take the Nothing 
seriously has its own foundation in the reduction of the question of Being to that of 
Reality: just insofar as Being is nothing real and actual, beings and beings only can be 
thematized. That the Nothing constitutes an unavoidable element for science cannot 
even be suspected by it, in case it makes itself known -  reassured by its continual 
success -  as the one and only truth.
Now, granted that the sense for the difference between Being and being is 
awakened, the claimed superiority of science is traced back to its foundation; in fact, it 
is the understanding of Being that precedes the understanding of the Being-present-at- 
hand, of Reality, of beings, and that founds the opportunity to gather data and 
information on them. Likewise, the essence of truth, as determined on the basis of the 
interpretation of Being as Reality, appears to be founded on that sense of the difference 
between Being and being which constitutes Dasein's primordial disclosedness to the 
world and to itself. Heidegger writes: “What ontico-ontological connection does «truth» 
have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the 
«understanding of Being»? Can the reason why Being necessarily goes together with 
truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of such understanding?” (BT 256).
c) Dasein and its disclosure to the truth of Being
Once again, let us refer to an example supplied by Heidegger himself (BT 
260): let us assume that a man, with his back turned to the wall, makes this assertion: 
“the picture on the wall is hanging askew”. This proposition, it is said, is true in case the 
man who affirms it, looking at the wall, perceives the picture hanging askew. In case the 
assertion is in agreement with the subsistence of what it states, we say of it that it is 
true: the interpretation of Being as Reality is the foundation of such a truth, as only 
what is present-at-hand is susceptible to a check. (The “fa c t” that Being “is” cannot be 
proved through any demonstration). However, in order to let a being be from time to 
time susceptible to check, it is necessary that the truth founded on Being as Reality, be 
anticipated by a truth that is not limited to an agreement (as if  the matter were of 
assessing a state of fact), but that, as difference between Being and being, clears the
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dimension itself in which a being manifests itself as it is. In this sense the truth is 
ontologically possible only on the foundation of Being in the world as Dasein' s 
disclosedness. Heidegger writes: “«There is» truth only in so far as Dasein is and so 
long as Dasein is. Beings are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as 
Dasein is, are they disclosed. Newton’s laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth 
whatever -  these are true only as long as Dasein is” (BT 269).
In this sense the phenomenon of truth directly refers to Dasein's 
transcendence: this means that, in order for the assertion “the picture on the wall is 
hanging askew” to be true, not only has Dasein to be open so that a being may show 
itself to it, but that a being reveals itself starting from itself. The twofold trait of truth 
shines once more in the guiding-word Dasein: being a man means, in its essence -  that 
is to say: perceiving the sense of the difference between Being and being - , being 
exposed to the clearing of the world. In it the possible truth of its own existence is 
placed: now, it is up to thinking and, in a different way, to art to “accomplish”, to say it 
with Heidegger, “the relation of Being to the essence of the human being” (PM 239).
It is now worth mentioning what Beaufret writes to Heidegger in a letter 
sent on 26 September 1969: “What of which man is «le Là» reserves him, perhaps, a 
destiny which is completely different from that to which he is blindly toiling 
everywhere. Perhaps, even, this «different» destiny is the one that a word completely 
stranger to philosophy (which, today, indulges in the indifference of the scientific 
enterprise, when not managing to have the ridiculous shelter in a religiosity without 
faith) always holds for him -  and this independently from the «hubbub of the many 
philosophical brains», as Montaigne called it; I am referring to the poetical word [...]” 
(DH 1 14).
d) The truth of Being as “native harmony”
That the truth of man’s existence is delivered over to giving rise to beings as 
a whole means to think of man’s essence in its most intimate finitude. Heidegger 
himself, in fact, inside the renowned Rectoral Address (see infra, chap. 3), quotes the 
sentence uttered by Aeschylus’ Prometheus: “Knowing, however, is far weaker than
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necessity” (QA 7). This enigmatic necessity, in which man’s destiny is played, 
constitutes that disclosure of Dasein that the latter has to be as what it has been 
delivered over to by Being itself. That thinkers and poets, at this stage, “bring this 
manifestation [the manifestation of Being] to language and preserve it in language 
through their saying” (PM 239), finds in Baudelaire’s words a very clear formulation: 
“Only the poetical word gives things back to the striking truth of their native 
harmony”.111 That this “native harmony” -  the truth -  may be misunderstood in terms 
of an empty sophism, reveals how the pre-eminence of scientific knowledge and of its 
method reduces the understanding of Being to the mere ascertainment of state of facts. 
No necessity, no wonder appears to be possible at the time of science and technology, in 
which the worldhood of the world is reduced to “objectivity for science and, today, it is 
mere material for the technological mastery of the world” (QA 83). The fact, then, that 
one claims to prove the truth as necessity means to misunderstand the sense of truth 
itself. As Aristotle said, “For it shows lack of education not to know of what we should 
require proof, and of what we should not” (Metaphysics, 1006 a ff.)112.
Is it not, thus, the time to awaken that wonder, inside which the history of 
the Greeks took shape and of which man’s determination as Dasein constitutes the
111 The painter Gustave Courbet echoes Baudelaire’s words when he says: 
“Imagination in art consists of knowing how to find the most complete expression of an existing 
thing, but never of supposing this thing or of creating it. Beauty is in nature and one finds it in 
reality under the most various ways. As soon as one finds it in nature, beauty belongs to art or 
rather to the artist that knows how to see it. Since it is real and visible, it has in itself its artistic 
expression. But our figurative devices do not have the right to deform this expression. We 
cannot modify it, if  not at the risk of perverting its nature and then of weakening it. Beauty as 
given by nature is superior to all conventions o f the artist” (C ou rrier du D im anche, 25
December 1861).
112 Assuming that it is the phenomenon of Being itself that cannot be proved, let us 
listen to the way Lukács interprets the nature of that “circle” we talked about at the beginning of 
this chapter and which constitutes man’s existence: “[...] Heidegger resolutely cut the knot with 
the aid of «essential intuition» (with which, because of its irrationalistic arbitrariness, anything 
at all can be sought out, especially by means o f an ontological transition to Being). For 
understanding «proves» (?) to be «the expression of the existential pre-construction of existence 
itself»” (D ie Zerstörung der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 494). Lukács continues: “ [...] Heidegger 
«ontologically» smuggled «understanding», i.e., a procedure governed purely by consciousness, 
into objective Being and thus tried to create, in his own way, just as ambiguous a contrast 
between subjectivity and objectivity as Mach [...] had done [...]” (p. 494). Insofar as Being, as 
non-being, cannot be assimilated to an “objective reality” -  which only, according to Lukács, 
“can produce a standard for genuine or merely imagined possibility” (p. 496) - , Heidegger’s 
philosophy is being interpreted as irrational, as “an abstractly mythicizing, anthropological 
description of human existence” (p. 498).
132
rediscovery and re-thinking? Heidegger writes, in a letter sent in April 1976 to his 
disciple Walter Biemel: “What has been given to us and that we have inherited since the 
emergence of the history of Being, which in it, as to help it take its own course, has not 
necessarily been thought of yet: alèthéia -  to think of it as such in its ownmost essence, 
and thus to prepare the possibility of a transformed stay of man in the world” (E 97).
e) Towards the transformation of modern man’s stay:
Being, world and labour (Heidegger and Adorno)
That such transformation of modern man’s stay may be tuned in with the 
“native harmony” Baudelaire is talking of, is what emerges from a short essay 
Heidegger wrote in Autumn 1933 entitled Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz? [Why Do 
I Stay in the Provinces?], drawn up at the time when the National Socialist regime 
offered him a chair at the University of Berlin (it has to be remembered that “on 27 
October 1933 Heidegger made his refusal public” [EP 305]). Assuming that the 
“provinces” to which Heidegger refers is the region around the small hut he owned in 
the Black Forest, we may realise how the solitude of the peasant world, which the 
philosopher experiences in these places, far from isolating him, rather frees his 
existence, “projecting it onto the vastness of being close to the essence of things” (EP 
151): so, it happens that Heidegger’s (philosophical) labour itself does not appear to 
peasants as “the «inopportune» occupation of an original character” (EP 150) and, on 
the contrary, shows itself as “inseparably linked with peasants’ work; it shares its heart” 
(EP 150). That a truly intellectual labour appears to be linked in its heart with a manual 
one, lets us perceive as the care of Being which supports any labour allows every 
human being, in the midst of the same world, a stay in his own land: “it is only labour 
that opens the necessary space so that this reality of mountains and valleys may stand 
out” (EP 150).
*
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At the antipodes of our reasoning lies the interpretation as uttered by 
Theodor W. Adorno in his Jargon der Eigentlichkeit113: as reminded by Remo Bodei, 
the editor of the Italian edition, this book contains “an onslaught against Heidegger -  by 
then become the main target” (It. ed. p. XXVI), insofar as his philosophy “is fascist up 
to its most intimate elements” (It. ed. p. XXVII) The text Adorno plays on to display 
how ideologically comic and poor Heidegger’s thought is, is just Warum bleiben wir in 
der Provinz?: Heidegger, defined as an “agrarian romantic”, “transforms into idolatry 
the cult of archaic social relationships, and praises folk, sedentary life, provided with 
deep roots in the land and in the stock” (It. ed. p. XXVII); and again: “[...] Heidegger 
insinuates a pre-established harmony between essential content and homey murmuring” 
(p. 53).
Adorno’s onslaughts against Heidegger appear in another text of those years 
entitled Philosophische Terminologie114: “Now, I [just like Lukács] think that just in the 
German situation this concept of the foundation or of the origin plays a particularly 
deadly role; that in this sense Heidegger’s thought, actually, is seriously in the wrong” 
(p. 151). That the question of Being as foundation is interpreted inside a merely 
sociological perspective in terms of “autochthony” (p. 163), of “an ideology of blood 
and land” (p. 152), leads Adorno to prove that “just in this research of his of the 
absolute origin, philosophy falls victim to the highest relativity, that is to say, to the 
exaltation of tight and close, artificial inter-human relationships” (p. 153), to the extent 
that “the stronger the agricultural-craft associations become, the more these social 
evaluation judgements lead to the conclusion that folk life, which is closer to the 
origins, that country life, with its provincialism and all what it involves, is a higher form 
of existence than the city’s” (p. 152).
In order to highlight the misunderstanding upstream of Adorno’s 
interpretation, it is worth remembering, for example, the position assumed by Walter
113 T. W. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1964 
(Engl. Trans. The jargon  o f  authenticity, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1986; It. Trans. 
Gergo d e ll’autenticità, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin 1989). With regard to Adorno’s interpretation, 
see F. Fédier, Trois attaques contre Heidegger, «Critique», n. 234, November 1966 (see infra, 
chap. 3, § 2).
114 T. W. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1973.
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Biemel inside a text entitled Le professeur, le penseur, l ’ami.115 With reference to it, we 
formulate two remarks: 1) notwithstanding in 1941 -  that is well after 1933-1934 -  the 
German Embassy in Bucharest had tried to persuade the young Biemel, just qualified 
for teaching philosophy, not to continue his studies with Heidegger as persona non 
grata, in March 1942 the applicant for the doctorate reaches, to say it with his own 
words, to “destination” !; 2) the fact that Biemel remained a disciple and friend of 
Heidegger’s until the latter’s death originates from the possibility that Heidegger can 
give the participants to his seminars the opportunity of thinking: “Heidegger led them to 
think in the first person, starting from themselves” (p. 128). Notwithstanding the 
opinion that Heidegger’s thought deals with questions solely concerning a cultivated 
class, the “professors”, and that its terminology is just an esoteric language; in 
opposition to the idea that the philosophical dialogue between teacher and disciple be 
reduced to a mere slavish repetition of the former’s “opinions” by the latter, Heidegger 
“cared that his interlocutor found in himself [and with his own words] the answer [to 
philosophical questions]” (p. 128). What then is less authoritative -  and thus freer? Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker’s essay, Rencontre sur quatre décennies116, would be worth 
reading in this sense: in his language devoid of “heideggerisms”, Heidegger in his 
reflection and dialogues with his interlocutors did not aim at “going round” a thing, as 
though in philosophy the matter were to learn the art of rhetoric: “That was the reason 
why one could not answer him with argumentations, but only by making him see 
something” (p. 159).
§ 7. Perspectives: truth, history, and politics 
on the ground o f the ontological difference
The problematic core from which our research starts -  the difference 
between Being and being -  is a phenomenon Heidegger had already perceived with Sein 
und Zeit: inside this perspective, the existential analytic of Dasein has become the first
115 In Martin Heidegger, L’Herne, op. cit., p. 137.
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task that a thought which cares for Being has necessarily to assume. Now, according to 
Beaufret’s words, “the first stage, in the three years that follow Sein und Zeit, is no 
doubt the conference he [Heidegger] held for the first time in Bremen in 1930 entitled 
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [On the essence of truth]” (E 16).
If, however, the analyses carried out by Heidegger on the essence of truth 
starting from 1930 are beyond the objectives of our dissertation, it is just with the 
presentation of the question of truth that both Division One of Sein und Zeit and the 
analyses carried out in this chapter conclude, and it is just the two years following its 
publication that constitute the problematic horizon inside which this second section of 
our dissertation moved -  the texts we have expressly analysed, Vom Wesen des Grundes 
and Was its Metaphysik? were both published in 1929. The purpose of our writing is, 
thus, to give a way of access to the question of truth as the disclosure (opening) of 
Being to man and of man to Being: such a disclosure is the phenomenon which 
manifests itself in transcendence, as Dasein's constituent way of Being, in which man’s 
whole existence is borne by glancing at the difference between Being and being. It is 
worth remembering at this stage what Heidegger writes in the Foreword to the third 
edition (1949) of Vom Wesen des Grundes: “The treatise On the Essence o f Ground was 
written in 1928 at the same time as the lecture What is Metaphysics? The lecture 
ponders the nothing, while the treatise names the ontological difference. [ .  ]. That 
nihilative «not» of the nothing and this nihilative «not» of the difference are indeed not 
identical, yet they are the same in the sense of belonging together in the essential 
prevailing of the Being of beings. The two essays -  which were intentionally kept 
separate -  attempt to determine more closely this Same as what is worthy of thought 
[...]” (PM 97).
In other words: the “discovery” of the phenomenon of the difference 
between Being and being and the interpretation of Being as Nothing, allow to 
comprehend the limits inside which the mathematical projection of nature as started by 
Galileo and Descartes moves; the same determination of truth in terms of certainty -  
under this perspective the Cartesian method of doubt becomes comprehensible -
116 In Martin Heidegger, L’Herne, op. cit., pp. 156-160.
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appears to be no longer sufficient, against the Greek determination of truth as alèthéia 
(BT § 44). To say it more clearly: knowledge itself on which modern man’s existence 
stands, to say it with the words Heidegger pronounced in his Rectoral Address, “cracks” 
in its constituent joints”, and risks of dragging “all forces into confusion” and letting 
them “suffocate in madness” (QA 13). Now, is it not just in connection with the sense 
of scientific knowledge -  as the one and only true measure of our historical humanity -  
that Heidegger committed himself, at first at a meditative level with the two essays from 
Wegmarken we have referred to, and, further on, at a political level in 1933? Just thanks 
to the unhinging of a “moribund” culture, a “new departure” could take place -  
“magnificent and great” as Heidegger defines it -  of the existential possibilities for 
man: “Each individual participates in this decision [of wanting ourselves -  Germans, 
French, Italians... -  as peoples called to give shape, once more, to our history] even 
when, and especially when, he evades it” (QA 13).
§ 8. Recapitulation and link to the third chapter
Assuming the preliminary character of our research -  whose aim is to set 
the question of Dasein against the background of the question of Being as such, by 
reawakening that sense for Being which, only, can let one perceive the significance of 
the transformation of the experience of time, history and destiny investigated in Part 
Two of Sein und Zeit (see supra, chap. 1, §§ 1.d & 3) - , our analyses have dwelled upon 
the nature of the relationship between Being and man as it shows in that existentially 
decisive phenomenon which the “understanding of Being” (as sense for the difference 
between Being and being) is. Under this perspective, we have assumed as basic theme 
of our investigations what Heidegger himself describes as the fundamental existential 
constitution of Dasein: “Being in the world”, which in its turn has to be interpreted as 
“transcendence” (see supra, § 3.a), rather than in terms of man’s mere factual presence 
inside the world: “transcendence”, which is just another name for the understanding of 
the difference between Being and being, clears the possibility itself of encountering and
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investigating from time to time this or that being. In order to comprehend what the 
sense of this clearing is, we have consequently decided to analyse in detail the 
fundamental constitution mentioned above by concentrating our investigations on its 
grounding feature: “Being-in”, thus dwelling exclusively upon one of the three 
modalities into which it is divided inside Sein und Zeit: the disposition (attunement). 
More precisely -  in view of perceiving the opening to Being that sustains both man’s 
existence and Heidegger’s entire pathway of thought (even after Sein und Zeit: see, 
particularly with regard to the extent of our dissertation, Was ist Metaphysik?) - , we 
have concentrated our reflections on the existentially fundamental phenomenon of 
angst, insofar as in it the difference between Being and being shows itself in a more 
vivid and intense way than in any other human “feeling”. However bewildering and 
disquieting angst may be, it proves decisive that man may experience thanks to it that 
opening to the world to which his existence is exposed, and which, far from merely 
annihilating him, lets him perceive in all its vastness the horizon inside which the 
possibility itself of every single man’s existence is at stake, thus granting him the 
occasion of giving shape to his destiny and rooting him in the bosom of the world he 
shares with other human beings (Mit-dasein). Here the dimension -  Being as opening 
and clearing -  comes to light and takes shape, inside which the adventure any existence 
potentially is unfolds its possibilities: a true existence, where in the expression “true” 
the traits of being-exposed, of standing-up-to and of rooting (authenticity) echo each 
other. Only the sense for the difference between Being and being is therefore capable of 
showing man the possibility of a stay on the Earth, where everyone may become what 
he is.
What about now the possibility of man’s authentic dwelling at the time of 
science and technology, namely of the forgetfulness of Being to the square? It is in this 
perspective that we may start interpreting Heidegger’s political engagement as rector of 
the University of Freiburg in 1933, whose aim was to encourage a revolution of the 
essence itself of knowledge (and, consequently, of the University) which may grant 
each human being, apart from his race or social status, his own place inside the spiritual 
community he belongs to. Although Heidegger’s attempt proved disastrous and his error
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of judgement on Hitler tragic, we are of the opinion that Heidegger hit the mark with his 
investigations on Nihilism as accomplished unfolding of the forgetfulness of Being, 
thus preparing a possible way of escape to the devastating menace impending on the 
world at Hitler’s time and, in a not less worrying manner, on us now. Here we have then 
laid the foundations of a listening to the well-known Rectoral Address Heidegger gave 
on 27 May 1933: a new destiny, perhaps, holds great expectations for us!
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CHAPTER THREE
THE REKTORATSREDE: EXPOSITION OF THE ESSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND SCIENCE ON WHICH THE UNIVERSITY HAS TO BE FOUNDED
§ 1. Heidegger and politics: preliminary considerations
“Spiegel: We will take note o f  that. But how 
do you  explain the origin o f  such rumours? Is it 
maliciousness? [Heidegger was accused of «having 
participated in book-burnings organized by the students 
or by the Hitler Youth» and of «having books written by 
Jewish authors removed from the university library or the 
philosophy department’s library»]
H eidegger: From what I know about the 
sources, I am inclined to believe that. But the motives for 
the slander lie deeper. Presumably my assumption of the 
rectorate was only a catalyst and not the determining 
cause. Therefore the polemics will probably always flare 
up again whenever there is a catalyst” (QA 47).
This chapter takes upon itself the task to contribute to clarifying the sense of 
Martin Heidegger’s political engagement --  as rector at the University of Freiburg - ­
between April 1933 and the beginning of 1934 (not farther) in favour of Hitler and 
National Socialism117.
The twofold clarification in respect of the role assumed by Heidegger and of 
the duration of his engagement is not meaningless: otherwise, it would be impossible to 
comprehend what Heidegger so keenly followed during the so-called “ill-famed” period 
of rectorate. In fact, as soon as National Socialism is only merely mentioned, at once
117 As reported by Henri Crétella in Crime and thought, the resignation from 
rectorate was “decided by Heidegger eight months after his taking office, and made effective 
four months later, in April 1934” (p. 13). Writes Heidegger on 4 November 1945: “The attempt 
of practical realization, as carried out during the winter semester, was a failure. During a few 
days of rest on Christmas holidays, I well realised that I was wrong in thinking that -  starting 
from a basic spiritual attitude as the one I had matured after years of philosophical work -  I 
could have an immediate influence on a change of the National Socialist movement’s spiritual 
bases (or, rather, in case of need, of those without any spiritual reference). Already early in 
1934, I had decided I would resign from my office as rector at the end of the semester” (EP 
198).
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common-sense judgments break out, as the outcome of those “bad reflexes” Francois 
Fédier talks about (H 41-51), which soon prevent a genuine understanding of the 
phenomenon in question. What National Socialism is, is a question the sense of which 
appears as obvious: by Hitler’s regime we mean to refer to the most upsetting historical 
event of the twentieth century, and perhaps of the whole history of mankind. That 
Heidegger got involved in favour of it by giving his assent to the Party makes us assume 
that Heidegger was totally Nazi -  and thus anti-Semite118. Here lies the origin of that 
awful “witch-hunt” made by influential intellectuals (see, for instance, Günther Grass in 
his Hundejahre) in search of a proof, in his life and writings, in confirmation of this 
terrible suspect towards Heidegger as a philosopher and as a man119. Let us think about 
what Jambet -  the author of the French preface to Victor Farias’ Heidegger et le
118 For a clarification as to the accusation of anti-Semitism, please refer to Fédier’s 
Note on anti-Semitism  (EP 275-286). The debate on Heidegger’s assumed anti-Semitism has 
long dwelled on his baffling discriminatory behaviour towards his master, Edmund Husserl. 
That all that is but mere slander is witnessed by numerous events. Two examples, in particular, 
can enlighten: the excellent correspondence with the Jewish pedagogist Elisabeth Blochmann 
(1918-1969) and the renowned 1969 essay by Hannah Arendt entitled For Martin H eidegger’s 
Eightieth B irthday (QA 207-217), whose background tone, as Zaccaria emblematically 
emphasizes, is that of “soothed grudge” (SP 9). NB: with the abbreviation SP we refer to the 
Italian edition of Heidegger’s Écrites politiques: Scritti politici, PIEMME, Casale Monferrato 
(AL) 1998.
119 To get a clarification of the meaning of the word “suspect”, please refer to 
Fédier’s Critique et soupçon (HP 191-223 [with the abbreviation HP we refer to the Italian 
edition of Fédier’s Heidegger: Anatomie d ’un scandale: H eidegger e la politica. Anatomia di 
uno scandalo, E.G.E.A., Milan 1993]), where there is evidence of that inquiring tendency of the 
accusation as made by Farias (and many others) against Heidegger, in which the latter is pointed 
at to “public revenge, by making up an indictment on the basis of fictitious or counterfeit 
«proofs»” (HP 192). And again, a bit further on: “The inquiring suspect plays on the guilt which 
structures every human being’s life to make believe in the presence, in this or that individual, of 
a hidden  guilt” (HP 194)! Is it not just this one the behaviour of one who is ruled by that 
“arrogance” Zaccaria talks about, “which often prevents a man from giving ear to the essential 
and, in general, to all what, by uprooting his customary thinking, discloses its groundlessness 
and violence” (SP 5)? To get accurate knowledge of the Italian reception of Heidegger’s 
thought and, more precisely, of his “relation” with National Socialism, please refer to the 
collection -  edited by Federico Albrisi and Maurizio Borghi for E.G.E.A. (Milan, 1999) -  of 
articles taken from the most outstanding Italian dailies between 1984 and 1999. Let us mention 
an article by Claudio Magris (Corriere della Sera, 1 November 1987), which reads as follows: 
“In Heidegger’s world view there was a cord which could lead him to be on the same 
wavelength as the Third Reich. The shepherd of Being, who so brilliantly showed the uprooting 
and inauthenticity impending on contemporary civilisation, did not have the humility of 
recognizing as sincere and legitimate other shepherds of other flocks, that is to say, the same 
dignity of all men: he was not free from the gloomy arrogance of one who deems himself to be 
the sole true shepherd, and thus the chief shepherd, the managing director of Being”.
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nazisme120-  writes: “Heidegger’s biography is nothing but the story of a stand in favour 
of death instinct” (H 44); or about Farias himself, who states that “horror is written in 
the heart of Heidegger’s philosophy”121. And, then, how about the fact that Heidegger 
has never justified himself publicly after 1945?
Thus, before accusing him of being a Nazi, it seems to be legitimate to read 
(and listen to) what Heidegger himself writes when he directly refers to his own 
political engagement. In no way do we want to minimize the weighty responsibility of 
his engagement in 1933 -  to which he himself had referred to since 1937 as “an 
indisputable mistake, however the matter may be intended”122 - , but not even do we 
want to single out a phenomenon of complete perversion of spirit. We had rather try to 
concentrate again on the reflection of that event, which may be interpreted as the 
outcome of a risky (but not rash) decision, of whose fragility Heidegger himself was 
well aware throughout his problematic assignment: “With the assumption of the 
rectorate, I had risked the attempt to save and to purify and to strengthen what was 
positive [in the revolution advocated by National Socialism]” (QA 19). And as much 
definite was the judgement Heidegger expressed in connection with the failure of his 
project: “All hopes were disappointed. Every effort on behalf of what really mattered 
was in vain” (QA 26).
However, Rüdiger Safranski’s comment on Heidegger’s engagement seems 
to take quite a different direction: “It was a case of trying to cut the Gordian knot of
120 V. Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme, Éditions Verdier, Paris 1997 (Engl. Trans. 
Heidegger and Nazism, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1989).
121 According to Farias: “By considering the historical context and the texts he 
wrote in his youth [...], we can see the progressive connections in a thought process nourished 
in traditions of authoritarianism, anti-semitism, and ultranationalism that sanctified the 
homeland in its most local sense. This sacralizing tendency was closely tied to a radical 
populism and carried strong religious connotations. From the systematic point of view, this 
development is linked to Heidegger’s reflections in Being and Time -  [...] (§ 74) -  and his 
rejection of democratic forms of social life [...]. / Heidegger’s decision to join the NSDAP was 
in no way the result of unexpected opportunism or tactical considerations. The decision was 
clearly linked with his having already acted in a way consonant with National Socialism prior to 
becoming rector of the University of Freiburg [...]” (p. 4). On Farias’ same wave-length is also 
Hugo Ott’s Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie (Verlag Campus, Frankfurt a. 
M. 1988), whose misleading interpretation may be put back into perspective thanks to F. 
Fédier’s Lettre au professeur H. Ott (RV 245-252) and to Hermann Heidegger’s Der 
Wirtschaftshistoriker und die Wahrheit. Notwendige Bemerkungen zu den Veröffentlichungen 
Hugo Otts über Martin Heidegger (in Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1997).
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reality, of taking angry leave from the troublesome subtleties of one’s own thinking on 
Being. A hunger for concreteness and compact reality suddenly erupted, and solitary 
philosophy sought immersion in the multitude. A bad time for differentiations. 
Heidegger even swept aside his most prominent difference, the one between Being and 
that-which-is, by allowing it to be understood that Being had at last arrived: «We are 
under the orders of a new reality»”123.
It is surprising how Heidegger, just in the decisive moment, would have 
chosen, through his engagement, to break any delay towards National Socialism, even 
to the extent of dropping the question that had thoroughly deserved his thought for a 
more concrete achievement of his own “ideals”. At once, everything becomes clear: 
Being, after his fleeting apparition with the Greeks, has come back at last -  it is the time 
of a collective going out of the Platonic cave, at last the historical moment for 
authenticity has come! From all this, it appears how Heidegger, as so many other 
Germans, would have literally been dazed by the illusion of National Socialism. Thus 
Safranski writes, in respect of the “Scholarship Camp” held by Heidegger at his own 
hut between 4 and 10 October 1933: “Heidegger wants to bring a group of young 
people to his peaceful Todnauberg to build campfires, share food, have conversation, 
sing along with guitar” (a sort of military, very “romantic” camp) -  “but”, Safranski 
continues, “he announced the project as if it were a march into enemy country, where 
dangers had to be overcome: «The success of the camp depends on how much new 
courage we can muster, ... on the strength and resolve of our will to loyalty, sacrifice 
and service»” (p. 262).
But: what does “but” mean at this point?124 Is it not Heidegger himself in his 
address for the summer solstice ceremony (24 June 1933) to invite his students to
122 F. de Towarnicki, Martin Heidegger. Souvenirs et chroniques, Payot & Rivages, 
Paris 2002, p. 69.
123 R. Safranski, Ein M eister aus Deutschland, Hanser, München/Wien 1994 (Engl. 
Trans. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
1998, p. 231). With regard to Safranski’s interpretation, please read Hermann Heidegger’s 
Bemerkungen zu Rüdiger Safranskis Buch “Ein M eister aus Deutschland -  Heidegger und seine 
Z eit”, in Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995.
12 It has to be noted that Heidegger himself, just to clarify in what sense “every 
effort on behalf of what really mattered was in vain” (QA 26), makes reference to the 
“Todtnauberg camp” as to a “strange omen for the winter semester 1933/34. [...]. / [...]. 
Perhaps it would have been more correct to have resigned from office at that time” (QA 27).
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“weigh «the unknown and the strictness» of the task all Germans are going to face” (EP 
296)? Fédier writes: “It almost seems to hear Max Weber in his conference Politics as a 
job and vocation (1919): «not the summer bloom, but a polar, glacial, dark and harsh 
night we are to expect»” (EP 296).
Thus, we should not mistake the fanatical enthusiasm for the courageous 
tone with which Heidegger, in a letter to his student Hans-Peter Hempel on 19 
September 1960, says that he hoped “that National Socialism would recognize and 
gather inside itself all constructive and productive powers”. In fact, when addressing his 
German students, Heidegger says: “you must not become blind in your fight, you 
should instead keep clear for action” (EP 117)125.
§ 2. Heidegger and politics: methodological and bibliographical remarks
a) The Heidegger-Forschung on Heidegger’s political involvement
In order to understand the sense of Heidegger’s assent to National Socialism 
between 1933 and 1934, we deem it opportune to present, right from the start, the main 
positions taken by critics with regard to his rectorate. Although the debate on this topic 
has involved a very high number of scholars, thus showing a wide range of nuances 
which cannot be easily defined within unitary perspectives, we have to point out that the 
criterion we have followed in the “classification” of the different interpreters has been 
that of separating those who have seen an inexorable link between Heidegger’s thought 
and his joining Hitler’s regime, from those who considered his involvement in favour o f  
National-Socialism as a meaningless moment in his biography, which cannot be 
connected to his thought, as if one could clearly split the man and the thinker. Right in
125 Safranski writes, again: “We are therefore faced with a Heidegger who is woven 
into his own dream of a history of Being, and his movements on the political stage are those of a 
philosophical dreamer” (p. 234). Later on, Heidegger’s incapacity of admitting that he was 
politically mistaken -  because he had dreamed “philosophically” (p. 234) -  leads Safranski to 
say: “Later still, admittedly, he would turn this «being mistaken» into a philosophical story, 
assigning to himself a grand role -  it had been Being itself that had been mistaken in him and 
through him. He had borne the cross of the «error of Being»” (p. 235). Finally, a few pages
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view of an elucidation of this highly problematic relation, reading and analysing the 
texts Heidegger wrote not only during his ten-month assignment as rector, but also in 
the preceding and following periods of time, proves in our opinion essential. It goes 
without saying, however, that the recognition o f  a link between life and thought cannot 
be considered as a crushing proof o f a perverse agreement with the incommensurable 
brutalities committed by the Nazi regime in the course o f its history.
In this perspective we cannot get out of taking into account the pages Dieter 
Thomä126 and Tom Rockmore127 have dedicated to this delicate historiographical 
analysis of the Heidegger-Forschung with regard to this issue. However, we will focus 
our attention on Rockmore only, insofar as the American scholar gives special treatment 
in his book to one of the questions on which our own writing is based, namely 
Heidegger’s French reception, especially with regard to his relation to Nazism (see 
chap. 7, pp. 244-281). Concerning the six fundamental critical lines Rockmore 
determines on the “Heidegger-Nazism” issue, let us point out what follows:
1) We will analyse in detail only those positions that recognize the link 
between thought and politics in Heidegger: this does not mean, however, that our aim is 
to show, like T. Adorno (see supra, chap. 2, § 6.e), that “everything that Heidegger said 
and did was Nazi to the core” (p. 282).128 In this perspective, the hypotheses advanced 
by P. Aubenque, S. Vietta, H. Arendt129 and R. Rorty prove inadequate, insofar as they 
are based (though for different reasons) on the assumption that -  to say it in Rorty’s
further on, with regard to Rektoratsrede, Safranski portrays Heidegger as “the priest without a 
message, the metaphysical storm-troops leader”, “erect, martially rattling words” (p. 247).
126 D. Thomä, D ie Zeit des Selbst und die Z eit danach. Zur K ritik  der 
Textgeschichte Martin Heideggers 1910-1976, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. A. M. 1990, pp. 474-487.
127 T. Rockmore, On H eidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Hemel Hempstead 1992.
128 For an analysis of the relation between Heidegger and Adorno, see Hermann 
Mörchen, Macht und Herrschaft im Denken von Heidegger und Adorno, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 
1980; see also in our writing: chap. 2, § 6.
129 P. Aubenque, Encore H eidegger et le Nazisme, in Le D ébat, n. 48 (January- 
February 1988); S. Vietta, H eideggers K ritik  am Nationalsozialismus und an der Technik, 
Niemeyer, Tübingen 1989; H. Arendt, Martin H eidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt, in Merkur X 
(1969).
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words -  “the relation between the intellectual and moral virtue, and the relation between 
a writer’s books and the other parts of his life are contingent”130;
2) Also the positions taken by J. Derrida, P. Lacoue-Labarthe and R. 
Schürmann131 prove inadequate because partial: although they recognize a link between 
the political behaviour and the philosophical approach, they maintain that Heidegger 
freed himself definitely from those traces of subjectivism (still present in Sein und Zeit) 
which made his commitment to National Socialism possible, only after the turning he 
made in the second half of the Thirties. The point is, the overcoming (on the basis of the 
question of Being) of man’s interpretation as subject is the fundamental contribution of 
Heidegger’s thought right from Sein und Zeit, isn’t it? In particular, Heidegger’s attempt 
was, according to Derrida, to redeem or save National Socialism by “spiritualising” it, 
namely by freeing it from that ideological element not founded on spiritual, but on 
natural, biological and racial forces. However, Derrida’s interpretation of the meaning 
the word “Geist” takes in Rektoratsrede is based, in its turn, on the misunderstanding of 
the role the Destruktion der Metaphysik plays in Sein und Zeit: this is the reason why 
Derrida finds it incomprehensible that the term Geist may show again in 1933, as it was 
put into question in Sein und Zeit as a word that names a metaphysical interpretation of 
man’s Being; hence, the hypothesis that the Rektoratsrede is still centred on the 
metaphysical approach Sein und Zeit wanted (in vain) to free itself of.132 Under what 
perspective could we still trust in Lacoue-Labarthe’s statement, according to which “we 
can analyse National-Socialism, only because we have read Heidegger?”?133
3) The authors that consider the link between life and thought as essential 
are: K. Löwith and, more recently, J. Habermas, O. Pöggeler, P. Bourdieu and T. 
Rockmore himself. Although such a link plays a decisive role in the interpretations of 
these scholars, we are of the opinion that their positions do not necessarily hit the mark:
130 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1989, p. 111.
131 J. Derrida, D e l ’esprit: Heidegger et la question, Galilée, Paris 1987; P. Lacoue- 
Labarthe, La fiction  du politique, C. Bourgois, Paris 1987; R. Schürmann, Le principe  
d ’anarchie. Heidegger et la question de l ’agir, Seuil, Paris 1982.
132 For a critical analysis of Derrida’s interpretation, see P. David, What does “To 
A vo id” Mean? On D errid a ’s De l’Esprit (in Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 
1992, pp. 15-27).
133 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique, op. cit., p. 72 f.
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supposed that Löwith’s essay Les implications politiques de l ’existence chez Heidegger, 
which appeared in 1946 on Les Temps Modernes edited by Jean Paul Sartre, gave way 
to the accusations of pro-Nazism against Heidegger134, we will now focus only on the 
positions taken by Habermas, Pöggeler135 and Rockmore, who, perhaps in a clearer way 
than others, perceive in Heidegger’s entire thought a singular liking for National- 
Socialism, also after his resignation from the rectorate assignment and even beyond the 
fall of the Hitlerian regime.
b) In-depth analyses of Habermas’, Pöggeler’s and Rockmore’s positions
On Habermas and Pöggeler. Let us start the analyses on these two authors 
from a text written by Habermas, which appeared as the preface to the German edition 
of Farias’ book and whose aim was to integrate the sense of his research. Although 
Habermas states that Heidegger’s work has taken on such an eminent relevance inside 
the philosophical thought of the XX century that the hypothesis “the evaluations on 
Heidegger’s fascist commitment can throw discredit on the substance of Sein und Zeit” 
(p. 52) would be misleading, the silence Heidegger kept after 1945 -  especially with 
regard to the mass extermination of the Jews136 -  would cast a dark light on the 
presuppositions of his work, which would have “assimilated the world-view impulses of 
that time right up to its rhetorical means of expression” (p. 53).137 This is why the
134 Löwith’s aim is to show that the Heideggerian concept of existence leads to 
very serious political implications (see supra, chap. 2, § 1.a), insofar as the Nihilism transuding 
out of any existential elaboration of man’s Being found an extraordinary resonance in the 
Hitlerian mythology: at this stage, man’s interpretation as “Being-towards-death” (Sein-zum- 
Tode) becomes, as reported by Palmier (Les écrits politiques de Heidegger, L’Herne, Paris 
1968), a real “apology of suicide” (p. 147)! Moreover, let us bear in mind that Löwith’s article 
set off on the pages of the same review an inflamed debate with A. de Waelhens and E. Weil.
1 5 J. Habermas, Texte und Kontexte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1991 (It. Trans. 
Testi filosofici e contesti storici, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1993); O. Pöggeler, D er Denkweg Martin 
Heideggers, Pfullingen 1983, p. 319 f.
136 See J.-F. Lyotard, Heidegger et “les ju ifs”, Galilée, Paris 1988.
137 The theoretically most significant limit of Habermas’ position lies in his 
interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy in terms of “world view”, insofar as this determination 
of the essence of thought would prove to be, according to Heidegger, one of the most evident 
nihilistic manifestations of the distortion of the spirit itself on which the philosophical 
investigation is grounded. Once we assume that the phenomenon of Nihilism is based on the 
forgetfulness of Being and represents its extreme unfolding and accomplishment, we may 
presume that the origin of Heidegger’s mistake has nothing to do with an approach from which 
he kept at a distance even before Sein und Zeit.
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suspect may rise that there is “an inner connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and 
his political perception of the historical situation of that time” (p. 53), right up to the 
hypothesis -  in complete agreement with Pöggeler -  that his commitment to National 
Socialism was determined by a non fortuitous proximity with his own orientation of 
thought, “however never getting out of this perspective” (Pöggeler). The “abstract” 
nature of Heidegger’s remarks on history -  due to his belonging to the cultivated 
bourgeoisie of the German “mandarins” - , the consequent “fetishism of the spirit” (in 
comparison with the material conditions of existence) and the “idolatry of mother 
tongue” would then represent the traits of the irruption of that world view which gave 
rise, at the time of the crisis of the Weimar Republic (1929), to those ultraconservative 
and antidemocratic sentiments that encouraged the ascent of National Socialism in 
Germany. Even Heidegger’s thought after Sein und Zeit would be nothing but the effect 
of those needs demanded by the new destiny, which was coming to the attention of the 
whole world and to which Heidegger adapted himself, to such an extent that his 
“specifically German professorial folly” carried him to the point of “leading the 
Führer”. Moreover, Habermas interprets the change in Heidegger’s interpretation of 
National Socialism between 1935 and 1945 -  which brought the German philosopher to 
a new evaluation of his support to Hitler, who started appearing as a “symptom of that 
disease he once had to treat” (p. 66) -  as an “elaboration of the disappointment” (p. 62), 
which led Heidegger to formulate a new conception of Being in terms of “history of 
Being” which gained a truly fatalistic character, insofar as the revolutionary attitude 
already present in Sein und Zeit made way for the fall of a hope and the consequent 
resigned acceptance of the destiny of a humanity already dominated by the inexorable 
primacy of science and technology, thus leaving him no other choice but withdraw from 
the “disappointing world history” (p. 67).138 The much praised German superiority,
138 In the appendix to the second edition of his book, Pöggeler maintains that 
Heidegger adopted, with regard to the undertaking of the rectorate, two non homogenous 
attitudes, insofar as he, on the one hand, abandoned the approach of Sein und Zeit in order to 
adapt his interpretative scheme to the historical-political changes of the new times; on the other, 
he cut himself off in an abstractly philosophical meditation, in the secret hope of a phantom 
revolution which would take the German people, as if by magic, back to its “fatedly” assigned 
task. In this perspective, Heidegger tried to bring his doctrine of the “truth of Being” to 
fulfilment, by becoming -  at the height of such an ambition -  the spiritual leader of National 
Socialism and of Hitler himself! With regard to Pöggeler’s interpretation of Heidegger’s
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however, would keep on being present in his thought, though purified of explicit 
references to National Socialism, thanks to a process Habermas calls “abstraction 
through essentialization” (p. 68), namely through a universalising reflection that let 
Heidegger un-shoulder the responsibilities of his error, which was caused by the 
“general movement of the planetary will to power” !139 Heidegger’s silence after 1945, 
his refusal to justify himself in public, the revisions and manipulations of his previous 
writings in order to remove the proofs of having committed himself with the regime, the 
apologetic tone of his assertions are nothing but clear signs of his unwillingness to 
revise his self-comprehension as “thinker with a privileged access to the truth”, thus 
showing an a-historical attitude that can be compared with the one adopted by those 
French “passionate” Heideggerians who even aimed at promoting him to member of the 
Resistance!140
On Rockmore. The hypothesis of a continuity between Heidegger I and II 
leads Rockmore to the conclusion that there must be an affinity between Krieck’s 
doctrine of the Nazi Weltanschauung and Heidegger’s thought on Being after the 
reversal (see p. 286). In this perspective, Rockmore confuses Heidegger’s attitude 
towards the destiny of the German people with an assent to the National-socialist 
ideology, thus revealing the narrowness and groundlessness of his interpretation: 
according to the American scholar, in fact, Heidegger saw in Nazism “a necessary step
political engagement, please refer to his: Heideggers politisches Selbstverständnis, in Heidegger 
und die praktische Philosophie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1988 (pp. 17-63); Heidegger und die 
politische Philosophie, in Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. 
M. 1991 (pp. 328-349); Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger, Alber, Freiburg i. Br. 1972.
139 In this perspective, it is worth reading Habermas’ article on Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (25 July 1953), in which the crime committed by the Nazis is interpreted as 
the fruit of the “bad conscience of a whole people”, and not -  as stated by C. E. Lewalter on the 
columns of Die Zeit (13 August 1953) in defence of Heidegger -  as “the symptom of the tragic 
collision between technology and man” on a planetary scale.
140 For a wiser critical opinion on Heidegger’s silence, we suggest reading a short 
text written by Derrida entitled H eidegger’s silence (QA 35-41), where the French philosopher 
-  whose understanding o f  H eidegger is not based on B eaufret’s interpretations -  invites all 
those who draw (too) quick conclusions on the relation between Heidegger’s work and his 
political involvement to read Sein und Zeit. Although Derrida himself -  together with Lacoue- 
Labarthe -  considers Heidegger’s silence on Auschwitz as “terrible, unforgivable perhaps”, he 
does not pass an implacable judgement; on the contrary, he notices in this silence a heritage, 
namely a chance to understand what the monstrosity of the Nazi crime consisted of, in order to
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to the authentic comprehension of Being” (p. 288), as if the question of authenticity in 
Sein und Zeit coincided with the pureness of the race. Let us suspend now the analysis 
of Rockmore’s position, in order to present the last two critical lines he puts into 
question: they will let us perceive in an even brighter way how partial and misleading 
Rockmore’s interpretation is, whose one and only true merit is that of pointing out the 
necessary link between Heidegger’s life and thought for a thorough understanding of 
the sense of his political involvement.141
The last two critical lines Rockmore presents deal with Jean Beaufret’s and 
François Fédier’s interpretations. According to Rockmore, Beaufret, on the basis of the 
ultra-revisionist theses of the French historian Faurisson, came to deny the historical 
reality of National Socialism: that is why his position would not be worthy of any 
consideration; Fédier, on the other hand, simply considers Heidegger as non responsible 
for the political consequences Nazism provoked, as they were not predictable. We deem 
it opportune at this stage to put Rockmore’s criticism into question, in the light also of 
the chapter he dedicates to the French reception of the link between thought and politics 
in Heidegger. Let us bear in mind that, after the Second World War, philosophy in 
France, as a result of the need of freeing itself from its own tradition deeply conditioned 
(almost in a univocal way) by Descartes’ thought, was strongly influenced -  more than 
in any other country -  by Heidegger, to such an extent that Rockmore himself defines 
the German philosopher as “the master thinker in French philosophy” (p. 246) and the 
“French Heideggerianism” as “perhaps the most important contemporary source studies 
of Heidegger’s thought in the world today” (p. 249).142
On J. Beaufret. Let us start by saying that Beaufret has been a friend of 
Heidegger’s from 1946 up to the death of the German philosopher in 1976; the 
hypothesis that Beaufret denied the reality itself of National Socialism could make one
comprehend -  thanks to a “non philological, but active” Heidegger reading -  “what we 
condemn, so that we know what we condemn”.
141 For a critical study of Rockmore’s position -  whose fundamental limit is that of 
having constantly (i.e. over the years) interpreted Heidegger’s thought in terms of 
Weltanschauung - , see P. David, New Crusades Against Heidegger. Riding Roughshod over 
Philosophical Texts (Part Two). The Genealogy o f  a M ystification (in H eidegger Studies, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1998).
142 For an analysis of the influence of Heidegger’s thought on French philosophy, 
see D. Janicaud, Heidegger en France, 2 voll., A. Michel, Paris 2001.
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think that their friendship was based on an ineradicable Nazi creed, or that Heidegger’s 
influence was such that he succeeded in gathering around himself a group of faithful 
attendants, who were entirely dominated by him and willing to any compromise in order 
to save their adored Master from the disgrace he was in. That singular openness and 
willingness to listen to Heidegger’s thought, which joined a relatively small circle of 
men around the figure of Jean Beaufret (François Fédier and François Vezin above all), 
runs the risk of being rapidly forgotten in favour of the conviction that the 
Humanismusbrief itself played a strategic role, insofar as the turning inside Heidegger’s 
thought should have convinced the public of his abandoning the previous positions and, 
especially, any link to Nazism itself (see Rockmore, p. 250). We may now supply our 
argumentation with two proofs, which could free Beaufret’s entire work of 
interpretation from that suspect impending on his figure of man and thinker: 1) let us 
remind ourselves that Sartre himself published on Les Temps Modernes (January 1946, 
even before the Humanismusbrief was written) an editorial note concerning Hegel’s and 
Heidegger’s political views and mistakes, in which he shows that the existential 
conception of politics and Nazism are poles apart; 2) let us keep in mind Beaufret’s 
friendship with the French poet René Char, whose military engagement in the course of 
the Second World War cannot be ignored, insofar as he, after having been denounced as 
extreme-left activist (October 1940) and searched by the Vichy police (December 
1940), ended up by fighting in the Resistance (1941-1944) under the pseudonym of 
“Capitaine Alexandre”. Moreover, Char’s friendship with Heidegger, who met the poet 
for the first time in Paris on the occasion of his first trip to France at Beaufret’s 
invitation to hold a lecture entitled Was ist das -  die Philosophie? (1955), proves 
decisive to our purposes: later on, Char himself invited Heidegger to hold private 
seminars in Provence in 1966, 1968 and 1969 (Le Thor Seminars).143
143 Thanks to François Fédier and Philippe Sollers, we now have sixty-two 
photographs portraying these peculiar experiences of thought (Soixante-deux photographies de 
Martin Heidegger, Gallimard, Paris 1999). With regard to the relation between Heidegger and 
Char, see: 1) the text of a conversation between Beaufret and Frédéric de Towarnicki entitled 
René Char et H eidegger (in F. de Towarnicki, A la rencontre de Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 266­
270); 2) a text by Beaufret entitled L ’entretien sous le marronnier (in R. Char, Œ u vres  
complètes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris 1983, pp. 1169-1175); 3) a text written 
by Char in 1966 entitled Réponses interrogatives à une question de Martin H eidegger (in R. 
Char, Œuvres complètes, op. cit., pp. 734-736).
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On F. Fédier. The essays Fédier published in the Sixties (as a result of a 
debate with Faye) and his book concerning Farias’ well-known text, are classified by 
Rockmore among those works, whose aim is to minimize Heidegger’s mistake in terms 
of mere contingency. Fédier, in fact, whom (not only) Rockmore defines as 
“Heidegger’s most ardent defender in the French philosophical discussion after 
Beaufret’s death” (p. 253), would limit his investigation to an obstinate defence of “the 
«sacred» cause” (p. 261), thus justifying Heidegger’s mistake by claiming that Hitler’s 
brutalities after his ascent to power were unpredictable. Moreover, with regard to the 
fact that Fédier, “an orthodox Heideggerian not swayed, or even chastened, by new 
information or the intervening debate” (p. 270), claims that Nazism reached its entirely 
unfolded essence only in 1939 (on the occasion of the “Decree on euthanasia”), 
Rockmore is of the opinion that the French interpreter underestimates the presence -  
already in 1933 -  of all those presuppositions which will give rise to the series of 
atrocities committed by the regime: Hitler’s Mein Kampf, published in 1925-26, already 
contained the guiding lines of that theory of the Arian race which can be found in the 
1935 Nuremberg Laws, didn’t it? In this perspective, contrary to Fédier’s interpretation 
of Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede in terms of a revolution of the scientific knowledge on 
which the University is grounded, Rockmore states that the Rektoratsrede shows “an 
explicit concern [...] to utilize the university to attain a common goal shared with the 
Nazis: the destiny of the German people” (p. 272).
c) Fédier’s contributions to an understanding of the “Heidegger affaire”
In the light o f  the presentation o f  the debate concerning Heidegger’s 
political commitment, we are o f the opinion that, in order to see clearly into the 
questions we explained above, it is essential to understand in a historically adequate 
way the conditions that made Hitler’s ascent to power possible (without supporting, in 
doing so, the theses o f some ultra-revisionists, who have come to the point o f denying 
the existence o f the gas chambers!) and, at the same time, to study accurately the texts 
Heidegger wrote about National Socialism (N.B. all texts concerning the well-known 
question o f technology and Nihilism, although they do not deal explicitly with National
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Socialism, may contribute to elucidate its origin and ground). But who, before Beaufret
-  also by virtue o f his numerous conversations with Heidegger -, had been able to seize 
the intrinsic problematic inherent in the questions related to the so-called Modern 
Times, o f  which Nazism, perhaps, represents nothing but the most evidently violent 
manifestation? In this perspective, we do have to claim that only an authentic 
understanding o f  what Nihilism means could cast light upon Heidegger’s political 
biography and, at the same time, upon the nature o f  the turning inside his path o f  
overcoming Metaphysics. This is the reason why Fédier’s work o f interpretation, which 
is divided into two directions -  historical elucidation o f the political context, on the one 
hand, and text translation and commentary, on the other -  seems to be the one and only 
way o f  access to this thorny matter, which still today keeps busy those who maintain 
that Heidegger’s thought has opened a new beginning in the history o f philosophy and, 
in a much wider sense, o f the European-Western humanity.
*
Concerning the approach we have chosen to understand the sense of 
Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism, we deem it opportune to point out what 
follows: our analyses are based on the remarks made by François Fédier, a disciple of 
Jean Beaufret’s, current associate editor of the international review Heidegger Studies 
and editor of the French edition of Heidegger’s work by Gallimard. In particular, with 
regard to Heidegger’s appointment as rector of the University of Freiburg between 1933 
and 1934, we have taken advantage of two texts by Fédier himself, in order to “decide, 
after weighing up the proofs, whether Heidegger truly deserves the treatment he has 
been given and the «image» he has been burdened, whether he truly deserves the infamy 
that overwhelms him after the publication in France (October 1987) of Victor Farias’ 
book Heidegger et le Nazisme” (EP 9): Heidegger. Anatomie d ’un scandale (1988) and 
Heidegger -  Écrits politiques (1995). Let us point out that this second book consists of 
a Preface written by Fédier and of his translation of a selection of texts related to both 
the period of Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism (see, first of all, the 
Rektoratsrede) and what “politics” in a broad sense of the term means (see, for instance,
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the 1966 Spiegel-Gespräch). Moreover, let us keep in mind that the Écrits politiques are 
furnished with an apparatus of notes by Fédier and that their Italian edition is enriched 
by an essential essay by Fédier, which is not present in the French version and was 
published on the review L ’Infini (n. 52, December 1996) with the title Pour ouvrir un 
juste débat, in reply to some very critical reactions after the publication in France of the 
Écrits politiques} AA
Let us now take notice of the fact that, as reported by Zaccaria (SP 5), 
Fédier himself thought he had succeeded in “taking the bull by the horns”, namely in 
preparing the field for an attentive reading of Heidegger’s writings concerning, directly 
or not, his political involvement, by showing the one-sidedness or, in certain cases, the 
absolute groundlessness of those theses which have played a decisive role in the 
embitterment of the prejudice that considers Heidegger (in a more or less concealed 
way) as a totalitarian thinker, even before 1933. In this perspective, it is worth reading 
Fédier’s 1966 essay entitled Trois attaques contre Heidegger (published on the review 
Critique, n. 234), in which he analyses the principles and implicit presuppositions that 
are present in the argumentations by Guido Schneeberger (Nachlese zu Heidegger, Bern 
1962), Theodor W. Adorno (Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, Frankfurt a. M. 1964) and Paul 
Hühnerfeld (In Sachen Heidegger, Munich 1961).
Supposed that we have already focused our attention on Adorno’s text in the 
course of the second chapter -  in order to disprove the hypothesis that Heidegger’s own 
philosophical work is permeated right from Sein und Zeit by the germs of a thought 
which would have later found in Nazism the happy occasion of its fulfilment - , we 
deem it opportune to meditate on Schneeberger’s book, which, by presenting itself as a
144 Also in Italy the publication of the Political Writings has aroused a number of 
polemics, which are all characterized by the general conviction that those by Fédier and 
Zaccaria, to say it in Maurizio Ferraris’ words (Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 June 1998), are nothing but 
“paltry defences based on abstruse exegesis”, with a view to sanctifying the German 
philosopher. In this perspective, it is worth reading two violent attacks by Sandro Mezzadra 
(Heidegger in discesa libera, in Il Manifesto, 24 July 1998) and Sandro Barbera (L ’errore di 
Heidegger, in La rivista dei libri, 11 November 1998), according to whom the Écrits politiques 
is a text of no scientific value (Mezzadra), full of translations that prove to be “an imposture, a 
swindle, an offence against the good faith of the reader”, who would be led astray by what 
Pierre Bourdieu defined as the “idiolect” of the followers -  Fédier and the “loyal” Zaccaria, in 
our case - , of the “guardians” of the Master’s language, to such an extent that Barbera wonders 
“whether the publishers, Gallimard and Piemme, are aware of what they print” (!).
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collection of historical (i.e. “objective” !) documents from 1929 to 1961, seems to be 
supplying irrefutable evidences of Heidegger’s guilt. After noticing that the documents 
are presented following a chronological order, it becomes evident that, despite the 
chronology, the second document -  dealing with the Cassirer-Heidegger meeting at 
Davos in 1929 -  consists of an excerpt taken from Mrs Cassirer’s autobiography, which 
was written in 1950. In this text we may read the following sentence: “We were already 
aware of his liking for anti-Semitism”. The fact that this sentence -  the one and only 
that shows, among all texts, such a liking by Heidegger -  is presented right at the 
beginning of the book, makes us suppose that Schneeberger’s intention is that of 
inculcating in the reader from the start a stereotyped image of Heidegger, so that also 
the following texts may sound as a confirmation of such a judgement. Moreover, in case 
we welcome Schneeberger’s hypothesis, according to which as many as 138 (out of 
217) documents do not deal directly with Heidegger but with the happenings of the 
German university in general, in order to “broaden the visual angle” with regard to the 
sense of Heidegger’s commitment, we would be allowed to start considering 
Heidegger’s own writings as based on a sordid feeling which was present inside the 
German community in favour of Hitler, as if the proclamations by Rudolf Hess and by 
the leader of the Nazi students functioned as background to the rising of that treasure of 
a Nazi philosophy Heidegger’s thought is. In so doing, Schneeberger’s book, in which 
the author never mentions Heidegger’s resignations in 1934 (after “only” ten months, 
and before the expiry of his mandate) and attitude towards the regime in the following 
years, smoothes the way to that climate of suspicion still circulating around Heidegger’s 
name and based on historical-political, sociological (we refer here especially to G. 
Lukács’ interpretations) or psychological presuppositions -  which have no bearing at all 
on the genuinely philosophical (namely ontological) origin and ground of the much 
condemned rectorate. In other words: “From the beginning of this rectorate to the end of 
his life Heidegger never ceased to conceive his confrontation with the political as 
fundamentally a philosophical [i.e. based on the ontological difference] and not a 
political matter”.145 As a matter of fact, it is Heidegger himself who “in the courses on
145 P. Emad, Introduction to: H. W. Petzet, Encounters and Dialogues with Martin
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Hölderlin’s Germanien and Der Rhein rejects what is «immediately political» and states 
that an achievement in the realm of politics, «in the highest and proper meaning of the 
word,» makes all discourses on the topic of politics superfluous”.146
Once we put into question the hypothesis that Fédier belongs to that 
“Heidegger church” and “Heidegger orthodoxy” (with “official apologists”) Thomas 
Sheehan talks about in an essay of his (that uses Farias’ theories in an uncritical way)147, 
we might be ready to listen without prejudices to Henri Crétella’s outstanding writing 
La mesure de l ’affairem , in which the French interpreter, inside the first paragraph 
enigmatically entitled Une défense exemplaire, after recalling the fourfold nature of the 
attacks upon Heidegger -  “documentary” (Schneeberger), “philosophical” (Adorno), 
“historical” (Hühnerfeld) and “linguistic” (Faye and Minder149) - , states that Fédier’s 
demonstration of the smallness of the theses on which they were based, made the study 
of Heidegger’s work possible, also by virtue of the beginning (since 1975) of the 
publication of his complete works. However, although Fédier’s critical effort in the 
Sixties had contributed to the elucidation of Heidegger’s position by pouring oil on 
troubled waters for at least twenty years, the publication of Hugo Ott’s and Farias’ 
books (which is based in its turn, to say it in Crétella’s words, on the “dossier of 
accusations tendentiously collected” by Ott since 1983) has violently rekindled
Heidegger 1929-1976, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993, p. XXVI.
146 P. David, A P hilosophical Confrontation with the P olitica l, in Heidegger 
Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995, p. 197.
147 T. Sheehan, A normal Nazi, in The New York Review o f  Books, 14 January 1993.
148 In Heidegger Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995.
149 As reported by Jean-Michel Palmier in his Les écrits politiques de Heidegger, 
J.-P. Faye claims that Ernst Krieck influenced Heidegger’s thought; in his essay on the review 
M édiations (autumn 1961-summer 1962) Faye writes “without joking”: “Here K rieck . starts 
speaking like Heidegger himself, or rather, anticipates the Heideggerian post-war language”. In 
the same perspective Robert Minder interprets Heidegger’s allocution in memory of Albert Leo 
Schlageter (1 June 1933), in which Rosenberg’s language and style would be clearly traceable 
(see Martin Heidegger ou le conservatisme agraire, in Allemagne d ’aujourd’hui, n. 6, January- 
February 1967). For a report concerning the debate between Fédier and Faye/Minder, see Beda 
Allemann, Martin Heidegger und die Politik  (in Merkur, 1967). With regard to an analysis of 
Heidegger’s language, it is also worth reading L ’ontologiepolitique de Heidegger by the French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, which is based on that deep resentment towards philosophy that 
reflects the need social sciences feel to take revenge against ontology. But how can one be 
convinced that ontological matters can be adequately tackled at a sociological, anthropological 
or psychological level (as in Ott’s text, whose aim is to show that Heidegger’s “mentality” made 
him join National Socialism), if Heidegger himself differentiated -  right from Sein und Zeit (BT 
§ 10) -  the sense of his project from that of these positive sciences? Concerning this, it may 
prove useful to read Crétella’s Le procès de la liberté (in Le Croquant, n. 3, summer 1988).
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controversy on the “Heidegger affaire”. Hence the hypothesis that Ott’s and Farias’ 
purpose is not only to throw discredit on Heidegger’s figure, but even to keep the 
descendants from studying his thought. In this perspective, Crétella’s analysis is in 
agreement with this remark made by Lacoue-Labarthe on Farias’ book: “The worrying 
aspect would be that one considered the issue as «definite», at least for a certain period 
of time, and that a doxa developed which judged the question as if it were clear. There 
are already sentences going around like: «Can one still read Heidegger?» Were this the 
effect of the book (to dissuade from reading, and from questioning), it would be a 
catastrophe. But we do not want to give up hope of the capacity of reading y e t . ”.150 
Under these circumstances, Crétella writes, “to defend Heidegger is just the same as to 
safeguard our liberty of thinking” (p. 63).
*
Let us now make some remarks on Fédier’s Heidegger: anatomie d ’un 
scandale, which is dedicated to an analysis of Farias’ Heidegger et le Nazisme. His 
painstaking piece of criticism of Farias’ text -  whose “analyses” historiographically 
constituted the pretext for a radical “banning” of Heidegger’s thought -  cannot be 
thoroughly resumed here. In this writing we can only refer to a reading “in the first 
person” of the first part of this book, in which Fédier shows, giving evidence of what he 
says, how the accusations charged to Heidegger are inconsistent or, better, completely 
unfounded. This is why the title of this first part recites: Un pseudo-événement [A 
pseudo-event] (H 53-147). Fédier’s task is, thus, to show how Farias’ book constitutes 
“only a semblance of accusation, though it is and, what is more unbelievable, has been 
so far taken as an incontestable accusation” (H 29-30).
And, moreover, it is worth remembering that Fédier’s judgment is shared by 
other philosophers. To this purpose, for example, a remark by Jacques Derrida on 
Farias’ book recites: “The reading proposed, if there is one, remains insufficient or 
questionable, sometimes so coarse as to make one wonder whether the investigator has
150 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique, op. cit., p. 188.
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ever read Heidegger for more than one hour” (H 43)151. In this sense, Fédier’s text, 
according to the author’s intentions, can be understood as an apology of Heidegger -  
but in the sense in which “in Greek «apology» has a more precise meaning [compared 
with that of assuming «the defence of someone, by praising him to counterbalance 
public attacks to which he has been subjected»]: that of reasoning which removes the 
accusation which, let us say, averts it, proving that it is not pertinent” (HP 29).
With regard, then, to the “spirit” of Fédier’s work, it is worth reading the 
chapter entitled Comment remonter le temps, alors que nous savons ce q u ’a été 
l ’histoire [How to go back in time now that we know how history has gone] (H 154­
205), where, as to the problematic connection between a philosopher’s “life” and 
thought, he writes: “I keep on thinking (and Heidegger’s work has deeply contributed to 
intensify the register and rhythm of my thought) that the exercise o f philosophy has 
definitely something to do with an eminent possibility o f  being a man; that the 
philosopher’s responsibility is wholly assumed by his existence; that his existence never 
reduces to his work, also (and mainly) when his work becomes the best part of his own 
existence. Moreover, I think that thought, in philosophy, is never arbitrary, and that it 
must rather obey some needs: one of them is just the need of watching over the 
possibility of being a man” (H 157, our italics).
How can one insist on judging Fédier’s book the fruit of “one-sided” 
enthusiasm towards Heidegger? Is his book, rather, not enlivened by the deepest 
“intellectual honesty”?152
151 If what Derrida says is true, do we not find ourselves in the most suitable 
condition to weigh the connection between Heidegger’s life and thought more carefully? Why, 
thus, remain deaf to the appeal contained in Heidegger’s question which asks: “Rather, is it not, 
perhaps, the work to make an interpretation of the biography possible?” (H 45)? With regard to 
this topic, please also refer to H.G. Gadamer’s Superficiality and Ignorance. On Victor F arias’ 
Publication (QA 141-144).
152 At this stage, we cannot forget his essential translation work of Heidegger’s 
thought: does it not become as decisive, just in this context, to be able to listen to and 
understand, thanks to the care and rigour of the word being translated, the tenor of the basic 
guiding-words with which Heidegger draws up his project of a new humanity, that is to say, 
which may be willing, once more, to be up to its own authentic chances and to carry through the 
task it was destined? Fédier writes about himself: “My whole effort, in fact, is mainly addressed 
to translate Heidegger into French -  not to supply something equivalent or a calque, but to make 
possible, in French, the same experiences of thought” (H 49). Here lies the reason of our 
assuming Fédier’s translation of Heidegger’s Politische Schriften (Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M.
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d) Interpreting Heidegger’s rectorate on the ground of Fédier’s theses:
Sein und Zeit -  Was ist Metaphysik? -  Rektoratsrede
Fédier’s work seems to have passed unnoticed or, when read, has been 
interpreted as too indulgent towards Heidegger. Here, the matter is not to judge 
Heidegger, but to understand in favour of what he “sided”. Fédier in this sense appears 
to be one of the few who strives to make one think about the sense of Heidegger’s 
engagement, making it appear at it was, with no praise but with clearness: “In a public 
event I said that Heidegger did not behave as a hero. This statement has been interpreted 
as a praise for his cowardice. Well, I did not praise Heidegger for his cautious 
behaviour. And not to be a hero does not mean to be a coward. In this respect it is worth 
remembering a remark by Simone Weil: «Most of the people who rise as judges here 
has never had the chance of giving proof of their heroism»” (H 168).
From the outline given by Fédier it seems that Heidegger’s political act was 
not originated by German people’s fanatical will of dominating -  that, according to 
some “Nazi philosophers” (Rosenberg and Krieck) had its own foundation in the 
biological-genetic superiority of the Aryan race - , but from a renewed sense of 
responsibility toward the menace that was impending (and that has continued to impend 
so far) on the destiny of Western peoples and of the whole world. In the light of the 
above, it may be understood in which sense the lessons held by Heidegger at the 
University after his resigning from his post of rector can be meant as a crucial moment 
in the diriment debate with Hitler’s National Socialism. That is to say, the fact that 
Heidegger did not militate inside the antifascist Resistance cannot be assumed as a 
further proof of his stubborn Nazi creed. In fact, it has been often reported that 
Heidegger’s lessons were attended not only by students belonging to the faculty of 
philosophy, as the participants, “having found there an opportunity for them to 
understand National Socialism in all its non-truth, were coming in search of a rule for 
their conduct” (H 230-231).
Moreover: those who identify the “absolute evil” in Nazism, essentially 
misunderstand its nature, as they ascribe only to it a feature which, instead, according to
1995) as key-interpretation of his engagement inside our dissertation (see our “Note on
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Heidegger, is much more profound, insofar as it animates in a unitary and enigmatic 
way Nazism, Communism and the much acclaimed “World Democracy” in which 
Western peoples are still living153. If we assume that the defeat of National Socialism 
does not coincide with that of the principle that allowed the birth both of Fascisms and 
of Communism in the first half of the twentieth century, we must insist on the question: 
what sort o f menace continues to impend on the destiny o f Western peoples? And, 
again, what condition does not allow men to see how urgent this question is? Are we -  
“after” Heidegger -  available to bear and think about the responsibility that this 
question implies? And, thus, taking a step back: are we allowed, perhaps, to assume that 
Heidegger’s interpretation of “National Socialism” in 1933 -  as “national socialism” -  
may contribute to eradicate the origin of that same menace?154 And again: if we could 
learn something from Heidegger’s mistake, what should we learn?
abbreviations”).
153 Fédier writes: “Heidegger talks about «the universal dominance of the will to 
power in history, meant in a planetary perspective» and specifies: «Just to this reality has 
everything to be traced back today -  be it called Communism or Fascism or World 
Democracy»./This sentence, or better this concept: to think of a sameness (and not of an 
identity) under three different «political» regimes, should not be interpreted as the means [...] to 
justify, in an embarrassed way, the fact that it had been mistaken as a possibility of revolution 
something which turned out to be just the opposite” (HP 236) (see also SP 378 ff.). With regard 
to this “sameness” Fédier continues a few pages ahead: “To go on thinking [...]: this is 
Heidegger’s main worry: in fact, the danger, which is constantly impending, is to stop thinking
-  which, seemingly, never happens. [...]. That is why the presence of mind demands that no 
authority prevail on thought -  no authority, but thought itself, as it manifests itself in the history 
of philosophy” (HP 242-243). In this sense let us read the following judgment by the French 
poet Georges Bernanos on “World Democracy”: “The democratic idea has long become only an 
egalitarian ideal of social reforms being destined to assure comfort to the masses, under the 
always increasing protection of the State” (HP 235).
154 If we agree to the hypothesis that Heidegger’s commitment, was not criminal, 
we have to dwell upon the sense he gave to the word which connotes the political movement 
founded by Hitler: “National Socialism”. Fédier writes: “The «German revolution» defined 
itself as social and national. Two terms which could address legitimate hopes. No doubt, there 
was still great confusion as to their respective determination. What was, thus, more urgent than 
calling all those who did not reject the idea of an authentic revolution back to the task of 
resurfacing, in all its truth, what could result a German [national, not nationalist] Socialism?” 
(EP 76). Moreover, what does “social” mean? Fédier writes: “Socialism [...]: is the principle of 
association which acknowledges human labour as the sole real unit out of which a people may 
be constituted. As to labour itself, it has its origin from knowledge” (H 182-183). In fact, 
Heidegger writes: “«Labour», for us, is the name of every action, being ruled according to 
knowledge, which is borne by the responsibility of the individual, of the group and of the State, 
and which constitutes a service for a people” (EP 140). For a preparatory analysis of the essence 
of labour in Heidegger’s thought, please refer to infra, § 7.
160
From all that, in our opinion, emerges the need for a slower attribution of 
faults and delivery of judgments, thus allowing to ponder in a more suitable way the 
responsibilities which concern not only Heidegger and Germans (the latter as 
“genetically” prone to destruction and evil), but the whole international community. Is it 
not historically documented that Hitler’s ascent to power (and in particular his “Peace 
Address” in 1933) deceived many foreign powers (let us mention Winston Churchill’s 
Great Britain), to such an extent that, later on, they tried to reach a mediation with 
Nazism? In this respect Heidegger recites: “Certainly -  it is always a presumption when 
human beings calculate the guilt of other human beings or charge them with it. But if 
one is indeed looking for those who are guilty and is judging them by their guilt, is 
there not also a guilt incurred by failing to do what is essential? Those who were so 
prophetically gifted then that they foresaw what was to come (I was not so wise), why 
did they wait almost ten years to oppose the threatening disaster? Why did not those 
who thought they knew it, why did precisely they not set out to direct everything, 
starting from its foundations, toward the good in 1933?” (QA 19, our italics).
If we watch Heidegger’s behaviour just before his assumption of the 
rectorate (and throughout the period), we must admit that nothing ingenuously 
enthusiastic is to be found in his joining Hitler’s project. As reported by Georg Picht, it 
was clear to the most perspicacious that the inception of National Socialism had been 
marked by criminal actions (H 163). However, the possibility of an authentic revolution 
was envisaged in it, on condition that the movement was able to reach a “restoration to 
health” (EP 79) and a “clarification” (EP 79) of itself as a whole.
The fact is that Heidegger thought that this task had to be carried out, first 
o f all, by the University! And this is just the sense according to which Heidegger 
engaged himself as rector, and not as “party man”. The urgent need for the University -  
as the seat of knowledge -  to revolutionize is the only “unity of measurement” through 
which the role played by Heidegger becomes meaningful. No doctrine or party ideology 
could have been adequate fo r  the task at issue: to awaken a sense o f  responsibility in 
the German people toward its own destiny as “capable” o f  history. Heidegger’s
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mistake consisted in seeing Hitler as one of the few capable of this crucial task!155 
Indeed, his thought appeared to the most persisting supporters of Hitler’s regime as 
“against”, or however useless, to the world view as championed by National Socialism
-  and thus suspect. Heidegger recites in 1937-38: “[...] those who want something 
different, true, the real change, become troublesome and annoying as disquieting, 
because, why not, all answers are already available; troublesome and disquieting and, 
thus, «politically» suspect” (EP 181).
Is it not, thus, in favour of a “new inner greatness of our people” (letter to 
Scheler’s widow, 7 March 1933) that Heidegger engaged himself -  greatness which 
arises, from time to time, from the firm taking on the task to which every people and 
every man as such are called, to be as they really are? In fact, what did Heidegger want?
It is just in the attempt to answering this question that it will appear how the 
frame itself of our whole dissertation reflects the close cross-reference between the 
traits that constitute, in our opinion, Heidegger’s thought and the spirit of his political 
engagement: the hypothesis (still to be checked) is that the menace impending on 
Western countries is the source o f  both the question which animates his first 
masterpiece Sein und Zeit, and his political involvement -  source on which the project 
o f a revolution o f knowing, o f  the sense o f truth, is founded and develops, a revolution 
in which the future o f the European humanity is at stake: in fact, Heidegger himself 
declares (QA 15-16) that the question which determined his “engagement” in 1933 was 
the same that had already dominated his thought since 1929, when he published his 
Was ist Metaphysik?. Rather: it is ju st the question which springs out o f  the 
investigation on the essence o f  Metaphysics (starting from the question o f  Being as 
such) -  question which concerns the condition in which “scientific knowledge” is -  to 
constitute the “place” from which the essence itself o f Metaphysics may be thought o f 
again in a more original way; starting from which, namely, the University may become, 
once more -  assuming it is willing to fulfil its own constituent task inside a human 
community -, the founded start o f  a new dialogue o f a Western people with its own
155 On the other hand, can we refuse Heidegger the possibility, as Crétella says in 
Crime and thought, of feeling “ashamed -  at the latest starting from the «Night of long knives»
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(spiritual) history and with the one o f  others. To this purpose Heidegger writes, in a 
magnificent text of his of the late 1936 entitled Wege zur Aussprache [Paths to a word 
of mutual understanding]: “To Western peoples that make up history, the main feature 
of their mission is indicated in advance, at this time of the world, as: to prepare a way o f  
escape for the West” (EP 157).
Upstream of this writing, in fact, lies the attempt of thinking the foundation 
of a possible understanding between the Germans and the French, as peoples who “take 
part, in the most essential way, in the historic-spiritual configuration of the West” (EP 
157). Notwithstanding Benedetto Croce’s interpretation of Rektoratsrede -  according to 
whom “Prof. Heidegger wants philosophy and science, at least for the Germans, to be 
nothing more than a German matter for the well-being of the German nation”156 - , there 
is nothing in this thought that makes us assume an intention of absolute dominion from 
Germany. Moreover, Heidegger’s spiritual meditation on the German language (as 
mother tongue) does not imply its “superiority”, as a sort of “super-language” to which 
all the others would be subordinated157. But then: what does Heidegger mean here by 
“mutual”? And what is now the task of philosophy? Heidegger recites: “An authentic 
understanding [...] is the restlessness o f  an en-counter in which a party places every 
time the other under strain fo r  the question, starting from the care fo r  common 
historical tasks. Such an understanding has to take place through different paths, and 
according to different rhythms, in every ambit in which peoples create and build up. It 
[...] requires intuition and the understanding of their main tones and fundamental 
attitudes [...]. Such tones and attitudes find their canonical shape and their thrilling 
strength in great poetry, in plastic and figurative arts and in essential (philosophic) 
thought of the peoples” (EP 159, our italics)158.
(end of June 1934) -  in front of the turn of the events, the fury of which he had not been able to 
foresee” (p.13^?
V. Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme, op. cit., p. 111.
157 As reported by Farias, Croce writes in a letter to Vossler (9 September 1933): 
“Finally, I have read Heidegger’s speech through. It is at once stupid and obsequious. I am not 
surprised by the success that his philosophy will have for a while: the empty and general 
pronouncement is always successful. But it produces nothing. I believe he will not have any 
effect politically: but he deprives philosophy of its honour, and that also means a slight to 
politics, at least for the future” (p. 111).
158 Should it be the case, what flourishing chances open to the translation work! In 
fact, it is true that the well translated word rises from a mutual understanding. Perhaps, the time
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§ 3. The “cultural debate” in Italy during the twenty-year period fascist Regime: 
the figure o f Elio Vittorini (1908-1966)
“In this capacity of bringing up everything 
for discussion again, case by case and problem by 
problem, lies the possibility for each man to take part in 
history. He who chooses once and for all deceives 
himself about his automatic perennial belonging to 
history; he who cuts himself off is a lazy. [...] As the 
motionless strength just consists of too many men like 
him, thanks to which a political party may gradually not 
be worried about anything surpassing it, and can no more 
renew itself, and degenerate, «fascistize», die” (E. 
Vittorini, Tempo presente, n. 9, 1956)
Let us interrupt our reflection for the moment. Now, in the light of Croce’s 
judgment on Heidegger’s political engagement, it may be of interest to make 
reflections, fo r us as Italians, on how that crisis took place in our country -  the twenty- 
year Fascist period -  crisis which struck in an almost analogous way Heidegger’s 
Germany. But, let us clarify the question under discussion -  the sense of Heidegger’s 
political engagement -  by approaching the figure of an outstanding Italian writer, Elio 
Vittorini, a brilliant example in the twentieth century Italian culture of a free man, 
equally critical towards a fanatical and slavish engagement in favour of a party 
ideology, be it fascist or communist. There are two paths we foresee: the first one (A) 
concerns a brief analysis of Vittorini’s “political biography” before, during, and after 
Fascism; the second one (B), instead, the comparison between Croce’s comportment 
towards Fascism, on the one hand, and Vittorini’s toward Communism, on the other.
(A)
Let us start this analysis by mentioning a (never forwarded) letter by 
Vittorini written in October-November 1948 to The Partisan Review, in which the 
writer corrects some inaccuracies in respect of the spirit of his whole “political life”
for the translation of Heidegger’s works has finally come also for Italians: to this purpose, let us 
mention the decisive work accomplished by Zaccaria, who has recently published his translation 
of the renowned essay contained in H olzw ege (HGA 5, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1977)
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contained in an article by Mario Praz, where the latter “talks of my Fascism of a time 
and of my Communism of another time, in a way that he who does not know something 
more about me thinks that I am inclined to something that Fascism and Communism 
should have in common” (L 211).
It thus becomes essential to understand how Vittorini comported towards 
Fascism (the critics defines his engagement in term of “left-wing Fascism”). The path 
we are going to follow to this end deals with the sense of his cooperation, as a writer, to 
a number of literary reviews of the time, in particular to Solaria since 1929, a florentine 
monthly review started in 1926 -  that, by its own name, appealed to freedom for a 
world whose sun is poetry -  and, since 1931, to Il bargello, a weekly review by the 
fascist federation of Florence. What sort of “cooperation” was it? Already in 1929 his 
article on L ’Italia letteraria (n. 41), under the emblematic title Scarico di coscienza 
[Making a clean breast], shows the nature of his “antifascism” (his works had become 
renowned victims of censorship since 1933). Vittorini writes: “The European position 
that I happened to support, appeared later on in practice as the most suitable one for 
resisting the official literary culture and producing national and popular turmoil of a 
modern nature and however of a different nature from the «national-popular» one 
towards which Fascism was pushing” (D 5-7)159.
Of his solarian experience, then, he says: “...I was a solarian, and solarian is 
the word that in literary environments of that time meant antifascist, supporter of
entitled D er Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (It. Trans. L ’origine d e ll’opera d ’arte, Marinotti, Milan 
2000).
159 Let us state in advance a brief comment: the title of this passage is M aestri 
cercando  [Looking for teachers]. The assumption is that, just thanks to the need of finding 
teachers in Italy, a “loving wit” towards the European literature may arise. Or, rather, must we 
believe that Vittorini’s assumed Europeism was confined to a passive behaviour of mere 
exaltation and imitation of the most outstanding European poets and writers? Is it not Vittorini 
himself who says that “the aura we breathe is one of exchange and of correspondences”? 
Thanks to this disposition, in fact, -  or: in the acknowledgment of a task common to all 
European peoples -  a national-popular culture can be founded again in its most genuine sense. 
In other words: if Vittorini’s words should still make sense for us, can we reduce the urgency, 
as claimed by the need of finding teachers, to an accusation against the Fascist regime and its 
censorship? Or, rather, do they sound as an invitation, so far unavoidable, to a common 
engagement for our history and our mother tongue? What about the so-called “literary culture” 
in Italy? What was lacking? Vittorini continues: “Croce’s aesthetics left us cool as a night star, 
far away in the literary recollection and astronomy; on the other hand, no one needed artistic 
rules but a tangible, safe truth, a land to which tightly cling”. Is this not: the need of taking root? 
(More precisely: what does Vittorini mean by the word “land”?).
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European unity, anti-traditionalist. [...]. We were also called dirty Jews for the 
hospitality we gave Jewish writers and for speaking well of Joyce and Kafka...”.
But, what about the fact that Vittorini’s Fascism “ended at any rate, with the 
relative membership card, [only] in autumn 1936” (L211)? Apart from the fact that he 
received the fascist card “like all the boys of my generation who attended public school 
under Mussolini’s government, and like all those who taught, under that government, at 
the University of Rome” (L 211), had he deluded himself, at least at the beginning, like 
many other young men, into believing in what was happening? With regard to his novel
Il garofano rosso [The red carnation] (1933) or, rather, to its revised 1935 version so as 
to make it accepted by censorship, he writes: “[...] the book was not accepted because of 
the censorship of ‘35-‘36 [...] Fascism did not want any mention of reasons of being 
fascist but the official ones, and of youthful enthusiasm for the criminal aspect that 
Fascism had involved (and that it was about to have in Ethiopia and Spain), namely for 
its bloody aspect, for its violent aspect, or for its noisily bold aspect that, as seen by 
boys as we were, unfortunately meant a lively aspect. Now, Fascism was the State, it 
wanted to be legalistic and demanded hypocrisy. Everything concerning it had to come 
out in a convenient way for the State” (D XV).
Thus, what was the meaning of the Spanish War in reference to the 
antifascist conscience of that time? It was just this war that opened the eyes and made 
the illusion of those who had “to believe in something that proved to be alive somehow” 
collapse once and for all. It is surprising how Vittorini refers to this historical 
phenomenon as a form of “political education”: just the words “más hombre -  more 
man” (!) mentioned by the Spanish radio taught Vittorini and those who, as he was, 
were in doubt on Fascism to search “a land to firmly cling to”, beyond any speechless 
sense of impotence or “abstract, not heroic or even live furies”160.
160 Vittorini writes in Conversation in Sicily (1936): “That winter I was haunted by 
abstract furies. I won’t try and describe them, because they’re not what I intend to write about. 
But I must mention that they were abstract furies -  not heroic or even live; some sort of furies 
concerning the doomed human race. They had obsessed me for a long time, and I was 
despondent. [...]./[...]; to believe mankind to be doomed and feel no urge to do something 
about it, not even the normal wish to go down with it./I was shaken by abstract furies, but not in 
my blood; I was calm, unmoved by desires” (Quartets Books Limited, London 1988, p. 3). This 
is the beginning of Vittorini’s first novel that he wrote after realizing, owing to the Spanish 
Civil War, the illusory character of Fascism. “I needed to be, also when writing, the one I had
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Can we then conclude that Vittorini, as Heidegger, was totally fascist, 
having joined Fascism since its beginning? Rather, should we not understand what 
Vittorini really wanted, what was his “need”, if we want to catch the real logic of his 
actions?
It is thus worth remarking that his antifascism did not just limit itself to a 
mere being against Fascism in favour o f the communist opposition. In fact, if Vittorini, 
on the one hand, took part in the antifascist activity from 1940 to 1945 “in the ranks of 
the clandestine organisation that Italian communists had the great merit to set up, 
among their other merits, and to fight just while Germans were passing from victory to 
victory” (L 212), on the other, he declared in many occasions that he was not 
ideologically a Marxist. Is it not, then, a misunderstanding to interpret his engagement 
in favour of Communism as the expiation of a previously made guilt? As Fédier says, 
referring to Heidegger: “no doubt, he thought that one does not disengage oneself from 
a commitment by taking another one” (HP XVIII). Is it not more suitable to assume that 
“to bring up everything for discussion again”, to say it in Vittorini’s words, constitutes 
the background of his fight from the “inside” towards both Fascism and, further on, 
Communism? That would be the reason why Vittorini himself, later on, in 1945, after 
the fall of Fascism, invited not only Marxists to re-build Italy. Indeed, is it not a 
common destiny that claims the whole people?
(B)
First of all, we can remind ourselves that Croce wrote, in 1925, The 
Manifesto o f antifascist intellectuals, in reply to Giovanni Gentile’s The Manifesto o f  
fascist intellectuals. Now, what sort of opposition characterizes Croce’s antifascism? 
What is the essence of his being anti-fascist? Croce’s words on Giornale d ’Italia on 9
become [...]. It was from my need that my thinking came, as my need had come from my life at 
that time, and from my being fond of the things of the earth, of men, of dear companions and 
men I knew, and of companions I did not know, whose names were Vasco, Giansiro, Romano, 
Eusebio [...], and of those whose names I did not know yet [...]. Más hombre, I thought. I 
thought I had distinguished these two Spanish words from what the war in Spain was [...]; and, 
after all, my thinking was (nothing but) más hombre: nothing but más hombre, nothing more
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July 1924 (after Giacomo Matteotti’s attack and kidnapping on 10 June 1924, and 
before his corpse was found on 16 August 1924) recite: “Fascism could not and had not 
to be, in my opinion, but a bridge towards the resumption of a severer liberal regime... 
Time is needed to develop the process of transformation of Fascism”161.
But, this is the point: what is the difference between Croce’s attitude 
towards Fascism in 1924 and Heidegger’s towards Nazism in 1933 -  in favour of which 
he sided for a “restoration to health” and a “clarification” of the movement from the 
inside? In other words: in an “inversely” specular manner to Heidegger’s attitude -  
according to whom “Certainly it would have been difficult to gather all capable forces; 
difficult, too, to slowly influence the movement in its entirety and its position of power, 
but not more difficult than to bear the burden that we were consequently forced to 
bear”(QA 19) - , was Croce’s antifascism “sufficient”? Was his own the only way of 
being really responsible towards what was happening?
If we are allowed to say it, his being anti-fascist, in an essential sense, rises 
from the same principle on which Fascism is based, insofar as, also in Croce, the 
political fight is reduced, according to Vittorini’s words (Il bargello, 11 November 
1934), “to the old liberal formula «right-left»”, to the mere staying one against the other 
of two opposed poles that reach their own determination not from themselves, but 
thanks to their being against one another, thus displaying “a total lack of revolutionary 
[critical] sensibility and a formal spirit”. This is a mark, both for Liberalism and 
Fascism, and for Communism as well, of that arrogance which characterizes he who
constructed and more reasoned than más hombre, however not less rung than más hombre, drum 
and más hombre, cockcrow and más hombre, and tears and hope as más hombre” (D XX).
161 Writes Federico Chabod in his L ’Italia contemporanea (1918-1948) (Einaudi, 
Turin 1961): “How to interpret the events of the years preceding and ending with the so-called 
«march on Rome» (28 October 1922) and with the ascent to power of Fascism? What do the 
supporters of Fascism want? Dictatorship? A great industrialist declared: «We did not want 
dictatorship; we merely wanted Mussolini, once in power, to restore order and peace in the 
country. After that, we would have come back to the old system»./All this may also be true. But 
what is certain, and matters most, is something different. Few men inside the Government 
realized they were on the eve of a very dangerous adventure, in which Italy would be dragged 
for twenty years, up to the catastrophe. Giolitti’s case is exemplary” (pp. 66-67). Now, let us 
listen, in the same sense, to Croce’s words from a letter to Prof. S. Timpanaro (5 June 1923): 
“[...] as to me, Fascism is the contrary of Liberalism. However, when Liberalism degenerates as 
it did in Italy in the years between 1919 and 1922, and just an empty and repulsive mask of it 
remains, a period of suspension of freedom may be beneficial: beneficial, on condition that it
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wants “unconditionally himself, and that, as such, makes sure of himself, i.e., installs 
himself in a certainty of himself, in his own absolute positiveness” (SP 5). Heidegger 
writes in his 1942-1943 Winter Semester Course on Parmenides: “To think against 
something means to think like what one places oneself against” (H 238). At this stage: 
can we still see, in Heidegger’s mistake, a slavish attitude or, even, a criminal intention?
Let us now listen to Vittorini’s words in his writings related to his “editorial 
adventure” of Il Politecnico, the review he founded and directed from September 1945 
to December 1947, when it closed down. The starting period of Il Politecnico, that of 
the second post-war period, is far different from the immediately preceding one. Still, 
the project of this review is founded on the need of comprehending the past and the 
spiritual tradition of a people: according to Vittorini, the problems of “reconstruction”, 
after the end of the war and the fall of Fascism, do not concern “only the new which 
rises from the ruins of the old, but also the new which asserts itself against the old still 
alive”162. It is from this consciousness that Vittorini’s ethical and political reflection 
rise with regard to the role o f  knowledge in the life o f a community o f human beings -  
thus not, as it happened in many literary and critical writings, on the level o f a sectorial 
debate aiming at defending or accusing the literature o f the fascist regime. The words 
in his article on the first number of Il Politecnico (29 September 1945) are worth 
attention: “From what does culture take reason to elaborate its principles and its values? 
From the sight of what man is suffering in society. Man has suffered in society, man 
suffers. And what does culture make for such a man? It tries to give him consolation. 
For its way of consoling in which it has shown itself so far, culture has not been able to 
prevent the horrors of Fascism. [...]. Notwithstanding, shall we go on following the path
restores a more strict and conscious liberal regime” (Epistolario 1914-1935, Istituto Italiano per 
gli studi storici, Naples 1967).
162 Vittorini writes on Il bargello  (1937): “A frequent, very dangerous 
misunderstanding [...] occurs when we talk about «defence of civilization». Be careful not to 
include, under this formula, both something still and something growing. As though civilization 
were only in what has been done [...]. As though it were the position attained, and not mainly 
the one to attain. The still state of civilization, the fact of civilization, what civilization has 
attained is, mostly, but the death of civilization. [...]. I mean: also through fighting against 
barbarism, it gains. Rather, more than ever through fighting against barbarism. And if it stops, 
when it stops, it is not, mostly, because of barbaric invasions, but because of those who want to 
defend it [...]” (D 87).
169
the Thomas Manns and the Benedetto Croces are still showing us?”163. And again: 
“Could we ever have a culture able to protect man from sufferings, instead o f limiting 
itself to console him? A culture which prevents, which averts them, which helps 
eliminate exploitation and slavery, and beats need; this is the culture into which all the 
old culture has to transform. [...]. To take care of bread and labour still means to take 
care of the «soul»” (our italics).
Moreover: how about his at least peculiar way o f  meaning his own joining 
(not for ideological reasons) the Communist Party, that is to say o f being a communist? 
Vittorini writes: “Thus, I  did not give my assent to a philosophy [the Marxist one] by 
joining our Party. I  gave my assent to a fight and to men. I  knew what my Party was 
when I  saw how communists were [...]. They were the best o f all I  had ever known, and 
also the best in daily life, the most honest, the most serious, the most sensitive, the most 
determined and at the same time the most cheerful and lively. That is why I  wanted to 
join the Communist Party: to be with the only ones who were good and also 
courageous, and also non desperate, non disheartened, non insensitive, non void; to be 
with the only ones who had been fighting since then (in ‘41, in ‘42) and believed in their 
fight; to be with the only ones that, when arguing about a matter, argued as 
revolutionaries”.
And, how about the diriment debate started by Vittorini against 
Communism -  of which there is a trace in the brilliant Letter to Togliatti, at that time 
PCI secretary (Il Politecnico, n. 35, January-March 1947)? In fact, to be a Marxist, what 
does it mean? We can still see that line linking Heidegger’s and Vittorini’s engagement, 
joined by the common tension of, to say it with the latter’s words, “searchingfor truth”
-  and not o f possessing it in a definite way, whatever its “colour” may be?l6A Can we
163 A few paragraphs before Vittorini writes: “There is no crime being committed 
by Fascism that this culture had not long taught to abhor. And if Fascism could commit all the 
crimes this culture had long taught to abhor, should we not just ask this culture how and why 
Fascism could commit them? [...]. The Greek, Latin and Christian thought in any time seem to 
have given men nothing but the way of disguising and justifying, or even making technical, the 
barbarism of their own facts”.
164 Vittorini writes: “[...] I think that, to call me a Marxist it would not be enough if 
I completed my studies on Marxism and joined Marxism under every point and accepted it 
accordingly; that would be a passive and useless, non productive way of being a Marxist; and I 
think that, to call me a Marxist, I myself should be able to give Marxism something, and to
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not find in this attitude the reason for Heidegger’s giving up, on the one hand, of 
National Socialism in 1934 and Vittorini’s, on the other hand, of Communism in 1951?
Well: it is just this fight for truth which emerges, though differently, in both 
Vittorini’s and Heidegger’s whole lives. We mention, in this respect, the words with 
which Vittorini describes in a letter of his the extraordinary experience he had during 
the construction of a bridge at the time when we worked, as an assistant to works, with 
a road construction company in 1927: “Building a bridge is not the same as building a 
table or a house. If one starts, the works cannot be stopped until their completion [...]. 
[...]. If it starts raining, you need to be faster than the rain to both excavate and pump. 
And thus you work day and night with no more shifts, you do not think that one works 
to earn one’s bread, and instead you think of how you can win and succeed. It was just 
that which marked an epoch in me” (D 54).
By these words Vittorini mentions that trait which, alone, enlightens what 
every man, as such, can be at the climax of his possibilities: his “genius” 
(ingeniousness), meant as creative attitude in favour o f the truth o f his existence (Being 
in the world: contentious in-standing in the midst o f beings -  here is the way o f being a 
man which sets a political, human community). Is it not just inside this dimension that 
labour can take shape as an authentic educational moment in man’s life?165
As a consequence, according to Vittorini, the relationship between politics 
and culture cannot be understood in its intimate complexity if it is analysed according to 
a criterion influenced “by the interest of political action” -  and not by that of 
“knowledge” (L 212). To cite Vittorini’s words in his letter to Togliatti, the writer 
cannot be merely relegated to the role of “«playing the fife» for revolution”, that is to 
say, of putting himself to the service of a “truth” which is useful to an ideology:
enrich Marxism, to be myself the running water which flows into the running water of 
Marxism” (D 65).
165 It has to be noted that “genius”, according to Zaccaria’s interpretation (IGP 115­
116), is the translation of “G eist” (Spirit). Thanks to this translation, which springs from the 
possibility of “understanding the word «genius» starting from its root gen-, which means «to 
generate»”, man is caught as “constitutively inclined to generate in a broad sense, or to build 
and to dwell”. It is in this sense that Heidegger’s locution “Being in the world” reveals the 
“nature” of the possibility of an existence in its from time to time getting to the bottom of itself. 
Thus, here is the dimension inside which the possibilities of the institutive history of a man and 
of his people authentically take shape.
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“Revolutionary is the writer who succeeds, through his work, in putting revolutionary 
needs which are different from those o f  politics; internal, secret, hidden needs o f  man 
that he alone can perceive in him, which he, as a revolutionary writer, has to put, and 
puts close to the needs politics puts, puts in addition to the needs politics puts” (our 
italics). Continues Vittorini: “We know what happened, in every great revolution, 
between politics and culture, we know that, every time, poetry was arcadia; we know 
that culture became, every time, a maidservant of politics [...]. But Marxism holds 
words for which we are led to think that our revolution can be different from the others, 
and extraordinary. It may be such that culture does not stop or poetry does not fall into 
arcadia, and we should at least strive in this sense”.
Well: do we not find in these words the same fragile truth which leads 
Heidegger in the renowned Spiegel Gespräch [Spiegel interview] to believe that 
“«thought and poetry», despite all censure of this phrase” are “the actions that most 
provide us [i.e., a people, its history and destiny] with a measure” (QA 55)?166 In this 
perspective, the sense of what we are accustomed to calling “politics” shows itself as 
completely transfigured. In fact, were both Fascisms and Communism itself not 
exposed to the harmful risk offalling victim o f an “excess” ofpoliticization, insofar as 
truth was only interpreted in terms o f  what was useful (for a people)? Is this not, 
perhaps, the reason why Vittorini in 1936, when the Civil War broke out in Spain, 
invited through an article on Il bargello -  which caused his expulsion from the PNF -  
the Italian fascists to “get out of falsehood” and to support, as real revolutionaries, the 
Republicans against Franco? And thus: what is truth in the strict sense of the word? 
Writes Vittorini on Tempo presente in November 1956: “The considerations of political 
opportunity, if they imply a distortion of facts, always turn out, sooner or later, to the
166 It is necessary to state precisely that the expression “fragile truth” has been 
borrowed from Fédier (HP IX). By it, we want to say that it is suitable to the truth to be fragile -  
in the same sense in which Plato, as reported by Heidegger at the end of his Rektoratsrede (QA 
13), says: “All that is great stands in the storm” (Republic 497 d, 9). The fragile essence of 
philosophical and poetic truth can be disregarded to such an extent that no space is given to 
philosophy and art. If we are allowed to say it: are, thus, censure policies, as adopted by 
totalitarian regimes, only a more striking form of the same evil instinct with which suspicion is 
still preventing the patience of listening? Who assures that art shows itself and may be known 
through the experiments made ready by aesthetic critics and by its most advanced interpretive 
techniques?
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detriment of the political party in favour of which they are made. This because, sooner 
or later, the party itself is compelled (if it wants to survive) to get out of the arid arena 
of falsehood; and then, if everything has been falsehood, everything falls down”.
§ 4. Introduction to Rektoratsrede. The University and the destiny o f the German 
people: the essence o f knowledge and man’s Being in the world
“According to man’s history and experience, 
at least as far as I know, all what is essential and great 
has only derived from the fact that man had a homeland 
(Heimat) and was rooted in a tradition”. (EP 259)
It is difficult for us, nowadays, with “hindsight”, to look at the period that 
saw Europe dominated by Nazism without any prejudice. But: is it possible to find a 
criminal attitude in Heidegger’s thought? Or, rather, is his thought an invitation to think 
deeply about the condition o f modern man? In our opinion, in fact, man’s interpretation 
as Dasein is far from stating any superiority of a race: never could the racial element 
exhaust the sense of the guiding-word through which Heidegger succeeds in identifying 
the constituent trait of man’s existence, of the sense of his Being. Thus, is the 
expression “Nazi philosopher” -  often linked to Heidegger’s name -  not nonsense, the 
same as talking of a “square circle”?167
Now, we had better go on more slowly. With this object in view, let us take 
a step back and try to give the question “what did Heidegger really want?” a first 
answer. Guided by Fédier’s and Heidegger’s words, we may say: “What [Heidegger] 
wanted was a revolution o f the German University, which could make it suitable for
167 In this sense, the revolution of the University system, as fostered by Heidegger, 
soon became an element of disturbance inside the total planning made ready by Nazism. 
Heidegger writes: “My joining of the Party remained simply a matter of form insofar as the 
Party leadership had no intention of consulting me in discussions of questions pertaining to the 
university, culture, and education. During the entire time of my rectorate, I never participated in 
any deliberation or discussion, let alone in the decision-making, of the Party leadership and of 
the various Party organs. The university remained suspect, but at the same time it was used for 
purposes of cultural propaganda” (QA 25).
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educating «the future leaders and guardians o f  the destiny o f the German people»” (H 
158-159, our italics).
Now, we should understand the meaning of each word making part of the 
cited sentence, as in it the one and only objective Heidegger set to himself in the 
moment when he became rector is said in a particularly effective and lucid way. We 
should not forget, in fact, that Heidegger himself was well aware of the risks he was 
taking by accepting the task: here lie his non-automatic confidence towards those who 
held the political power and his uncertainty towards the real capabilities and intentions 
of the University -  as “the seat of the spiritual legislation of a people” -  to want itself, 
to find its own essence.
In other words: according to Heidegger, the University should have become 
the place where, thanks to the joint work o f  teachers and students, the enquiring 
reflection takes place in respect o f  the authentic chances opened to the (German) 
people as one o f those that gives shape to (Western) history. Heidegger writes: “we 
were able to think what was coming, that is to say, we attempted to face it in our 
confrontation with it” (QA 18). The truth that is searched inside the University is not the 
one of a party doctrine or of a chief who imposes in an authoritarian way the law to 
which the people is subjected. Rather, it springs from the common work between “those 
who lead” and “those who follow”, according to the attitude of that strife Heidegger 
himself is talking about in his Rektoratsrede -  a strife meant not as a disagreement 
between two opposing positions that aim at destroying each other in order to dominate 
in an absolute way, but as a concentration that insists on the stupefying familiarity with 
what is essential. A fight in which, in the mutual exercise o f  asking, the two opponents 
succeed in understanding phenomenologically what knowledge means and in giving the 
destiny o f their people a configuration; better: (they succeed) in educating the future 
leaders and guardians of the destiny of a people -  and, thus, in contributing that a 
people may square itself in itself, that is to say, in favour o f its own destiny. The matter 
is to think of that task which starts and puts a people inside its history -  as the spiritual 
tradition that enjoins a people to enter its own destiny -: a mission. “History” here has 
to be meant not only as the sum of the events that take place chronologically, but as the
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articulation of those major decisions that spring out of the strife a people starts with 
itself, in order to be up to the task it is called to, and to which it has to correspond by re­
inventing it from time to time. In the light of the menace impending on Western 
peoples, “destiny” does not mean mere fatality, but rather: responsibility, wait and 
preparation for a future, for a new beginning (see supra, chap. 1, § 3).168
But where can we find the scale for this beginning? By no means in an 
arbitrary decision -  but rather in “the need of taking root” (in a homeland and in a 
tradition), from which alone that truth of the existence may arise, which pushes a people 
to be up to its own spiritual mission in the world. Thinking of Simone Weil, Fédier 
writes in this respect: “To take root is perhaps the most important and non­
acknowledged need of the human soul. It is one of the most difficult to define. The 
human being has his root for he takes part in a real, active and natural way in the 
existence of a community which takes care and keeps alive some treasures o f the past 
and some presentiments o f the future” (H 211, our italics).
Well, are preserving and leading not the noblest tasks of education? 
Heidegger writes: “I believed that the university, renewing itself starting from itself, 
might also be called to significantly participate in the inner self-collection of the people, 
giving it a decisive measure and orientation” (QA 17, translation slightly modified). 
Only in this light can the meeting that took place on 22 January 1934 at the auditorium 
of the University of Freiburg appear in its truth: “six hundred former unemployed 
workers, reintegrated into work [...], were received to become the first participants in a 
sort of popular University” (EP 303).
The research carried out inside the University cannot be thought of any 
longer as “intellectual labour” -  to which “manual labour” is set against: according to 
Heidegger’s intentions, the purpose is, for every German citizen, either a university
168 Vittorini writes in August 1937 on Letteratura: “ [...] history seems to have 
committed itself to justify everything that has happened as necessary and logical. [...]. But it is 
very dangerous that, later on, we draw out of it [...] a sort of doctrinal belief in the need, in the 
fate of the things that are happening. A belief like that halts man and diverts him away from 
fight. And then the course of events, no more resting on man’s activity, rests on itself, and evil 
may even last forever. [...]. In conclusion, that apparent fatality of progress is in ourselves who 
fight, until we go on fighting; and it does not take place thanks to a strength outside ourselves; 
[...]” (D 90-91).
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student or a worker or a farmer, “to become strong, in order to fully and rightfully exist 
as a compatriot inside the German community” (EP 137). The spiritual community, 
according to its more authentic sense, is founded on the mutual task which invites each 
man, of whatever “social position” and profession he may be, to assume his own 
responsibility in respect of the building-up of the future of the (German) people: it is 
feeling themselves bound, each according to one’s own measure, with “clarity and 
resolution” (EP 140), in the fight for the essential. Here is, thus, what the University 
revolution consists of: a revolution of knowing, insofar as the latter is no longer a strict 
prerogative of the so-called educated classes. The expression “knowledge” takes in this 
context a new sense: “In fact to know means: to recognize each other and meet in the 
world where we are placed, both all together and each o f us individually” (EP 139, our 
italics)169.
This is a surprising sentence, as it diverges from the most common 
interpretations. Here everything becomes more radical in comparison with that 
semblance of knowledge in which learning falls; knowledge, here, means: “in the 
decision and in the way of going on, to be up to the task we are assigned from time to 
time” (EP 139). Now: thus, what do “truth” and “to think” mean? In other words, in the 
light of Sein und Zeit: what does being a man mean? Heidegger recites: “Decisive, for 
knowledge, is not the variety and the extent of what we know, but only i f  it has 
originally grown, and thus rooted; i f  it is oriented towards our sphere o f existence and 
if, when acting and comporting, we are responsible for it” (EP 139, our italics).
The knowledge Heidegger is talking about does belong a priori neither to 
the so-called “cultivated class”, nor to a given social class, or to a given race, or in an 
exclusive way to a people over all the others, or to a single man (Hitler, fo r instance),
169 On the subject, see Safranski’s interpretation, according to whom, in this 
episode, “Philosophical ecstasy has been replaced by the mystique of the people’s community” 
(op. cit., p. 261): “However, as Heidegger cannot leave the unemployed standing amid the 
questionability of Being-in-the-world as a form of the knowledge the Volksgenosse needs [...], 
he must offer and provide some specific help. This speech betrays the difficulties he has with 
this. He cannot think of the right words. So he speaks of what they should know [...]” (op. cit., 
p. 260). Now: it is just “what is necessary to know” the element in favour of which that “fight of 
the whole people in trouble for itself” (EP 118) takes place -  fight as the fundamental 
disposition of that race of “rigorous men, free from egotistic thoughts” (EP 146), who “live to 
put themselves constantly to a test, having as their sole purpose the one to which they are totally 
committed” (EP 146).
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or even to a single party. After reporting a passage from the text of a conference held on 
13 November 1935 entitled Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, in which Heidegger writes: 
“Races and ethnic groups take strength only when, joining the unity of a people, take 
possession of their task, that is to say, when they become historical looking at the 
future” - , Fédier comments: “I do not think I am wrong when I say that this statement is 
an explicit critique to Nuremberg racial laws, insofar as they just aimed at levelling the 
people with the exclusion of any foreign «blood», whereas Heidegger maintains the 
plurality of origins and of «nations» just from the beginning, that is to say, the 
irreducibility of natural differences, their incapability of accounting for a people, as they 
are determined by history, namely by Spirit [genius]” (H 167).
Thus, how can we only doubt that Heidegger was an anti-Semite? Is it not 
just on the door of his hut in the Black Forest that we can read Solomon’s saying: 
“Watch over your heart, as life springs out of it”? What “evil genius” could deceive a 
man in such a perverse way as to let such a noble thought rise in him, against an 
assumed criminal heart?
In the same way, any speech that aims at interpreting the attention devoted 
to a people and its essence in terms of “popular culture” or “folklore” should appear as 
devoid of any foundation. Let us think about the frequent references in the Politische 
Schriften to the Black Forest: if only we could listen (with less irritation) to Heidegger’s 
words when addressing his students at the University of Freiburg on 26 May 1933 in 
memory of A.L. Schlageter, who died “in the name of the German people and its State, 
his eyes stared at the Alemannic land”: “Freiburg student, let the strength of the home 
mountains of this hero foster and pervade your will” -  “they have long given their mark 
on the rigour of will” (EP 115)! Can we still reduce the love for Alemannic homeland to 
a “provincial” feeling? Does the simplicity of peasant life have anything to teach us 
today, in the epoch of the economic conception of labour? In this respect, Fédier writes: 
“It may thus be understood as the interest for peasant labour [...] is so easily deemed as 
the sign of an out-of-date, or even obscurantist, spirit” (EP 306)170.
170 With regard to the guiding-word “popular”, whose sense appears to be 
absolutely misunderstood inside the National Socialist propagandistic jargon, it is worth reading 
Fédier’s notes n. 3 (EP 288-289) and n. 22 (EP 297-298). How much the access to the meaning
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Now, let us pay attention to the (already quoted) magnificent writing of 
autumn 1933 entitled Warum bleiben wir in der Provinz? (EP 147-153), where 
mountains, valleys and forests constitute the frame, within which the history of a 
community of men and the destiny of each of them, involved in their job, mutually 
settle. The philosopher and the peasants, their common decent existence, their labour... 
gently, mildly, attuned and shaped by the “centuries old, un-replaceable and rooted 
taking place and living in the Swabian-Alemannic land” (EP 151). What, thus, is at 
stake in Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933 -  to such an extent that he interpreted 
his commitment as a necessity and a mission? Let us start a meditated reading of 
Rektoratsrede.
§ 5. Notes for a comment on Rektoratsrede. A four-stage appeal to Germany: 
“Intention to found the essence o f the university in a primordial manner” (A 17)
a) The revolution of the essence of knowledge as 
re-establishment of an immediate relation with the (Greek) question of Being
Let us take as the problematic crux for our considerations the text Heidegger 
delivered on the occasion of the official ceremony of his installation in office as the new 
rector of the University of Freiburg in Breisgau (27 May 1933). There are two reasons 
for this choice:
of this word was already precluded in 1913 -  namely, well before Hitler’s ascent - ,  emerges 
from a passage by the French poet Charles Péguy (1873-1914): “Today, when we talk of the 
people, we make a caricature, a poor caricature, even an empty one, devoid as it is of any 
content: we only make a political caricature, and a parliamentary caricature. But when there 
were Michelet and those of his sort to talk about the people, it was reality that took shape, a 
reality they had lived and of which they were part. Well, we have known the same reality, the 
same people; just the same in which we were raised. It is just that people we have known: at the 
height of its manifestations, in its whole vitality, in all its race, in its beautiful and free 
creativity. [...]. Nobody will ever know how great and deep the decency and spiritual integrity 
of that people were; we will never find such a great tact, such a profound civilisation. And not 
even the same refinement and discretion in talking” (Sixième cahier de la quatorzième série -  
L ’argent, in Oeuvres en prose complètes III, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris 1992, 
pp. 788-789). At this stage, Heidegger’s words in 1937 should become more comprehensible: 
“It is possible to close the ranks around the University [...mainly against] the new positivistic 
objectives: the study of folklore, prehistory, geopolitics, the doctrine of races, etc. [...]” (EP 
147).
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1) the date when the speech was delivered is emblematic, as it follows 
Hitler’s and his Party’s “rise to power” in January 1933171. In this sense this text clearly 
reveals the targets of the project in favour of which Heidegger made up his mind, 
“directly” taking part in the political debate of those years.172 The fact that Heidegger’s 
commitment to Hitler’s National Socialism cannot be reduced to fanaticism -  as appears 
in this speech and in all his “political writings” between 1933 and 1934 (see, in 
particular, Allocutions and articles, EP 111-146) - , is a question which casts a new light 
on Heidegger’s project, thanks to which the sense of his engagement and, 
symmetrically, of his mistake appears to be far more radical than what we are used to 
acknowledging. So, what did Heidegger want?
2) The French edition of Heidegger’s Politische Schriften, edited by Fédier, 
collects texts between 1933 and 1966 (the date of the renowned interview granted to the 
Spiegel): the whole of these texts, in fact, according to the editor’s intentions, is nothing 
but a selection: other texts, in fact, could rightly have been included in it.173
171 See E.Nolte, I  presupposti storici del nazionalsocialismo e la “presa del 
potere” del gennaio 1933, Marinotti, Milan 1998; ID, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. 
N ationalsozialism us und Bolschew ism us, Ullstein, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 1987; ID, 
Streitpunkte, Ullstein, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 1993.
172 At this stage, it is worth pointing out that Fédier’s P reface  to Politische 
Schriften is mainly dedicated to clarify Germans’ and Europe’s political and spiritual condition: 
let us think about, for instance, the consequences of the Versailles Treaty (1919), which Alain, 
Simone Weil’s master, defined as a “wild peace”, and in the bosom of which Fascism in Italy 
and National Socialism in Germany were born (see E. Nolte, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, 
Piper & Co. Verlag, München 1963; R. De Felice, Mussolini il fascista. La conquista del potere 
[1921-1925], Einaudi, Turin 1966). Moreover, it is of the utmost importance to understand how 
Hitler was perceived in 1933-34, not only in Germany, but also all over the bourgeois-Western 
world: let us think of the renowned Hitler’s “Peace Address” on 17 May 1933 which, according 
to Fédier, “was understood at that time as the sincere witness of a will to smooth out the 
international tension” (EP 293). Is it still possible to assume that one who joined National 
Socialism in 1933 “implicitly” gave his assent to the “industrial” massacre of men as made 
further on in extermination camps? To this regard J.M. Palmier writes: “The regime that Nazism 
would inaugurate was more or less something unknown and unimaginable; to mention Ludwig 
Marcuse’s expression, it was not less inconceivable, as a system, than the one that an atomic 
explosion before Hiroshima could mean” (H 37). The hypothesis leading our interpretation is 
that Heidegger, according to Fédier, undoubtedly “committed himself to Hitler -  and he was 
heavily wrong about it -  but not for the National Socialist Party programme or the Nazi world 
view” (EP 298). On this subject, please refer to the Appeal to students -  3 November 1933 (EP 
117-118).
173 It is worth mentioning that, on the occasion of Gadamer’s one hundredth 
anniversary of birth, Klostermann, the editor in charge of the publication of Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe, published a volume (HGA 16) entitled Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines 
Lebensweges (1910-1976). Therein, almost all texts which are present in the Politische Schriften 
are included. On the other hand, it has to be pointed out that two whole sections of this volume
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Well, what counts most is to understand the unitary sense of Heidegger’s 
reflection over a period of more than thirty years (if not more!). It is our hypothesis that 
we can approach it thanks to a remark made by Fédier with respect to the title he 
himself gave this collection of texts: Political writings. In other words: assuming that 
Heidegger has never written any treatise of (science of) politics -  to the point that in this 
selection of texts some essays do not seem to have immediate connection with the 
political question, in the technical sense of the term -  what does “politics” mean here? 
Fédier writes: “I have long hesitated before giving this book the title «Political 
Writings». The meaning we are usually content to give this word -  we that, accustomed 
to comfortably living in an atmosphere of «liberal democracy», have become so little 
responsible as to deem that politics is, after all, a politicians’ affair - ,  this meaning is 
now so empty to only evoke a more or less tenacious controversy between equally 
defensible «points of view», as they are expressed within an almost natural assent. But 
the real politics, the one that the thought and the action of some outstanding examples 
let us guess in the course of history, implies something quite different and, in particular, 
quite a different attitude: in fact, the matter is to exist inside a dimension in which each 
one, by attending and taking part, has his place in the existence o f a community, which 
is something different from any natural community -  a historical community, which 
immediately ceases to exist as such i f  the inheritance that constitutes its sense is not 
expressly assumed, namely, if it is not received in such a way as to transform the heirs, 
in unpredictable ways, into new starters in the frame o f the same history” (EP 44-45, 
our italics).
But, a few lines ahead, he goes on like that: “It may seem monstrous of 
Heidegger to have outlined this political ideal just when Nazism was gaining ground”.
But -  and this is the turning point: “[...] just when Nazism was stretching 
out its tentacles over the whole society, was it not, rather, a duty, for all those who
are dedicated to the rectorate period; in particular: III. Rektor der Freiburger Universität (1933­
1934) -  a good 121 documents; IV. Professor im dritten Reich (1934-1945) -  26 documents. Of 
remarkable interest to our purposes also appears to be Section V. Bereinigung und Lehrverbot, 
inside which the fundamental Das Rektorat. Tatsachen und Gedanken (EP 215-238) is to be 
found.
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hoped something different, to explain what a legitimate revolution should have been?” 
(EP 45).
No doubt! And it is just this duty, as we are going to see, that inspires the 
much execrated Rektoratsrede from beginning to end. In fact, according to Heidegger, it 
gives “an exposition of the essence of knowing and science; the [German] university is 
to be grounded on that essence [...]” (QA 20). Indeed, the legitimacy174 of a revolution, 
which concerns the destiny of the whole humanity, is founded just on the radical nature 
of this project, insofar as it can face and resist the impending menace on itself. As this 
menace does not cease with the danger represented by the historically determined form 
of National Socialism. In this sense the revolution of knowing, as planned by 
Heidegger, appears to be as the most radical form of political revolution.
At this stage, we could interpret Heidegger’s assumed silence after 1945 in 
quite a different way. In fact, was it not just the mistake of 1933 to direct Heidegger 
towards a radical re-thinking of his own project? Re-thinking, in this case, should not be 
interpreted, according to Fédier, as a “change of course”, but as a “change of 
navigation” (HP 232), which goes deeper and deeper into the comprehension of that 
menace before which humanity (still) finds itself, namely, that of “falling down into 
inhumanity” (H 239). Fédier writes: “The historical setback of the rectorate is an 
enormous setback. In a given sense, Heidegger’s thought shattered against it -  but not 
as his opponents (be they Nazi or Anti-nazi) would suspect. In touch with the cruelty of 
this reality, all that had kept some firmness shattered. After 1934, Heidegger’s wholly 
freed thought has become more and more capable of saying and thinking of what our 
times and our world are” (RV 231).
In the same way, are his courses between 1934 and 1944 not a sign of a 
“singular, non violent, with no immediate effects, exclusively thinking, non ideological 
at all” (RV 232) endurance? What does “to think” mean here, and what do thought and 
philosophy have to do with a revolution? Fédier writes: “Heidegger’s mistake consists
174 Let us think of the expression “self defence”, according to which there is no 
punishment for one who committed the fact because he was compelled by the need to defend his 
or someone else’s right against the present danger of an unjust offence.
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in thinking that a spiritual mobilization could have constituted an effective 
counterbalance to an ideological mobilization” (EP 299)175.
According to Fédier, the extent of Heidegger’s mistake consists, at the 
moment of his decision, on the one hand, in undervaluing the rise to power (and its 
blighting strengthening) of Nazism and, on the other, in overvaluing the University’s 
will to be up to its own task. Both these aspects made it possible, in the same 
proportion, the disaster the whole world had to face. Why, thus, is the “lack of courage” 
of the University world so easily forgotten? Is the root of that same evil -  namely, 
Nihilism - , which committed an incommensurable crime against humanity, not 
inscribed in it? And it is, in fact, just starting from this question that Heidegger, as 
rector of a University, hoped -  in vain -  to start, through his own action as a 
philosopher, a real revolution. In the middle of the extreme danger, he addresses his 
appeal to the (German) people to “stand up”, to resist the menace coming from the 
uprooting in which modern man lives with regard to his destiny and to philosophical 
and scientific truth. Heidegger writes in Das Rektorat. Tatsachen und Gedanken -  a text 
that, in our opinion, can well serve as countermelody and, for us, as a decisive 
introduction to the comprehension of Rektoratsrede: “What is essential is that we are in 
the midst of the consummation of nihilism, that God is «dead», and every time-space 
for the godhead is covered. The surmounting o f nihilism nevertheless announces itself in 
German poetic thinking and singing. The Germans, admittedly, still have the least
175 Let us look at what Heidegger says in connection with his university teaching 
after April 1934: “But in the following years even teaching was more of a conversation of 
essential thinking with itself. Perhaps it touched and awakened people here and there, but it did 
not shape into a developing structure of a definite conduct, which might in turn have given rise 
to something primordial” (QA 29). Is this proof of Heidegger’s fault? What about the sense of 
these words, should Heidegger’s mistake be freed from prejudices and ignominy? Should we 
agree with Heidegger’s hypothesis, according to which man would have acted too much for 
centuries and thought too little, we would start discerning the nature of that “change of 
navigation” made by Heidegger in his thought: on this subject, let us think of the philosophical 
questions faced during university courses after 1934 (in particular: the Pre-Socratics and Being 
as physis -  Hölderlin, poetry and the question of language -  Nietzsche and nihilism). What 
about all this, in the light of the 1989 publication of the fundamental Beiträge zur Philosophie. 
(Vom Ereignis) (HGA 65, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1989; Engl. Trans. Contributions to 
Philosophy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1999) -  a work that, according to the 
German editor von Hermann, marks “a revolution in the history of Heidegger’s D enkw eg  
reception and effects; [...] on the basis of Beiträge, all Heidegger’s texts starting from the early 
thirties have to be thought of in deep [...] just because Beiträge  give the last perspective in 
which those texts were written” (IGP 10)?
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understanding of this poetry, because they are striving to adapt themselves to the 
standards of the nihilism that surrounds them and thus to misjudge the essence of a 
historical self-assertion” (QA 29, our italics).
Now, let us take a step back and try to give the question a possible answer: 
what is the “nature” of the revolution Heidegger is thinking about? We must at once 
clarify that here the word “revolution” assumes a meaning which is different from the 
one we are accustomed to giving it, that is to say, in Marxist-Leninist terms. Indeed, by 
this expression Heidegger identifies the principle which gathers the essence of every 
form (political, social, economical...) of revolution, as if  the upheaval caused by the 
revolution itself shifts from its roots the essence itself of man’s destiny: a revolution o f  
the spirit, o f  the genius -  “to overthrow all ways of representation” (Hölderlin). Is it not 
the only “escape” for humanity to save itself from the menace of nihilism? It is in this 
very sense that the revolution as thought o f by Heidegger at a philosophical level has to 
be meant -  i.e. in the light o f the question o f Being and time -  in terms o f  Dasein.
Now, having witnessed a firs t and, further on, a Second World War, 
Heidegger writes: “Was there not, then, enough reason and essential distress to think 
in primordial reflection toward an overcoming of the metaphysics of the will to power, 
and that means to begin a confrontation with Western thinking by returning to its 
beginning? Was there not, then, enough reason and essential distress to attempt, for the 
sake o f this reflection on the spirit o f  the Western world, to awaken and lead into battle, 
here in Germany, that place that was considered the seat o f  the cultivation o f  
knowledge and insight -  the German university?” (QA 18, our italics).
Here is the revolutionary project, so to speak, in its breadth and depth, 
according to which Heidegger decided his own political engagement -  project which 
seems to emerge from a merely philosophical need, and the features of which we find in 
his works well before 1933.176 In fact, the debate with Western thought consists of the
176 As mentioned by Fédier (EP 42), Heidegger’s first Freiburg courses already 
face the question of the essence of the University. In particular, see M. Heidegger, Anhang: 
Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums (SS 1919), in Zur Bestimmung 
der Philosophie, HGA 56/57, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1987 (Engl. Trans. Towards a 
Definition o f  Philosophy, Athlone Press, London 2000); ID., P h ä n o m e n o lo g isc h e  
Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung  (WS 
1921/1922), HGA 61, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1985 (Part Two, Chap. 2). With regard to
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need (and urgency) of overcoming Metaphysics -  it should be remembered that, 
according to Fédier, the 1936-1941 essay entitled Überwindung der Metaphysik 
[Overcoming metaphysics] could have been part of the selection of texts which 
constitute the “political writings” - , and this thanks to a resumption of its inception: the 
Greeks! It is not by chance, in fact, that Fédier writes that “Heidegger means the 
«revolution» as the enterprise able to re-establish an immediate relation with what 
constituted the Greek beginning” (HP 231).
Here, thus, the “nature” of Heidegger’s endurance towards National 
Socialism is made clear: is it not in this very sense that Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Nazism in 1935, as the “encounter of technology in its planetary agreement with man as 
subject” (RV 231), appears in all its radicalism? In fact, it is Heidegger himself who 
says, in connection with the need of overcoming Metaphysics: “But I say that traditional 
metaphysics’ way of thinking, which ends with Nietzsche, no longer offers us any 
possibility to experience the fundamental characteristics of the technological age, an age 
that is only beginning, through thinking” (QA 59).
b) Structure of the following parts of the chapter
Now, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks in connection with 
the structure we are going to give the following parts of this chapter: after presenting 
the core of the whole Rektoratsrede, through our sub-paragraphing -  which will make 
the thematic organization of the text clear -  and a comment on every stage, the matter 
will be, on the basis of this preparatory work, to bring to light, according to Fédier’s and 
Zaccaria’s precise suggestions, the sense of the title given by Heidegger to his own text. 
Thanks to that, it will be possible to have a first comprehension of the background of 
the whole Address, in the bosom of which lies that joint work of teachers and students 
around the foundation of that essential knowledge which preserves and leads a people 
and the humanity. It will be just the reflection on the spirit which joins “those who lead”
this topic, please refer to C. Strube, Wissenschaft wieder als Lebenswelt: Heideggers 
ursprüngliche Idee einer Universitätsreform. Für Klaus Held zur Emeritierung, in Heidegger 
Studies, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2003.
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to “those who follow” that will open the space for new considerations -  under the 
guidance of Simone Weil (1909-1943) and of Adalbert Stifter’s poetical work (1805­
1868) -  on the essence of education and labour (in particular, on the link between 
manual and intellectual labour) and on their relationship as the trait giving shape to a 
true human community (see infra, §§ 6-7). At that stage, our writing will be considered 
as temporarily concluded, but not really exhausted, in the hope that the considerations 
made in this last chapter send back to the first two, in a unitary and triple glance at the 
phenomenon from which Sein und Zeit starts: the question o f  Being as that o f the 
difference between Being and being.
*
Let us start the first section of our work with a basic remark: Rektoratsrede 
must be perceived as an appeal being addressed by Heidegger to the German people (in 
particular to its University world) in favour of an original essential foundation of the 
University, the latter meant as the seat of knowledge. The matter is to single out the 
elements that make us understand in what sense, thus, the reflection on the essence of 
the University takes a decisive role in determining the constituent foundations of a 
political community. Which revolution could have caught in the most essential way the 
need for a necessary taking root of the whole (German) people in its own destiny, but 
the one that wanted to pay attention since its inception to the phenomenon that 
constitutes the existence of every man, his Being in the world: the relation of man to the 
truth (Wahrheit as alèthéia)? Assuming that the University is willing to take charge of 
this task, its own is a real spiritual mission! -  at the time of that national and social 
revolution which was perceived, as Fédier writes, “at that time -  though it is almost 
unconceivable for us - , as an upheaval that would at least partially set free” (RV 231).
Now, let us present the paragraphs as mentioned above, in the hope that the 
unitary sense of Rektoratsrede may emerge, thanks to the highlighting of the mutual
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reference among its fundamental traits. In this sense the text, which consists of 46 
paragraphs, can be subdivided into four stages177.
First stage. The will of the essence of University and the destiny (Dasein) of 
the people: towards the (Greek) essence of scientific knowledge. The difference 
between philosophy and science [paragraphs 1-10];
Second stage. The Greek beginning (theoria) as injunction -  “the passion 
for asking” (polemos: Auseinandersetzung) -  which transforms the present-day build-up 
of knowledge: the thought of the question of Being as the trait which founds and 
collects the spiritual world of a people [paragraphs 11-20];
Third stage. The rigorous (and responsible) fight for the essence of the 
University and of scientific knowledge: the task that joins teachers and students before 
the destiny of the entire German people and its State. Students’ obligations and services 
[paragraphs 21-40];
Fourth stage. Urgency and responsibility of a historical decision in favour of 
the original essence of the University (as the seat of the spiritual legislation of a people) 
[paragraphs 41-46].
c) Comment on the first stage.
The University: the essence of knowledge and the destiny of a people
From the title of this first stage, we can appreciate the decisive relationship 
between the German University and the destiny of the German people. It is thanks to the 
understanding of the extreme urgency of the destiny of the German people that a new 
will may arise, from both the teachers and the students, to determine the essence of the 
University. The urgency we are talking about is not only represented by Hitler’s rise to 
power: the problem Heidegger is talking about is even more serious, as the spiritual
177 Right from the beginning we mention a comment by Heidegger from Das 
Rektorat 1933/34. Tatsachen und Gedanken: “The heart of the address serves the explanation of 
the essence of knowing, science, and profession that is based on a training in science. Four 
major points should be singled out with respect to content: 1) The grounding of the sciences in 
the experience of the essential area of their subject matter; 2) The essence of truth as the letting 
be of what is, as it is; 3) Preservation of the tradition of the beginning of Western knowledge in 
the Greek world; 4) In keeping with this, the responsibility of the Western world” (QA 20).
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crisis of European humanity has deeper roots. Now, at stake, there is man, the sense o f  
his existence: in short, the truth o f his world and o f his knowledge.
In this perspective Heidegger appears to us, to say it with Fédier’s words, “a 
real son of his time” (H 174). So, the debate about the sense of scientific knowledge 
springs out of it, in such a radical way as to have Heidegger saying: “Should there still 
be science for us in the future, or should we let it drift it toward a rapid end?” (QA 6).
It is worth noticing that the objective is not to eliminate scientific 
knowledge; rather, it is to contribute to re-determine the foundations and limits of every 
scientific interpretation of the world. In fact, Heidegger writes: “It is never 
unconditionally necessary that science should be at all. But if there should be science 
and if it should be fo r  us and through us, then under what condition can it truly exist?”
(QA 6).
Now -  insofar as the University is, according to its own essence, that high 
school whose task is to educate, just starting from the build-up of scientific knowledge 
and through it, the future leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German people -  it 
is decent to ask ourselves: what about the University in 1933?
Let us listen to Heidegger’s words in his 1929 essay entitled Was ist 
Metaphysik? -  from which it emerges how the root of the crisis of European humanity 
has become the main question inside his thought well before Hitler’s rise to power. 
Heidegger writes: “Our Dasein -  as members of a community of scientists, teachers, 
and students -  is determined by science. What essential thing is happening to us at the 
foundation of our existence, assuming science has become our passion? The areas of the 
sciences lie far apart. The ways they treat their subject matter are fundamentally 
different. This disintegrated multiplicity of the disciplines is only held together today by 
the technical organization of the universities and faculties and only retains some 
meaning because of the practical purposes set for the departments. However, the roots 
o f the sciences in their essential ground have died [our italics]” (QA 15-16).
And again, a bit further on: “It [the German university] was to renew itself 
starting from its essential ground, which is precisely the essential ground of the 
sciences, that is to say from the essence of truth itself; and, instead of persisting in a
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technical organizational-institutional pseudo-unity, it was to regain the primordial vital 
unity of those who question and those who know” (QA 16).
This is the spirit of Heidegger’s political commitment in favour of the need 
and urgency of a renewed attention towards the foundation linking man to his world: the 
essence of truth! Here is a revolution of thought which can root man in the heart of his 
more essential possibilities and, in our case, determine the task of the University as the 
seat of (scientific) knowledge, insofar as teachers and students, together, cooperate in 
the joint research work in guiding their people to be up to its spiritual destiny, that is to 
say, as Simone Weil says, to “guard and keep alive some treasures of the past and some 
presentiments of the future” (H 211). Thus, is this not the reason why Heidegger 
interprets the task of the University as a spiritual mission that, in an inexorable way, 
“forces the destiny of the German people into the shape of its history” (QA 5)?
The matter is, at this point, to understand what the sense of referring to 
Greek philosophy is. Our hypothesis is that we can approach it, on condition that -  on 
the basis o f the question o f Being -  the constituent difference between philosophy and 
science clearly emerges. And more precisely: to the purpose of our research, it is 
imperative to understand in what sense and how philosophical truth constitutes the very 
foundation of scientific knowledge (only in this perspective can the phenomenon of the 
“dispersion” of scientific knowledge be realized in its problematic aspect): “All science 
is philosophy, whether it knows and wills it -  or not” (QA 7).
According to this point of view, Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein as 
“care” (Sorge) of Being itself (BT § 41) appears to be as the re-established assumption 
of the spiritual disposition which gave rise to Greek philosophy, insofar as: “there, for 
the first time, Western man rises up, from the unity of a people and by means of his 
language, against the totality o f what is and questions and comprehends it as the being 
that it is” (QA 7, translation slightly modified).
This is the reason why the University and the people under its guidance 
have to place themselves again “under the power of the beginning of our spiritual- 
historical Dasein” (QA 6), if they want to unravel the destiny they are delivered to.
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d) Comment on the second stage.
The question of Being as ground of the spiritual world of a people
As in the first stage, it is necessary to clarify its title. Let us analyse the first 
part of it, which recites: “The Greek beginning (theoria) as an injunction which 
revolutionizes the contemporary build-up of knowledge”. Two are the guiding 
objectives of our interpretation: 1) to comprehend the Greek initial essence of scientific 
knowledge through analysing the meaning of the Greek key-word theoria; 2) to 
comprehend in what sense and how the Greek beginning may constitute, nowadays, an 
injunction which revolutionizes (both) the build-up (and the teaching) of scientific 
knowledge.
With reference to the first aspect, we can say: by theoria the Greek 
beginning names that glance which takes the phenomenon of beings as a whole -  the 
phenomenon of the being qua being - , in the manner not of a staring which is content 
with mere contemplation, but of that “passion to remain close to and under the pressure 
of what is” (QA 7). This “passion” is the fundamental disposition that reveals man at 
the climax of his possibilities, insofar as, by rooting him in his own world and letting 
him perceive the fragile sense of his own existence, shapes his knowledge and way of 
acting, on the basis of his corresponding, from time to time, to the rooting power of 
astonishment before the being in its Being. This is what Heidegger, under Aristotle’s 
guidance, names man’s actual, active “being at work”: Da-sein.
Again: in order to clarify the meaning o f the expression “beings as a 
whole”, Heidegger presents a sentence by Aeschylus’ Prometheus -  who, at the time o f  
the Greeks, was considered the first philosopher -: “Knowing, however, is far weaker 
than necessity” (QA 7). What does this sentence disclose, in view o f the understanding 
o f the Greek interpretation o f  the phenomenon o f Being? What does this consciousness 
o f the “lim it” o f  knowledge show compared with the “ultra-power o f  destiny”? 
Perhaps, have we not already said that knowledge receives beforehand its measure and 
truth from a dimension -  Being: time -  which guards the stupefying phenomenon o f  
being qua being, o f  its taking place? Is it not just the “creative impotence o f  
knowledge” (QA 7), which rises from the consciousness o f  the limit o f thought, the
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symmetric phenomenon to the Greek pre-metaphysical astonishment before the ultra­
power o f destiny?
But: what is the nature of this painful trait of “impotence” (powerlessness)? 
And, likewise, how about the fact that man can feel lost and anxious in his own world? 
Then, is it not just the philosopher who, insofar as he keeps a creative relation with 
beings as a whole, perceives and bears the injunction which rises from powerlessness, 
by bringing it to word? Is this “keeping up with” his hard destiny not the trait in which 
man’s genius is rooted? Heidegger says, during the renowned Debate in Davos with 
Cassirer: “[...] the question concerning the essence of human beings only makes sense 
and is only justifiable insofar as it derives its motivation from philosophy’s central 
problematic itself, which leads man back beyond himself and into the totality of beings 
in order to make manifest to him there, with all his freedom, the nothingness of his 
Dasein. This nothingness is not the occasion for pessimism and melancholy. Instead, it 
is the occasion for understanding that authentic activity takes place only where there is 
opposition and that philosophy has the task of throwing man back, so to speak, into the 
hardness of his fate from the shallow aspect of a man who merely uses the work of the
spirit”.178
How to name the peculiar essence of the action as carried out by the 
philosopher as he thinks? The Greeks named it theorein. Thus Heidegger writes: 
“Science is the questioning standing of one’s ground in the midst of the constantly self- 
concealing totality of what is” (QA 8). (Well, is the trait of “constantly self-concealing” 
not the manner in which destiny manifests itself in its incalculable ultra-power?). It is in 
that sense that the trait of creative powerlessness is the “innermost determining centre 
of all of popular and national Dasein” (QA 7), insofar as the knowledge which derives 
from it, setting the inexhaustible foundation of the essential possibilities of a people, 
starts and supports the shaping of its history, of its destiny-constituent decisions.
Now, we may ask ourselves: what meaning will this initial essence of 
scientific knowledge likely take in our time? Rather: in what sense and to what extent
178 M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der M etaphysik (1929), HGA 3, 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1977 (Engl. Trans. Kant and the Problem o f  Metaphysics, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington 1990, pp. 182-183).
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does it concern us nowadays? What is so great in the Greek beginning, as to make 
Heidegger say that it “has invaded our future. There it stands as the distant command to 
us to catch up with its greatness” (QA 8)? Why -  only thanks to the diriment debate 
with the initial Greek thought -  does the build-up of scientific knowledge have to 
“become the fundamental happening of our spiritual and popular Dasein” (QA 8)?
The hypothesis, which makes listening to Heidegger’s appeal possible, 
presents two equally decisive aspects: on the one hand, the hope for the “great change” 
derived from both Hitler’s rise to power and the genuinely revolutionary spirit of the 
German youth of those years -  “German students are on the march” (QA 9); on the 
other hand, the condition of modern man, “forsaken”, according to Heidegger’ 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s sentence “God is dead”, “in the midst of what is” (QA 8). 
In this latter sense, the dialogue with Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaximander becomes 
the path through which Heidegger succeeds in seeing the root of the spiritual crisis 
which may uproot Western humanity. In our opinion, Heidegger’s greatness lies just in 
this: in his interpreting, thanks to the debate with the Greeks, the deep poverty of our 
time to the point to awake humanity, bringing to word the extreme urgency of 
questioning that dimension -  the realm of Being -  in relation to which the sense of 
man’s Being in the world takes shape. Heidegger’s greatness as a philosopher consists 
in realizing (and in saying) the relation which joins the question of Being and man -  to 
the point that the task of thought would be to bring this same relation to 
accomplishment. Within this horizon, thus, one can perceive the sense of the quotation 
from Plato’s Sophist appearing at the beginning of Sein und Zeit. Having realized the 
relation of Being to man is just the revolution according to which “the initial, awed 
perseverance of the Greeks in the face of what is transforms itself into a completely 
uncovered exposure to the hidden and uncertain; that is, the questionable” (QA 8).
This is why, far from confining ourselves to a mere imitation or 
conservation, the Greek genius becomes the school of a truly new philosophical spirit: 
thanks to this, it is possible to start that necessary revolution of which the University, 
through its building-up work of scientific knowledge -  which is founded on that glance 
that, in the exercise of asking and answering by teachers and students, aims at the
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“essential in all things” (QA 9) - , is the outermost post. This revolution must rejoin the 
people to the print of its history and, through that, set it off for its future path, thus 
letting all the “world-shaping powers of human-historical Dasein” -  such as “nature, 
history, language; people, custom, state; poetry, thought, faith; disease, madness, death; 
law, economy, technology” (QA 9) -  rise and assert themselves. Here are gathered in 
their wholeness -  according to the glance of the Spirit -  all the ontic ambits which 
constitute the different objects investigated by positive sciences, as well as, 
symmetrically, all the faculties and departments that make part of the University, and all 
the professions, manual and intellectual, of which the existence of a community of 
human beings consists.
In this sense, the will that wants the essence of the University is the 
disposition of those spiritual guides who, led by the “primordially attuned, knowing 
resoluteness toward the essence of Being” (QA 9), embody that will of greatness of 
which the spiritual history of a people consists -  meant as the history of the need for 
taking root, in which a people know, and must know, how to resist the acceptance of 
decline and be up to the destiny to which it is called. To say it with Cézanne’s words: “I 
want my frequenting a master [the tradition] to reveal myself [the destiny]: every time I 
get out of Poussin, I know myself better”. Is this, perhaps, the reason why the tradition 
(and not the race) is interpreted as “the power that most deeply preserves the people’s 
earth-and-blood-bound strengths as the power that most deeply arouses and most 
profoundly shakes the people’s Dasein” (QA 9)?
e) Comment on the third stage.
The strife for the essence of knowledge
After having shown what the greatness of the Greek beginning consists of, 
and having acknowledged in what sense a remote injunction (which only can root a 
people in the heart of its historical destiny) reaches our time -  i.e. assuming that the 
acknowledgment179 of the greatness of the Greek spiritual world may start that
179 By “acknowledgment” we do not mean to refer to a mere ascertainment about a 
fact, but rather to that trait of realizing something, recognizing its rank, keeping intimately
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revolution of the University, capable of getting ready and educating, in the discipline180 
of labour, the future leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German people - , we 
can perceive the reason why, according to Heidegger, the build-up of science must 
become the “fundamental happening of our spiritual and popular Dasein” (QA 8). The 
idea of scientific knowledge thus becomes the shaping power which may imprint the 
task that, co-originally -  namely: in their making a “battle community” (QA 12) - , 
concerns teachers, on the one hand, and students, on the other. At this point, it is 
necessary to say that the core of the problem of these sections -  the relationship 
between teachers and students in the sense of the relation between “those who lead” and 
“those who follow”: the battle (Kampf) -  will be the object of a specific analysis 
hereafter, only once the question upstream of the whole Rektoratsrede has been 
perceived, thanks to a reflection on its title, where there is clear mention of Heidegger’s 
intention throughout his rectorate.
Before all that, it is necessary to better clarify how to determine the original 
and full essence of scientific knowledge. Just to let the University be understood as the 
mid point of “the most disciplined preparation for the highest service to the people in its 
state” (QA 12), three are the traits which equiprimordially constitute the knowledge 
which shapes the essence itself of the University:
1) The knowledge about the “community of the people” -  (knowledge) 
meant as carrying “the burden of” and participating “actively in the struggles, strivings, 
and skills of all the estates and members of the people”;
2) The knowledge about “the honour and the destiny of the nation in the 
midst of all the other peoples”;
3) The knowledge about “the spiritual mission of the German people” (QA 10).
connected to it and, each one according to one’s own existential possibilities, corresponding to 
it. This “acknowledging” lets knowledge grow in a more essential and renewed way: it is the 
trait of letting appear something which is able to guide and give direction. Recognizing is a trait 
of that availability to keep sharp towards one’s authentic existential possibilities. This means to 
exist!
180 Also in this case, the word “discipline” has to be meant not as subjection and 
command -  in a military sense! -, but as the high rigour leading the action of one who, moved 
by the sense of responsibility and the spirit of sacrifice, answers with sober force the task he 
himself feels to be called to.
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Let us look at these words -  which are worth deep meditation -  and let us 
make only some remarks. To each of the three sorts of knowledge corresponds a 
specific service by the students -  namely, the labour service, the military (defence) 
service and the knowledge service. Calling “service” the slow and hard apprenticeship 
carried out by the student all along his education path must not lead to think that 
Heidegger meant to turn the University into a barracks, from which the future jailors of 
the concentration camps would come out one day. In other words: Heidegger’s high 
school is based on a spiritual, not ideological, need, almost as if all students had been 
but potential activists of the Nazi Party. We can assume that in this context “to serve” 
should be meant in its active sense -  “to serve something”, that is to say, to be at work 
in favour of something: let us think of the expressions “to serve the cause of the people” 
and “to serve God”. Thus, not “to serve” in the sense of being subject to slavery, but of 
addressing every effort and attention to something, devoting to it, having recognized its 
dignity; in short: to want to learn (not to release the hold), to decide to follow, to let 
oneself be guided by what is great. So that trait of freedom appears, which allows the 
student to follow his teacher, to understand the need for rigour in the research and to be 
compelled to comply with the bonds he has given to himself. Here lies the spirit of 
Simone Weil’s words, according to whom “the first of pedagogical principles is that, to 
educate someone, a boy or an adult, one must first of all raise him to his own eyes”. 
Now: this is just the spirit of that University education in which “At the moment when 
faculties and departmental student bodies set the essential and simple questions of their 
science into motion, teachers and students are already encompassed by the same final 
necessities and pressing concerns of the Dasein of people and state” (QA 12).
In this essential moment one can perceive a peculiar equality between 
teachers and students. On the other hand, how could knowledge “well root” in students 
and how could teachers lead, if it were not that, as Kierkegaard writes: “To be a teacher 
does not mean simply to affirm that such a thing is so, or to deliver a lecture, & etc. No, 
to be a teacher in the right sense is to be a learner. Instruction begins when you, the
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teacher, learn from the learner, put yourself in his place so that you may understand 
what he understands and in the way he understands it”?181
We must add that the order according to which the three constituent 
elements of scientific knowledge have been presented can be re-exposed, so as to clarify 
their mutual articulation: as in the case of the University, “the knowledge of the 
mission” is the “mid point of the most disciplined preparation for the highest service to 
the people in its state”, insofar as it attunes beforehand the other two. In fact, as 
knowledge -  meant as “the most severe endangerment of Dasein in the midst of the 
overwhelming power of what is” (QA 11) -  gathers in a sudden glance the possibility of 
all Dasein powers which give shape to the spiritual world of a people, in the same way 
it determines the relevant professions (and the relevant training), so that in their future 
acting the spiritual destiny of a people may be guarded: “The very questionableness of 
Being forces the people to work and fight and forces it into its state, to which the 
professions belong” (QA 11).
f) Comment on the fourth stage.
The urgency of a decision in favour of the essence of the University
The possibility of a revolution which may found a people on the print of its 
own history (“historical mission”) only lies in the decision which wants the original 
essence of the University, namely the essence of scientific knowledge. This revolution 
is not the result of a political doctrine of a party or of an arbitrary decision of a 
philosophy University professor; its power, rather, comes from the awareness of that 
impending menace on European humanity, “when the spiritual strength of the West fails 
and its joints crack, when this moribund semblance of a culture caves in and drags all 
forces into confusion and lets them suffocate in madness” (QA 13).
Rektoratsrede appears as an appeal addressed to the University world, so 
that it may resist the danger for man to be uprooted in a more and more worrying way: 
all the powers shaping the greatness of the spiritual world of a historical people have
181 In P. Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Études Augustiniennes, 
Paris 1987 (Engl. Trans. Philosophy as a way o f  life, Blackwell, Oxford 1995, p. 154).
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been caught in a mortal vicelike grip of a more and more technical knowledge, which 
transforms them into objects of scientific investigation of “separate specialities”, 
dispersed “in individual fields and corners” (QA 9). In that sense we can say that, 
through the uprooting of such knowledge, the mission of the German University will be 
the one of starting a lucid and incessant struggle in favour of the essential, which 
educates the future leaders and guardians of the destiny of the German people to the 
high school of passion of asking what deserves to be disputed, exposing itself -  as all 
“what is great” -  to the risk of going to rack and ruin. That need for taking roots, which 
constitutes, for each of us, the authentic and though fragile possibility of being a man in 
the frame of the spiritual mission of one’s own people, will be so reawaken in the whole 
people.
g) Comment on Heidegger’s subtitle of his Rektoratsrede
Thanks to the analyses carried out so far, we should now be ready to 
comprehend the sense of the title Heidegger gave to his Rektoratsrede. Our attempt -  
which is based on Fédier and Zaccaria’s decisive interpretations -  aims at freeing 
Heidegger’s Address and, with it, his whole political engagement in 1933, from that 
diffuse feeling of suspicion impending on him as a man and a philosopher. In fact, as 
reported by Hermann Heidegger, the editor of the German edition, “the writing of his 
Address had then [already] raised suspicion about Heidegger”. At this stage, how not to 
mention Karl Löwith’s words, in which he defines the Rectoral Address, “in the light of 
philosophy”, as “a very ambiguous work... and he who listens to it does not know in the 
end whether to consult the pre-Socratics’ sylloge edited by Diels or to march with the 
S.A.”.182
Now, the German title recites: “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen 
Universität’. Its commonly accepted translation sounds as follows: “The self-assertion 
of the German University”. Fédier’s attempt is to put the usual translation into 
parenthesis, waiting for a translation which originates from a phenomenologically more
182 K. Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933, J. B. Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung und C. E. Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart 1986, p. 33.
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accurate glance at what is named in the German word “Selbstbehauptung”. In other 
words, the risk is that the suspect impending on Heidegger is further confirmed by the 
translation of the title of the Rectoral Address, from which the same perverse destroying 
intention, which had ruled Hitler’s dictatorship since its beginning, seems to leak out. 
To stop the current translation, means to restrain that pretence of settling everything, 
which, in this case, turns into reading in Heidegger’s words -  according to an 
inquisitorial comportment - , a hidden intention: an interpretation of this sort, that is to 
say, a one-way interpretation, cannot but look for confirmation of its own suspicion, 
through pointing out an ill-concealed background ambiguity in the text, which 
constitutes a menace for the good of truth and which has to be cancelled.183 Is it not just 
this the destiny of Heidegger’s thought before, during and after the ascent of Nazism? 
Have Heidegger, his life, his thought, not become by now the source of an attack ad 
personam which has assumed the dimensions of the vilest slander? In other words: what 
does it mean to interpret the Rectoral Address as “ambiguous”? And, again: what does 
“ambiguous” mean?
*
A short etymologic analysis of this word may prove helpful. In Latin 
“ambiguous” originally means “which is inclined on both sides”: let us think of Livy’s 
expression “per ambiguum favorem”, which means “favouring now one, now the other 
(of the two peoples)”; let us also think of the mythological figures of the mermaid, 
“virgo ambigua”, and of centaurs, “viri ambiguii” (Ovid). The adjective “ambiguous” 
comes from the verb “ambigere” -  “amb” + “ago”: to agitate (to push) a thing from two 
sides, for example in the sense of “to contend” at the court for a right or a possession 
(questionable or dubious): “ii, qui ambiguunt” (Cicero) means “the opposing parties”. 
And again -  this example perhaps discloses the most profound trait of that “being in 
doubt, undecided” with which we are used to understanding the word “ambiguous”:
183 Ambiguity which, perhaps, “hides” a problem which has to be weighed with 
responsibility. In other words, the mere fact that Rektoratsrede appears to be ambiguous shows 
how little it has been understood in its “revolutionary”, critical spirit (in the broader sense of the 
term).
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“quaenam post Augustum militiae condicio, ambigentes” (Tacitus), that is to say, “those 
who were worried, were uneasy about the fate...”.
What counts here is to perceive in the word “ambiguous” the decisive trait 
of that “indecision” -  not to interpret, according to the common sense, as having a 
doubtful, equivocal, meaning and interpretation: “ambiguous answer” or, even, as 
leaving doubtful on intentions -  i.e. untrustworthy, false: “ambiguous behaviour/smile”. 
The difficulty lies in taking indecision as the trait of a controversy, of a dispute which 
exposes the two counterparts to a debate in favour of the essential -  in other words: 
marked by truth, which has, in its turn, to be gained. The matter is, thus, to determine 
the mid point of the most aimed concentration of both parties. To want at all costs to get 
out of that creative indecision that ambiguity, as correctly meant, is, is only, in respect 
of truth, a mere illusion, a real “daydream”. Does the ambiguity Tacitus’ sentence is 
talking about not reveal a more decisive trait (though much more tiring and hard to 
maintain) towards that “uncertainty” the contemporary man is no longer disposed to 
bear? In fact, is it not emblematic that the question of knowledge about the destiny of 
the State Heidegger talks about in his Rektoratsrede (and on which the “[legitimate] 
defence service” of students is founded) is confused with the military phenomenon of 
the S.A.? And that, in the same way, the question of knowledge about the spiritual 
mission (and the knowledge service) is reduced to having “recourse of the pre- 
Socratics’ sylloge”?
And again: is it not Heidegger himself to think of the essence of scientific 
knowledge as co-originally determined by the knowledge about the people, the State 
and its spiritual mission? Now, the hypothesis is the following: it is just this co-original 
(and problematic) nature to shape the title of the whole Rektoratsrede. It is just in the 
heart of this triple knowledge that the University is fighting at the front line “the 
struggle of the whole people in travail for itself”’ (EP 118). And it is Heidegger himself, 
in the decisive moment in which he presents his project, to address a strong appeal to 
the whole University world so that teachers and students of each Faculty, together, join 
and resist, as one who is exposed to something great, the hardness of the task to which 
they feel compelled to reply. Heidegger writes in an Appeal to the students on 3
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November 1933: “The revolution of National Socialism brings to the complete 
overturning of our existence as Germans. It is up to you, in this event, to keep as those 
who always push forward and keep ready, who are always persevering and continue to 
grow [...]. Let the spirit of sacrifice grow inside you incessantly, in order to find an 
escape to the essence and to raise the most intimate strength of our people in its State” 
(EP 117-118)184.
*
Now, let us look at Fédier’s interpreting translation of the title of 
Rektoratsrede: The German University/firm in itself/towards and notwithstanding all 
(EP 42).
Assuming that Heidegger himself, according to his own words, had become 
rector also to start a debate with National Socialism based on the essential (and that he 
had already realized the risk it represented), the French translation by Fédier -  as well 
as the Italian one by Zaccaria, to which it owes its origin: “The squaring in itself of the 
German University” (SP 60) -  springs out of a profound comprehension of the worrying 
conditions of modern man and of the “new courage” which must animate the spiritual 
resistance (not in favour of this or that party...), thus facing everything can damage or 
reduce, or even destroy the destiny of a people. Heidegger writes: “Only the action 
which takes place in the intimate engagement for the future is justified” (EP 145). And 
again: “The student is compelled to leave himself open to the uncertainty of everything, 
starting from which the need for his engagement is founded” (EP 146).
A second reason for stopping the current translation is that, according to 
Fédier, “to assert oneself is a winning attitude” (EP 40), whereas “the moment of the 
«Selbstbehauptung» is that of the lasting fight and in which one’s existence is not yet 
out of danger” (EP 40). From here the sense of the Italian translation of 
“Selbstbehauptung’ into “the squaring in itself”, in which in the word “squaring” -  
which has already appeared in the previous pages, and the meaning of which is clarified 
only now -  reference is made to “that peculiar return to oneself (and to one’s own
184 Cf. EP 297, note 21.
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constituent powers), which allows to keep the position in a fight or in a conflict in 
which the main scope of one’s existence is involved” (SP 60). Here is depicted the 
(spiritual) figure of “the one who leads”, who, at the head of his people, understands 
that he is guided himself “by the relentlessness of that spiritual mission that forces the 
destiny of the German people into the shape of its history” (QA 5). In fact, Heidegger 
continues: “For what is decisive in leading is not just walking ahead of others but the 
strength to be able to walk alone, not from obstinacy or a craving for power, but 
empowered by the deepest purpose and the broadest obligation” (QA 9).
§ 6. Education as decision in favour o f a strife between 
“those who lead” and “those who follow ”
As already anticipated under the section concerning the comment on the 
third stage, we deem it opportune, at this point, to devote some reflections on the 
educational relation which links teachers to students, relation that Heidegger represents 
through the difference between “those who lead” and “those who follow”. It is now our 
task to try to clarify the nature of the link between “to lead” and “to follow”, in order to 
understand what “education” is, that is to say, what teaching and learning mean. In this 
respect some pedagogical reflections by Simone Weil will prove decisive. They make 
part of some letters she addressed to a student of hers during her teaching period in 
female high schools of five cities in France between October 1931 and January 1938 -  
which was interrupted, as the Italian editor, Maria Concetta Sala, writes, “by two long 
periods of leave: the first, in the school year 1934-1935, was requested by her for study 
reasons and mostly devoted to work at the factory; the second, in 1936-1937, was 
determined by health reasons [...]”.185
Two are the reasons for the choice of these letters: 1) they were written in 
the same historical period as the Rectoral Address; 2) it is our objective to clarify, with 
reference to the work carried out so far -  which foresees a clarification of the essence of
185 S. Weil, Piccola cara... Lettere alle allieve, Marietti, Genova 1998, p. 10.
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labour as it is thought of by Heidegger - , the sense of the relationship between the 
knowledge about the people (“labour service”) and the knowledge about his spiritual 
mission (“knowledge service”).
*
Let us, thus, start this analysis by pointing out, first of all, that “leading” and 
“following” must not be thought of as two poles in contrast with one another, as in the 
“active-passive” dyad, almost as if students were only thought of as an amorphous 
subject matter and the educational moment was solved, to say it with some “teachers’” 
words, by “filling up their empty skulls”. Proof of this fact is that: 1) those who lead 
“are themselves led” (QA 5) by the relentlessness of a spiritual mission; from that we 
understand how the essence of leading is determined, the same as that of “following”, 
by the acknowledgment of an obligation which constitutes the source of every future 
thought and action. It is thus found as devoid of any foundation -  a boutade, according 
to Fédier (H 158) -  Otto Pöggeler’s judgment, according to whom Heidegger’s 
intentions, when he started his engagement, were to den Führer fuhren (“to guide the 
Führer”): is not there, in fact, according to Heidegger, something much greater and 
more decisive for a people than an (assumed) Heideggerian philosophy?186;
2) The German youth, just in those years, appeared to be one of those 
strengths that more intensely wanted that same process of meditation and innovation. In 
particular, the will to actively take part in the management of the University -  “a claim 
that student associations had reiterated since the beginning of Weimar Republic” (EP
186 In this rigorous sense, neither the Party, nor its undisputed (and indisputable) 
“Führer” (the matter, here, is to think that a people’s Führer can take a different role from that 
of a dictator), could have shirked the inexorable nature of this responsibility. As a matter of fact, 
Heidegger became rector because he saw “the rectorate as a possibility to lead all capable forces
-  regardless of party membership and party doctrine -  toward this process of reflection and 
renewal, and to strengthen and secure the influence of these forces” (QA 17). Vittorini writes on 
Il bargello (2 September 1934), in a brief passage entitled Hitler non vuole critica [Hitler wants 
no critics]: “In his last speech [...] Hitler got angry with critics. He said that the world can exist 
without critics, whereas it cannot exist without workers. I agree with him. We would only like 
to know what prevents a worker from working bad or upside down, but critics. For working bad 
or wrong or upside down is worse than not to work: this is also well known to peasants who, for 
example, take care not to sow wheat in autumn, and just for a happy critical instinct. On the 
other hand, what is a leader’s task but a critical one?”.
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290) -  is interpreted as the most resolute sign, from the students, “to stand their ground 
while German destiny is in its most extreme distress” (QA 10). In this sense, Heidegger 
emblematically writes again: “But we do not need to first awaken this following. 
German students are on the march” (QA 9). The students themselves are the ones that 
want the essence of the University and search for “those leaders through whom they 
want to elevate their own purpose so that it becomes a grounded, knowing truth, and to 
place it into the clarity of interpretative and effective word and work” (QA 9-10)187.
It is this mutual tension that attunes the build-up work of scientific 
knowledge for a people, all gathered in the enjoinment of “facing” its destiny, its 
mission. Now, to take a happy image by Zaccaria: if  the “head” that guides the 
revolution of the essence of knowledge is “the questioning, uncovered standing one’s 
ground in the midst of the uncertainty of the totality of what is” (QA 9), what is its 
“heart”? (In fact, as Vittorini says, do we not need “to think with the whole body”?). 
Heidegger writes: “The two wills [the teachers’ and the students’] must confront one 
another, ready for battle. All abilities of will and thought, all strengths of the heart, and 
all capabilities of the body must be unfolded through battle, heightened in battle, and 
preserved as battle” (QA 12).
Now, the matter is to comprehend the meaning of the word “battle” -  
namely, to perceive its decisive trait. First, we must clarify that the fight we are dealing 
with, is carried out in favour of the knowledge which gives shape to a people as a 
whole. Thus, it is not only a mere learned and intellectual quarrel, which takes place in 
the “golden world of Culture” -  of which the University is deemed to be the guardian
187 On the subject, read Simone Weil’s comments as contained in some writings of 
hers of the period 1932-1933: L ’Allemagne en attente, La situation en Allemagne and Sur la 
situation en Allemagne (in Écrits historiques et politiques, Gallimard, Paris 1960). “In 
Germany, nowadays [August-September 1932], the political problem is the one which more 
closely concerns each one. Or better, no problem in connection with the most intimate aspects 
of every man’s life may be formulated but dependent upon the social structure problem. [...] 
The crisis has broken what allows every man to ask himself about the problem of his own 
destiny [...]. Mainly the young, be they belonging to the working class or to the lower middle 
class, for whom the crisis constitutes the normal state of things, the only one they have known, 
can not even imagine a future for each of them individually” (pp. 126-127). Is this not the same 
spirit which may have enlivened the Italian youth in the years when Fascism was born? Let us 
remind ourselves of Vittorini in his 1929 article on L ’Italia letteraria entitled Maestri cercando 
and in his 1932 article on Il bargello entitled Il coraggio d ’imparare [The courage of learning]
-  where, in a provocative tone, he says: “A teacher to me? What is this affront?” (D 37).
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beyond argument - , in which everybody is pushed by the need to be original, to such an 
extent that he arrogates himself the right of having the precious treasures of his own and 
other peoples’ past undergone to his judgment.
Neither teachers nor students as such are of prominent importance. Here, the 
matter is that one must have already let his own egotism aside, once and for all, and be 
available, both teachers and students, to learn from time to time. Only then that strong, 
and still so sober, debate may take place, insofar as it embraces teachers and students, 
joined by the same need, all along the patient and well-disciplined work of questioning 
about the foundation of their science. Heidegger writes: “Questioning is then no longer 
merely a preliminary step that is surmounted on the way to the answer and thus to 
knowing; rather, questioning itself becomes the highest form of knowing. Questioning 
then unfolds its most authentic strength to unlock the essential in all things. Questioning 
then forces our vision to focus, with the utmost simplicity, on the inevitable. Such 
questioning shatters the encapsulation o f the sciences in separate specialities [...], and 
directly exposes science once again to the productivity and blessing o f  all world- 
shaping powers o f human-historical Dasein [...]” (QA 8-9, our italics).
In other words: should the teachers themselves not be disposed to listen to 
the students, i.e., should they end by eliminating the agon in which teachers and 
students debate a problem together -  where could they find the necessary strength and 
resistance to really guide and educate: “ex-duc_re”, that is to say, “to bring up, to raise”: 
to let them be?
Moreover: there is a word which, in our opinion, allows to catch the 
decisive trait of that quivering tension (polemos) which, in the happiest occasions, give 
the fight its spirit: it is “Streit”, strife. In it there is the extreme courage of learning 
which frees competitors, by putting them, one in favour of the other, in the mutual 
invitation to face the engaging (and also worrying) problematic nature of the question, 
thus increasing their strength and firmness towards their decision of wanting the essence 
of scientific knowledge.188 In fact Heidegger writes: “The faculty is a faculty only if it
188 Is friendship not, perhaps, a magnificent example of this will to surpass oneself 
thanks to the other -  let us think about, for instance, the friendship that joined Heidegger and 
Jean Beaufret (see Fédier, Heidegger vu de France, RV 225-244)? Read also Beaufret, Letter to
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becomes capable of spiritual legislation, and, rooted in the essence of its science, able to 
shape the powers of Dasein that pressure it into the one spiritual world of the people. 
The student body of a certain department is a student body only if it places itself in the 
realm of this spiritual legislation from the start and thus tears down departmental 
barriers and overcomes the staleness and falseness of superficial professional training” 
(QA 11-12).
*
Now, let us present two short reflections by Simone Weil (one of which has 
already been cited), which highlight in a striking way that creative trait of the strife 
between teachers and students -  trait in which the noble figure of man in the midst of 
being as a whole is shining: 1) “The first one of pedagogical principles is that, to 
educate someone, be it a child or an adult, you need first of all to raise him to his own 
eyes”; 2) “Education -  have it by object children or adults, individuals or a people, and 
even oneself -  consists in giving rise to motives. The indication of what is profitable, of 
what is compulsory, of what is good, pertains to teaching. Education deals with the 
motives for the real performance. As no action is carried out when there are no motives 
capable of giving the energy required”.189
In the light of these sentences we can say that: the task of education is, first 
of all, to guide man to become himself, to stimulate that first glance which roots man in 
his world, by exposing him to the powers that give shape to his destiny; to teach to see 
the problematic nature of the question of Being as that stupefying and at the same time 
worrying phenomenon which enjoins man, in every thought, in every action of his, to be 
up to his destiny, to that high idea of dignity (decorum) which shapes the possible truth 
of his existence. Now, let Heidegger’s words re-launch the high stake here: “Teaching 
is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in teaching is not the learnable, for the 
student is merely instructed to take for himself what he already has. [...]. True learning 
only occurs where the taking of what one already has is a self-giving and is experienced
Martin Heidegger on his eightieth birthday, on 26 September 1969 (DH 1 9-18; in particular, 
his comments on the nature of the relationship between Descartes and Leibniz and, 
symmetrically, between Husserl and Heidegger).
204
as such. Teaching, therefore, does not mean anything else than to let the others learn, 
i.e., to bring one another to learning. Learning is more difficult than teaching; for only 
he who can truly learn -  and only as long as he can do it -  can truly teach. The genuine 
teacher differs from the pupil only in that he can learn better and that he more genuinely 
wants to learn. In all teaching, the teacher learns the most”.190
Thus, if strife is thought of as that disposition thanks to which the teacher 
and the disciple are the one the occasion for the other to comprehend himself better -  
“as confrontation in which the essence of those who confront one another exposes itself 
to the other and thus shows itself and comes to appearance, and that means in a Greek 
way: into what is unconcealed and true” (QA 21) - , we start perceiving in what sense 
the task of University is to educate, in the amplest sense of the word.
§ 7. Labour as educational power within a real human community
Thus, it is decisive to clarify the motive why the labour service also 
contributes, together with the military and knowledge ones, to instil in a student that 
responsibility towards the destiny of his own people, (destiny) of which he himself will 
be one day the leader and guardian. In other words, the matter is to understand in what 
sense and how labour, in its not being reduced to a production performance in view of a 
salary, is for a man an educational and creative dimension, according to the words 
(enigmatically placed at the entrance gate of Auschwitz) that recite: “Arbeit macht f r e i”
-  “labour sets free”. What can the active participation “in the struggles, strivings, and 
skills of all the estates and members of the people” (QA 10) teach? What does 
Heidegger mean when he says that “in the future the school will not have anymore the 
exclusive role in education” (EP 115) -  to the point that “the work field, the yard, come 
alongside the paternal home, the youth associations, the military (defence) service and 
the school” (EP 116)? What a high idea of education, which -  as in the case of the
189 S. Weil, Piccola c a r a .,  op. cit., p. 16.
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relation between the original essence of knowledge and the different positive sciences -  
recovers from dispersion all educational powers of a people, and pays attention to have 
the youth caring about the spiritual mission of its people!
What spiritual aspect in the essence of manual labour makes the “labour 
service” at the yard -  “a place with peculiar characteristics and wholly autonomous” 
(EP 116) -  as necessary in education as the intellectual labour carried out during the 
“knowledge service”? What is the main trait of that “living bridge” between intellectual 
and manual labour? Is it not this one, the point on which to play for a revolution of the 
spirit of man down to the roots of his own existence?
Let us start by saying that the question of labour takes an essential role in 
Heidegger’s political reflection in the year of his rectorate. The most significant articles 
and allocutions explicitly devoted to this question are: The work service and the 
University (20 June 1933, EP 115-117); The German student as a worker (25 November 
1933, EP 124-135); Allocution to workers (22 January 1934, EP 136-141); The appeal 
to the work service (20 January 1934, EP 141-143). The extent and depth of 
Heidegger’s reflection in this respect are such that singling out a way of access to the 
problematic in the very full articulation of its references -  people, history, State, truth, 
nature, knowledge, art -  becomes difficult. Thus, our aim is to supply, through our 
analysis, a very first indication able to drive our sight to the very heart of the 
phenomenon in question.
The way we are going to follow, in order to analyse the relationship 
between intellectual and manual labour, is: assuming that, as Heidegger says, the yard 
and the school meet in a mutual and constant give and take, the matter is to 
comprehend what the yard gives to school (and thus to the squaring o f  a people in 
itself) -  at the time o f the revolution o f  National Socialism and o f  the Jugendbewegung, 
when Germans become a historical people and the essence itself o f the German student 
and o f  his scientific preparation changes. Decisive to this purpose appears, in our 
opinion, The appeal to the work service. Herein, we are going to present five passages
190 M. Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den 
transzendentalen Grundsätzen, HGA 41, Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1984 (Engl. Trans. What 
is a Thing?, Regnery, Chicago 1968, p. 73).
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from which that joining trait between manual and intellectual labour is emphasized -  
trait which shows how, fo r  every man, the possibility o f  working is the opportunity to 
become, to be, himself.191
Right from the beginning it is clear that the role played by the labour 
service is to raise to every man who makes part o f a people, the dignity o f labour, the 
magnificent contest man starts with the whole world in the very moment when he works. 
This is the reason why the study, as the student’s labour, must “become again a risk, 
and not a shelter for cowards. He who does not resist the fight, is overcome” (EP 146): 
“to things themselves!” In this sense Heidegger’s attempt is to revolutionize both 
knowledge and the very essence of labour, to set it up in the heart of a people that is 
willing to correspond to its spiritual mission, together with the other peoples. Heidegger 
writes: “From now on, everything requires decision and every action responsibility. We 
know for sure this: when the will for the squaring of oneself in one’s own 
responsibilities becomes the law of the coexistence of the peoples, then every people 
can and must be capable of teaching to each one of the others the richness and the 
strength of the great actions and great works of the human being [genius]” (EP 124).
One and fivefold is the main experience as supplied by the work service: 1) 
“of uprightness, of closeness to soil and tools, of the strength of the laws and of the 
hardness peculiar to the simplest physical labour, and therefore of the essential work 
carried out in a group”; 2) “of an existence severely shaped on the rule of everyday 
labour in the community inside the yard”; 3) “thanks to the everyday proof and critical 
pointing out -  of becoming more lucid and more solid in relation to the social condition
191 Péguy writes: “Believe it or not, we have been raised in the bosom of a lively 
people. A yard was, then, a place on earth where men were happy. Nowadays, a yard is a place 
on earth where men complain, hate each other, fight; kill./In my times everybody sang [...]. In 
most working places people sang; today they grumble./Believe it or not, it is the same, we knew 
workers who were willing to work. We knew workers that, when they awoke, only thought of 
their job. [...]. In their job lay their joy, and the deep root of their being. And the reason itself of 
their life. There was an extraordinary honour of the labour, the most beautiful of all honours 
[...]. We knew the same honour of the labour that governed the arms and hearts in the Middle 
Ages. Just the same, kept intact at bottom. We knew the accuracy being pushed up to perfection, 
compact as a whole, compact in its very detail. We knew this worship of a well-done work, 
pursued and improved up to the greatest care. In my childhood I saw craftsmen bottom chairs 
with straw with the same identical spirit, and the same heart, with which a people carved its 
own cathedrals. [...]. In this exemplary honour of the craft, one could find all the noblest and
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one comes from, and to the responsibilities of each one towards the common belonging 
to an only people”; 4) “of the origin of a genuine companionship which only rises from 
being exposed to a great common danger, or from feeling oneself every day more and 
more firmly bound by a task, the extent of which is wholly perceived”; 5) “of the real 
requirements, in the individual, for his sentient setting, while he manages so that the 
final decision in connection with the choice of his job be taken away from the pleased 
vanity of the bourgeois spirit when, in private, makes calculations of expediency with 
respect to his prospects of career adequate to his status” (EP 142).
Here is, thus, the unitary root of manual labour which leads the student, 
thanks to the labour service, to be raised “to his own eyes”, to set in himself in the basic 
experience of being exposed to his own destiny, and to have to face it, in the sense of 
that feeling of wanting to be up to the great chances that a man has to be himself, from 
time to time at work in his contentious relationship with beings as a whole. There, then, 
the constituent powers of his Dasein and of his people’s rise “before his eyes”: only out 
of that does the firm decision in the choice of a profession spring.
*
To this respect, let us present an anecdote from Adalbert Stifter's 
masterpiece, Der Nachsommer (1858)192, which belongs, as Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister 
or Rousseau’s Emile, to the “Bildungsroman” genre. It is worth mentioning, to whom 
who does not know the work, that this episode takes place almost at the beginning of 
the book and dictates its course, better: its core.
After a first preparatory course of studies, the moment has arrived in 
Heinrich’s young life -  Heinrich is one of the three male leading characters in the novel
-  to begin more advanced studies. His decision to become “Wissenschafter im 
a llgem einen” (scientist of beings as a whole) meets his father’s full assent, 
notwithstanding the disapproval of many around him who maintained that “he should 
have assigned to me a role which might be useful to the society, so that I could devote
highest feelings. A dignity. A pride. [...]. They said as a joke, and to make fun of their curates, 
that to work is to pray, and did not know they were saying so well” (op. cit., pp. 789-792).
192 A. Stifter, Der Nachsommer, Winkler Verlag, München 1966.
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my time and my life to it, and one day I could leave being aware that I had done my 
duty” (p. 15).
Let us try to clarify the sense of both “consent” and “disapproval”. If 
Heinrich, on the one hand, says that, when he chose his life vocation-profession 
(Lebensberuf), “he was induced by an inexplicable impulse of his heart” (p. 14), pushed 
by an indefinite call to “do it, as though the future was keeping something deeply valid 
and important for me” (p. 15) - ,  on the other hand his father, when answering the 
criticism addressed him, says: “Man does not exist (dasein) in the first place for 
society’s sake, but for his own sake. And if one exists in the best way for one’s own 
sake, he exists in the best way for society’s sake too. He who was created by God in this 
world as an excellent painter would give humanity a very bad service if, for instance, he 
became a man of law; by becoming a very great painter, then, he can also give the world 
the best service for which God created him. All that is always foretold through an 
intimate impulse, which leads one towards one thing that has to be followed. Otherwise, 
how could one know what one is destined for on the earth, whether to be an artist or a 
leader or a judge, if  there were not a spirit that says that and leads to those things, in 
which one finds one’s good luck and one’s own gratification? God rules over in a way 
as to properly distribute the various endowments, so that every job is carried out, and 
there is no time when all men are master builders. Among these endowments there are 
also social endowments, and in great artists, jurists and State men, also fairness, 
gentleness, justice and love of one’s homeland would also be found. Among these men, 
who have cultivated in the vastest way this intimate trait of theirs, there are very often 
those who, in times of danger, give help and save their country” (pp. 15-16).
And again: “On the other hand, God has not shown us profit as the target of 
our action, neither for us nor for the others; he has given the exercise of virtue its own 
alluring spell (Reiz) and its own beauty, and at that noble souls aim” (p. 17).
Now: would Heinrich’s father not be the butt of ferocious criticism still 
nowadays? Does his assent not appear as a rash, not responsible and reckless behaviour, 
the result of childish imagination at which the conventional man smiles? Is it not a 
reckless act to let his son run such a risk? And, moreover, Heinrich’s proposition is just
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a whim -  proof of that is that neither Heinrich nor (what is even more serious) his 
parents know what he had to start, or what conclusion he had to attain. And, as if it were 
not enough, continues Stifter, “He [my father] said that I had to be let free, that from 
indeterminateness what in which I would be skilled and the role I would play in the 
world would develop” (p. 17).
A heartless father, who leaves his son to only count on himself -  exposed to 
the risk of falling at any moment, for the way is uncertain. He could be overwhelmed by 
adversities -  he could be led into temptation.
*
But, let us try to restrain our respectability and look the risk of such a free 
education in the face, by listening to the words that Simone Weil addressed to a student 
of hers, Albertine Thévenon: “Life sells at a high price the progress we make. Almost 
always at the cost of unbearable pains” (CO 24).193
Let us remind ourselves that these words were written by Simone Weil at 
the epoch of her experience as a worker at a factory. As the yard for the students in 
Heidegger’s projects and the paternal home in Stifter’s, Simone Weil’s (wanted) 
experience at the factory is education in the highest sense of the word: the factory, far 
from reducing to “that gloomy place where you cannot but obey, break under 
compulsion all that is human in us [...], must be a working place in the highest sense of 
the word, a community of men, a place where people collide in a hard, painful, however 
joyful way, with real life” (CO 25).
Is it not, perhaps, an intimate need for taking root which drove Simone Weil 
to escape “a world of abstraction” (that of the University and of a merely conceptual- 
intellectual knowledge) to find herself at last “among real men, good or wicked, but of
193 We try to clear up the nature of the pains Simone Weil is talking about, by 
citing another passage from the same letter. Herein, the trait of every man’s strife for his own 
sake or for his own world’s sake is also present: “Slowly, suffering, I have regained through the 
slavery [of the factory labour] the sense of my dignity as a human being, a sense that this time 
was founded on nothing external, always accompanied by the feeling that I had no right at all, 
and that every moment free from pain and humiliations had to be received as a grace, as the 
mere result of casual favourable circumstances” (CO 27). Is grace not the sign of a new 
dimension, in which man’s genius cannot be any longer confined to be sure in himself, 
“measure of all things”?
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authentic goodness or wickedness” (CO 33)? What a high idea of existence dominates 
Simone Weil’s character, her thought and her actions: thus, can that hateful hierarchy, 
which nowadays sees intellectual labour to surpass manual labour, have a meaning? 
Does the difference between the two, perhaps, consist of a different “cultural level”? 
What could be “added” to manual labour to be considered of equal dignity? Is manual 
labour, perhaps, based on lower, merely technical, knowledge? The matter is to 
understand what allows this “tone of winner”, with which the so-called “men of culture” 
judge almost with contempt or with forbearance the absolute inferior level of every 
manual labour: here lies the urgency for a revolution o f knowledge, which may set new 
tasks both for manual and fo r  intellectual labour. In fact, what does “to know” mean? 
What does being a man mean?
On the basis of these questions, the meaning of what Simone Weil writes in 
another letter of hers to Albertine becomes more comprehensible: “Well, you live to 
such a degree in the present moment -  and I love you for that -  that you, perhaps, 
cannot even imagine what it means to conceive all one’s life before oneself and take the 
firm and constant resolution of making something of it, of steering it from top to 
bottom, with will and work, in a determinate sense. When one is like that -  and I am 
like this, and I know then what it means -  the worst thing in the world that a human 
being could do to you is to inflict pains which break your vitality and, thus, your 
capacity of working” (CO 23).
Is it still possible to think that the possibility of comprehending oneself is 
precluded to a worker or a peasant? Then, in our opinion, the matter is to start to see in 
any job the opportunity every man has to be himself, aimed, while working, towards 
that effort of being up to his task “inside the diriment debate with beings as a whole” 
(EP 132). In this sense, Weil writes in a short reflection placed at the beginning of her 
Journal d ’usine (1934-1935): “That man be not only aware of what he does, but, if 
possible, that he realize its use, that he perceives nature as modified by him” (CO 45).
Is it not just that the linking trait between intellectual and manual labour? In 
fact, if “to know”, in its essential sense, means “to recognize and meet in the world in 
which we are, both all together and each of us individually” (EP 139), teachers and
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students are wholly borne by the “courage of trying through our questions the depths of 
Dasein, thus resisting dizziness” (EP 134)194. Is it not this courage that the paternal 
home (Stifter), the yard (Weil) and the school (Heidegger) have the task, still now, to 
infuse in the heart, in the thought and in the actions of the new German, French, 
Italian... student?
Now, let us conclude this reflection on the essence of labour -  in connection 
with Heidegger’s political-spiritual project -  by calling upon Vittorini once again. The 
Italian poet writes on Il bargello in February 1937: “(...) Manual labour (it was said) is 
similar to nature, is connected to the glebe, shuts itself in the particular. But, why all 
that happens if it were not for the fact that one lets his arms act as brute force? Manual 
labour creates goods in the ambit of intellectual creation, that is to say, in the ambit of 
the intellectually proposed targets. And why do we not let it stick to that creation, and to 
intellectually propose those targets again? (...). Then (...) manual labour would no 
longer be a brute force guided from the outside by intellectual labour (...). It would 
redeem itself, and also would redeem intellectual labour (...) from the meaning o f 
«social condition» in which it has shut itself up (...). And it would free culture (...). It 
would raise it to find  its original meaning, its purity, its capacity o f growing (...). Being 
placed, manual and intellectual labour, on the same cultural starting plan (...) the 
mechanically-caught man would have no value. The artificial weight of his graduation 
would fall down from the balance (...). There would be a possible selection, which 
operates in the same manner for labourers and intellectual workers...195 (...) We have 
never refused to acknowledge the honourableness and importance of manual labour. It
194 In our opinion, we may find a profound affinity between Weil’s experience and 
Heidegger’s project when looking at two sentences of theirs which, in the light of the analyses 
carried out in this last paragraph, we are going to present without any additional comments: in 
them, there should be evidence of genius as the original possibility of D asein  s existence. “That 
for every man his own job is an object o f  contemplation” (CO 45) o  “«to ask» means: to 
expose oneself to the magnificence of things and of their laws” (EP 134). With reference to 
Weil’s interpretation of the question of labour, see in particular: La rationalisation [The 
rationalization] (February 1937), CO 289-316; Condition première d ’un travail non servile 
[First condition of a non-servile labour] (1942), CO 355-372.
195 [Note by Vittorini] We have to say that in its invention, or in the invention of 
every gesture, of every movement, as well as of any change even if only provisional, manual 
labour is a fu lly  and deeply intellectual fa c t. Its inferiority starts with its repetition. At that 
stage, it becomes mechanical. But also intellectual labour repeats itself. It also becomes
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is notorious in England the anecdote of a John Bull who told his manservant: «All jobs 
are honourable...Come along, Bob, scrape by balls» (...). However, manual labour has 
never reached the same importance as the intellectual, or assumed intellectual, labour. 
And the matter is that nothing in the world can be given importance from the outside, 
and not even given it prestige through demagogy and rhetoric. In real terms, to invest 
something with significance, with importance, you cannot but place it in a position to 
gain this significance and this importance from the inside...” (D 81-82, our italics).
mechanical. It is also “inferior”, in substance, in everything it does without any “invention’ 
(our italics).
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CONCLUSION
THE NEW FUTURE OF KNOWLEDGE (THOUGHT AND ART)
ON THE GROUND OF THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
“What matters is not to catch the solution, 
but to perceive the enigma.” (Ernst Jünger)
It is not an easy task at all, to draw conclusions from the path we have 
followed in this writing, as the horizon of sense, which has given rise to our analyses, 
starts appearing to us only now with some difficulty: our dissertation, in fact, having 
abstained from “innovative” interpretative hypotheses and, at the same time, from a 
reconstruction o f the history o f the reception o f  the question o f the sense o f  Being, 
appears to be originated, first of all, from the preoccupation -  and that has been our one 
and only target -  with approaching a problem. In this sense, the results attained cannot 
be enumerated among the contributions that philosophical criticism is used to giving, in 
order to supply a comprehension, as much exhaustive as possible, of the themes faced 
by this or that thinker. Moreover, making a balance of our job appears to be extremely 
problematic, insofar as we realise that we may have contributed to broaden the 
misunderstanding to which any interpretation of an essential thought is exposed.
In other words: our objective has been to fo llow  Heidegger’s traces of 
thought and, in doing so, to let the problem from which it is determined come up and 
clear itself, renouncing at once the claim to make everything clear and explain 
everything. This is the reason why the path we have taken had to make many detours 
and, instead of proceeding, we have been very often compelled to retrace our steps and 
to repeat in a different way what we had sensed. At the same time, many questions we 
have approached on our way, and that would have deserved a further analysis, have 
only been mentioned, just to gain the ontological place from which they originate. The 
dimensions themselves of the Greek world and of poetry, to which we referred in some 
occasions -  and which play a great role inside Heidegger’s meditation, in particular 
after Sein und Zeit -  have been able to start appearing in their whole evidencing and
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indicating power: such perception, which for the time being is only capable o f touching 
on the sense o f their real extent, can be considered as the one and only result of our 
tiring preparatory work, thanks to which we will, perhaps, be allowed, in the years to 
come, to mature in the school of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’, Sophocles’, Pindar’s and 
Hölderlin’s words.
Thus, this conclusion could have been the foreword to the whole writing: 
the outcome of our work, in our opinion, is such to re-launch -  on the basis o f the new 
orientation opened by Heidegger’s reference between thought and art -  the originality 
o f the rediscovery o f the phenomenon o f Being in Sein und Zeit. The circular reference 
between the beginning and the end in our way of proceeding, however, runs the risk of 
reducing to a mere vicious circle -  that is why extreme caution must be exercised. Far 
from being content to reconfirm the validity of its point of view by means of always 
new evidence and proofs, the pathway of thought, which comes back to itself, should be 
capable, every time, of disclosing, of entering inside a wider and freer dimension as the 
glance becomes simpler and sharper. The matter is to expose oneself to the play that 
inter-connects questions and answers in an inexhaustible fugue (in a musical sense): on 
the contrary, any problem caught through a theoretical-conceptual framework already 
departs from a disposition aiming to control, order, settle and classify every “new idea”
-  in short, to balance all accounts through a device which solve any difference. A 
possible quiet life must have its root in this slow and patient apprenticeship o f  the 
poetic vision o f  the Greek Dasein: in fact, something as an indication to the course our 
studies are going to assume starts to take shape, we ourselves on the trail of a problem 
rather than of a blind faith in a philosophy of Heideggerian sort, almost as if  to think 
were the same -  at best! -  as to jealously defend more or less eternal ideals, values or 
world views.
*
Now, we deem it opportune to formulate some remarks on the method 
followed to introduce the question which has guided Heidegger’s thought since its 
inception. And more exactly, the methodological nature of the following considerations
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lies in the clarification of the way of access that has been chosen to show the nature and 
the extent of Sein und Zeit inside Heidegger’s pathway of thought, starting from and in 
view of the question from which also this work originates: the question of the sense for 
Being. Even before starting to read the first forty-four paragraphs of Sein und Zeit in an 
analytical way, in fact, it was necessary to base our reflection on the new essence of 
man as Dasein just in the core of the element from which it takes its own foundation. To 
this purpose -  with a view to clarifying the meaning given by Heidegger to the 
expression “Being” -  we have taken advantage of his analyses on the problem related to 
the locution which recites: “the ontological difference, or the difference between Being 
and being”. In this perspective, such a difference constitutes the phenomenon which 
makes it possible to realise the role carried out by the existential analytic o f  Dasein 
with reference to the relationship between Being and time: to insist on identifying the 
way of access to the question of Being, in fact, becomes a lot more necessary as such a 
question is less acknowledged as the one from which philosophy originated in its 
emergence more than two thousand and five hundred years ago, and which remains, 
according to Heidegger, the most deserving matter to think about also nowadays. The 
non-acknowledgement, by philosophical thought, of the need to go back to its 
fundamental question had, thus, to be explicitly assumed as the theme of analysis, 
insofar as the task has come up in all its urgency of re-gaining a sense for that 
dimension of which any philosophical position feeds and, in general, any man’s 
decision on the enigma of his own Being in the world. The indecision of thought 
towards its constitutive destiny has emerged in all its uprooting character starting from 
the dispute of the exclusiveness with which science, on the basis of the “mathematical 
project of nature” -  being born with the modern era and spreading out worldwide 
nowadays, to such an extent as to have become the “philosophy” itself of our epoch -  
claims to supply the guidelines on human existence on the Earth. In this sense, the 
preparation to the question o f Being had to elucidate the ontological assumptions on 
which the scientific enterprise is founded, by highlighting in the phenomenon o f  the 
forgetfulness o f  the difference between Being and being the origin and limits o f  its 
knowledge.
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Let us keep in mind that by the expression “mathematical project of nature” 
we do not merely refer to the dominion of those peculiar sciences such as mathematics 
and modern physics, since they “limit” themselves to exactly match the principle of 
truth as certainty: that does not hamper -  on the contrary, it postulates -  that any 
knowledge, once it is meant as world view, reduces itself to ideology and system, 
whatever the reference ontic ambit may be. This could be the reason for so many 
interpretations which assume, from time to time, a political, rather than philosophical, 
scientific, religious etc. “point of view” on this or that phenomenon: each of them, in 
fact, is mathematical in the broader sense o f  the word, as it has already given the 
phenomenon in question just enough time and space to implement the information 
already available, so as to have a concept as exact (true!) as possible. The historic- 
political phenomenon of Totalitarianism would represent the extreme case of that 
perversion of glance which dominates any world view, and which is founded on the 
preparation of new devices which appear as more useful as more effective in realizing 
the wanted form at and in cancelling any critics. The “political” trait o f  the existing 
relationship between thought and truth -  which can soon become a “pact o f  steel” 
between ideology and dogma -  does not reduce itself to an assumed abuse o f power by 
this or that party, having rather its hub in the decision man assumes towards the sense 
o f Being in the world: this means that the dictatorship of any view finds even more 
subtle modalities to present itself as undisputable truth reaching, under the illusion of 
mutual welfare, the most worrying deprivation of freedom!
*
Now, being mindful of the fact that the expression “ontological difference” 
does not appear inside Sein und Zeit, we realise the risk that the assumed interpretation, 
on which our writing is based, may be considered arbitrary and without any foundation, 
insofar as the temporal jump we have made would presume the rejection of the method 
that guides any historical research -  the genealogical one - , which appears to be the 
only one that is able to guarantee the supply of proofs on which any reasoning aiming to 
prove a thesis by deduction is based. To subvert the linear order of time is the most
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evident sign of lack of scientificity -  i.e. of logicality, and, thus, of coherence and, in a 
wider sense, of truth -: indeed, what could be proved once that, having recourse to a 
fact which, paradoxically, follows what we want to clarify, we neglect the only criterion 
which assures knowledge, namely the reference of a cause to its effect?
On the other hand, on the basis of the information we have supplied above, 
we can get free quite easily from the fast rhythm and from the lethal vicelike grip of 
these questions, after remembering how Heidegger’s thought, just thanks to the 
rediscovery of the phenomenon of the ontological difference, traces the dominion of 
scientific method back to its limits: in fact, if we had to accept the hypothesis that what 
can be proved does not exhaust the trait which allows to decide whether knowledge is 
true or not, we could start to suspect that the element upstream of Heidegger’s 
meditation is far wider than any ontic district inquired by positive sciences individually, 
and that time and history experiences, on which any genealogic interpretation is 
founded, are nothing but reductions -  however powerful and effective -  of far richer 
phenomena, in relationship to which the philosopher’s thought itself cannot be anymore 
meant as a whole of doctrines or theories to be measured in terms of logical coherence, 
as though it were a chemical equation to balance.
In this sense it seems permitted to assume that, as reminded by Frédéric de 
Towarnicki, “Heidegger’s thought had already -  in 1927 -  gone further in its movement 
on his first book”196: this means that the question which originates an essential thought 
in a man anticipates, so to say, and discloses the way to a path inside which every single 
work is but a stage which, just from its beginning, appears to be projected beyond itself 
in the mutual persistence on that common destiny to which, from time to time, it is 
called to cor-respond. And from here, the possibility that a thought becomes ripe having 
crossed all turnings necessary to its flourishing, however sometimes very painful.
It is also quite important to remark as the so-called “turning” (Kehre) inside 
Heidegger’s thought -  the outcome of which is represented by a new guiding-word, by 
which the path is signed: “the difference between Being and being” -  takes place in the 
years immediately following the failure of his rectorate and was marked by the
196 F. de Towarnicki, Martin Heidegger. Souvenirs et chroniques, op. cit., p. 34.
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rediscovery of Hölderlin’s poems. What is worth pointing out in this case is how such a 
turning takes place thanks to the dialogue that thought, starting from Heidegger, 
established with poetry and, more amply, with art: assuming, in fact, that the first 
university course on Hölderlin (winter semester 1934/35), “far from being an escape 
from the «hard reality», a recourse to an «ideal world» (which would be the world of 
poetry -  as though poetry was not reality itself in its incandescence), is to be meant, 
instead, as the radicalised continuation of his rectorate attempt, or, perhaps, even better: 
as the metamorphosis that Heidegger’s thought was made to suffer because of the 
rectorate failure”197, the poet, as the thinker -  however not in the same way - , shows 
himself as a man who is exposed to the “ultra-power of Being”198. Once the 
interpretation of man’s essence in terms of subjectivity and consciousness is 
reformulated in the light of the rediscovery of the sense for the difference between 
Being and being, the poet’s word cannot be anymore meant as the communication of 
psychic experiences man “lives” inside himself (Erlebnis). Heidegger’s mistake in 
joining National Socialism becomes, thus, the opportunity thanks to which the 
transformation of thought in modern man can be prepared even more accurately: the 
word of thought and poetry show the dimension -  the shining of Being in being -  in 
which lies the possibility for man to dwell in the world. Here, the trait opens which 
joins the Greek determination of Being as alèthéia to the renewed sense for Being that 
shines in the guiding-word according to which man’s existence appears to be as 
transfigured, i.e. re-driven inside its original element: Dasein -  i.e. to be compelled to 
be that Open in which beings take place. Only a glance which may be capable of 
perceiving the vastness and immediacy of Being, whose trace, we think, we are starting 
to scent, can realise the peculiar destiny of the human being and the nobleness of its 
Being in serene agreement with the harmony intimately linking all things: now words, 
to say it as Hölderlin (Brot und Wein), are just as flowers!
197 F. Fédier -  J. Hervier, Note préliminaire des traducteurs, in Les hymnes de 
Hölderlin: La Germanie et Le Rhin, traduction française du tome 39 de l’édition intégrale de 
Martin Heidegger (Gesamtausgabe), Gallimard, Paris 1988, p. 8.
F. de Towarnicki, Martin Heidegger. Souvenirs et chroniques, op. cit., p. 36.
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